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From the formation of the German nation in 1871 until the eve of World War I, 
Germany’s emergence on the world stage as a global power was never a simple 
endeavor nor one where there was a clear path forward for policymakers in Berlin or 
diplomats serving abroad. While scholars have focused on the direct actions in creating a 
formal German empire, a clear mark of a global power, they have not fully engaged in 
examining the impact of indirect forms of imperialism and empire building.  This 
dissertation is a global study of German interactions in South America, and how it relied 
on its diplomats there to assist in the construction of an informal empire, thus 
demonstrating Germany’s global presence. This coterie of diplomats and foreign policy 
officials in Berlin pointed to South America as a region of untapped potential for 
Germany to establish its global footprint and become a world power.  This work draws 
upon primary sources, both unpublished and published, examining the records of 
diplomats, businessmen, and colonial and religious groups to show the vast networks 
and intersections that influenced German policy in South America as it sought to 
increase its global presence and construct an informal empire. 
The Foreign Office relied on a cohort of trusted development specialists to put its 
vision into practice.  This select group of atypical diplomats (non-nobles, with extensive 
knowledge in many fields), had considerable backing and wielded significant influence 
on German policy in South America. The ways in which German diplomas intersected 




South America. They used these connections to demonstrate Germany’s power, increase 
its prestige in South America, and strengthen Berlin’s global presence and claims of 
being a Weltmacht. Such efforts were part of early attempts at globalization, as the 
German Foreign Office, guided by its diplomats abroad, sought to create a more 
integrated global community, and demonstrate Germany as a global power. While 
Germany’s policy was diverse, at its heart was a concept of creating an “empire by 
infrastructure” as a means of projecting power. Viewing South America as a place to 
build infrastructure, Germany engaged in a variety of projects there. The resulting 
picture of German diplomatic efforts in South America yields a study in policy and 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION – GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY IN SOUTH AMERICA 
 
In 1902, Franz von Reichenau, a young German diplomat, found himself on the 
edges of the Foreign Office.  With his prospects of promotion in the foreign service 
growing dim, he believed that “I must finally give up the hope of playing the diplomat 
further.”1 All that changed, however, when the young Reichenau had the opportunity to 
dine with the Kaiser at the Neu Palais in Potsdam. While there, Wilhelm II greeted him 
and inquired, “if I [Reichenau] was ready to pack again,” to which the eager diplomat 
replied yes.2 A few weeks later, Reichenau found himself preparing to make a long 
journey to Santiago as the German ambassador to Chile. Although this was not a 
preferred position, he accepted it knowing that he could, ““enter back to active duty 
through this appointment,” and move up in the Foreign Office.3 Indeed, after serving in 
Chile for several years, Reichenau, a more seasoned diplomat, found himself returning to 
Europe in 1908 becoming the German ambassador to Serbia. 
The story of Reichenau was common for eager, but inexperienced, men, who 
desired to serve the German Empire (Kaiserreich) as career diplomats. That he was 
willing to serve so far away from his homeland, not to mention the fact that the Kaiser 
himself desired it, underscores the importance that South America represented in 
                                                                
1 Franz von Reichenau, Nachlass, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Berlin (hereinafter cited as 
PA-AA), p. 183. 
2 Ibid., p. 187. 
3 Ibid., p. 191. 
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establishing, and solidifying, Germany’s global presence in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries.  
From the formation of the German nation in 1871 until the eve of World War I, 
Germany’s emergence on the world stage as a global power was never a simple 
endeavor nor one where there was a clear path forward for policymakers in Berlin or 
diplomats serving abroad. As Germany struggled to build a formal empire, mainly since 
there was little territory left that it could acquire, it relied on its diplomats abroad to 
assist in demonstrating Germany’s global presence - the construction of an informal 
empire. This coterie of diplomats and foreign policy officials in Berlin pointed to South 
America as a region of untapped potential for Germany to establish its global footprint 
and become a world power in a world that already had established ones in Great Britain 
and France. 
This study examines the early stages of Germany’s role in nineteenth century 
globalization and its ideas of international development in South America.  I study the 
members of the Imperial German diplomatic corps in South America, examining their 
substantial influence in this important, yet overlooked, zone of diplomatic activity and 
their ideas regarding German imperialism as they sought to fashion Germany into a 
global power.  In places such as Brazil, Peru, Bolivia, and Chile, career diplomats 
exerted great effort in developing German policy there.  Although these men were on the 
periphery of German foreign policy, the Foreign Office chose a select group of atypical 
diplomats (i.e. non-nobles, men with extensive knowledge in many fields, particularly 
legal, and promoted based upon merit and not connections), placing considerable trust in 
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them in allowing them to wield significant influence in determining policies that affected 
German interactions in South America.  The activity that these diplomats undertook was 
the result of a push and pull of domestic and international interests, mediated by groups 
of expatriate commercial and religious interests on the ground as well as an equally 
interested cohort of diplomatic specialists. 
 Rather than focus on how prestige and power affected formal relations between 
Germany and South America, I focus upon more informal interactions, namely 
infrastructure development - the undertaking of colonial projects - in order to extend 
German presence in the area.  During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
the definition and use of “development” was complicated, as it had various meanings to 
different groups and people in and around the Germany government who were interested 
in the nation’s position as a world power.  Two words were commonly used in the late 
nineteenth century to describe development – Entwicklung and Erschließung. When 
defining development, the latter, Erschließung more specifically refers to “site 
development” or “exploitation”; Entwicklung, on the other hand, refers to development 
through “growth,” “progression” and “movement and changes in behavior.”4  
Broadly speaking, when discussing development as a state policy, the term that 
the leadership in German Foreign Office, including the chancellor, employed was 
Erschließung.  To them, the idea was to use whatever means necessary to allow 
Germany to expand its imperial footprint and open up South America for German goods, 
                                                                
4 Konrard Duden, ed., Vollständiges orthographisches Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache, (Leipzig: 
Verlag des Bibliographischen Instituts, 1880). 
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and exploitation.  For the diplomats overseas, who saw it as their duty to expand their 
nation’s presence abroad, their definition was more closely related to the word 
Entwicklung.  These diplomats viewed Germany’s mission as something more than just 
providing new technology to modernize countries in South America.  In using this term, 
these men saw such a policy as one in which progress was achieved through 
development and improvements, which, over time, would allow growth for both 
Germany and the nations in Latin America. Certainly, these two terms overlapped and 
were used interchangeably. In many cases, it is hard to create a clear dividing line as to 
what the Foreign Office, its diplomats, and German settlers, businessmen, and 
nationalistic groups meant when they discussed development and development policy. 
For the purposes of this dissertation, however, when I discuss “development,” unless 
otherwise noted, I will be using the meaning encapsulated by Entwicklung. 
 Although their definitions of development were different, the result for the 
Foreign Office and its diplomats was the same.  The goal of the projects they undertook 
was to facilitate the production of goods and services to develop an area and thus 
demonstrate Germany’s place as a global power.  Viewing South America as a place to 
build infrastructure, Germany engaged in a variety of development projects: creating 
local and international trade networks; establishing banks to finance local construction 
and foreign investments; constructing railroads, canals, and roads; building schools, 
hospitals, churches, and water supplies for new communities; and fostering agriculture.  
Through these projects, the Foreign Office attempted to demonstrate to the states in 
South America the benefits Berlin could offer: the structures of a modern state.   
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 The men of the German diplomatic corps assumed an important role in fostering 
Germany’s ambitions in South America by creating informal, but influential, networks 
concerning these projects.  They communicated regularly with members of the business 
community, the German government, South American leaders, proponents of 
Deutschtum (communities of Germans living abroad who emphasized their ethnic and 
cultural connections to Germany) in South America and Germany, and, most 
importantly, with one another about each group’s interests and their effect on German 
foreign policy, and imperialistic designs, in South America. 
As recent scholarship has shown, “writing the history of German colonialism has 
never been simple,” but the “past two decades have seen enormous changes in how the 
history of empire and colonialism has come to be viewed, markedly revising earlier 
views of Europe’s relationship to non-European worlds.”5 Prior to these conceptual 
changes, scholars who studied German colonialism and imperialism consistently 
downplayed its value by placing it in a secondary role in larger, and broader, accounts of 
German history. They treated the topic as nothing more than an offshoot of larger 
impulses of territorial expansion which were prevalent throughout Europe.6  
                                                                
5 Bradley Naranch and Geoff Eley, eds., German Colonialism in a Global Age (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2014), pp. xi and 1. 
6 Lora Wildenthal, “Notes on a History of ‘Imperial Turns’ in Modern Germany,” in After the Imperial 
Turn: Thinking with and through the Nation, ed. Antoinette Burton (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2003), pp. 144-156; and Sebastian Conrad, “Doppelte Marginalisierung: Plädoyer für eine Transnationale 
Perspektive auf die Deutsche Geschichte,” Geschichte und Gesellschaft vol. 28 (2002): pp. 145-169. 
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Beginning in 1960 with Fritz Fischer’s Griff nach der Weltmacht, German 
historians began to explore German expansionism in the Imperial period.7 Fischer 
himself asserts that Germany foreign policy can only be understood in the context of 
its particular domestic situation and argues that Germany was a recklessly 
expansionist state, which Kaiser Wilhelm II deliberately marched towards war.8 
Although Fischer does not specifically explore German policy in South America, his 
discussion of the general aims of German foreign policy affected how other scholars 
viewed Germany's global actions.9  In the 1960s and 1970s a debate, which was based 
upon his arguments, emerged concerning how to explain Germany’s foreign policy.  
The first school of thought examined the influence of domestic politics on the creation 
of foreign policy (Primat der Innenpolitik), while the second placed an emphasis on 
foreign policy makers (Primat der Aussenpolitik).  The idea of Innenpolitik gained 
considerable support, especially beginning in the 1980s with Hans-Ulrich Wehler’s 
The German Empire.  As a result, post-Fischer and post-Wehler scholarship on 
German imperialism has continued investigating the peculiarities of Wilhelmine 
Germany’s domestic situation to explain the appeal of expansionism.  Scholars such as 
A. S. Kanya-Forstner, Joseph Schumpeter, D. K. Fieldhouse, Friedrich Katz, and 
                                                                
7 Fritz Fischer, Griff nach der Weltmacht:  Die Kriegspolitik des kaiserlichen Deutschlands, 1914-1918 
(Düsseldorf:  Droste, 1961). 
8 Fischer's work initiated a debate that lasted throughout the 1960s that reoriented Germany's foreign 
policy.  He is the first to argue that Germany first began to push for an aggressive foreign policy as 
early as 1890 that would put it on par with Britain, the United States and Russia.  Fischer saw this early 
push for an aggressive policy as the foundation of Germany foreign policy up to World War II, seeing 
continuities between German foreign policy in World War I and II. 
9 For a succinct summary of the debate, see Isabel Hull, The Entourage of Kaiser Wilhlem II 1888-1918 
(New York: Cambridge University Press), pp. 1-8; and Robert Moeller, "Kaiserreich Recast?" Journal 
of Social History vol. 17 (Summer 1984):  pp. 655-83. 
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Jürgen Hell have all argued that factors such as social structures and reliance on the 
military and political developments all influenced German policy abroad.10  While 
these works are important in framing the different factors that influenced imperialism, 
there is a clear absence of literature that explores how Germany constructed its power 
in Latin America. 
It the mid-1990s, however, the status quo began to change, and a new narrative 
of German imperialism began to take shape.11 Breaking away from the Sonderweg 
theory, historians found new models and methods of interpreting German history 
through the theories and critiques of postcolonial studies.12 Others looked towards the 
work of British, American, French, Dutch, and Spanish historians who were revving the 
                                                                
10 Joseph Schumpeter, Imperialism and Social Classes (Cleveland:  World Publishing Company, 1965).  
A. S. Kanya-Forstner, The Conquest of the Western Sudan:  A Study of French Military Imperialism 
(Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1969).  Although Kanya-Forstner’s work focuses on French 
imperialism in Western Sudan, his ideas are a useful lens in viewing imperialism in other areas in Europe.  
D. K. Fieldhouse, “‘Imperialism’: An Historiographical Revision,” Economic History Review, 14 
(December 1961), pp. 187-209.  Friedrich Katz, Deutschland, Diaz und die mexikanische Revolution (East 
Berlin:  Deutscher Verlag und Wissenschaft, 1964); “Hamburger Schiffsfahrt nach Mexiko, 1870-1914,” 
Hanseatische Geschichtsblätter, special ed., 83 (1965):  pp. 139-5; and The Secret War in Mexico:  
Europe, the United States and the Mexican Revolution (Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 1981); 
Jürgen Hell, “Das Griff nach Südbrasilien:  Die Politik des Deutsches Reich zur Verwandlung der drei 
brasilianischen Südstaaten in ein überseeisches Neudeutschland (1890 bis 1914)” (Ph.D Dissertation, 
Universitat Rostock, 1964; and “Das ‘südbrasilianische Neudeutschland’:  Der annexionistische Grundzug 
der wilhelminischen und nazistischen Brasilienpolitik (1895 bis 1938),” in Der deutsche Faschismus in 
Lateinamerika, 1933-1943 (East Berlin:  Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, 1966; Ragnhild Fiegbig-von 
Hase, and Ursula Lehmkuhl, eds., Enemy Images in American Hi1story (Providence:  Berg, 1997); 
Gerhard Brunn, Deutschland und Brasilien (1889-1914) (Cologne:  Böhlau, 1971). 
11 Birthe Kundrus, “Blind Spots: Empires, Colonies, and Ethnic Identities in Modern German History,” in 
Gendering Modern German History: Rewriting Historiography, eds. Karen Hagemann and Jean Quataert 
(New York: Berghahn, 2007), pp. 84-106; and Sara Friedrichsmeyer, Sara Lennox and Susanne Zantop, 
eds., Imperialist Imagination: German Colonialism and Its Legacy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 1997). 
12 David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, “Forum: Interview with David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley,” German 
History vol. 22 (2004): pp. 229-245; and The Peculiarities of German History: Bourgeois Society and 
Politics in Nineteenth Century Germany (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984). For more concerning 
the idea of multiple modernities, see, for example, Dennis Sweeny, “Reconsidering the Modern Paradigm: 




study of colonial empire in their regional expertise. Slowly, but surely, German 
historians began to acknowledge Germany’s colonial legacy as holding a central place in 
its past. 13 
Concurrently, a number of scholars began to examine Germany’s interest in 
colonialism and saw its long history in these areas as playing a critical role in explaining 
racism, xenophobia, and violence.14 These studies became a touchstone for Holocaust 
scholars and historians of the Third Reich. They gave rise to a new wave of interest in 
German colonialism with scholars looking for links to Nazism through colonial policies 
– the destruction of the Hereo and Nama tribes in Southwest Africa being of primary 
interest. They focused on German settlers, scientists, and soldiers, and the future roles 
they played in supporting the racial policies of Nazi leadership as applied to mixed 
populations at home and in the European East.15 With the rise in interest gender studies, 
                                                                
13 See, for example, Matthew Jeffries, Contesting the German Empire, 1871-1914 (Malden, MA: 
Blackwell, 2008), pp. 172-178 for current account of the impact of the new colonial history. For other 
accounts which examine integrating German colonialism and imperialism into the larger framework of 
German history, see Edward Ross Dickinson, “The German Empire: An Empire?” History Workshop 
Journal vol. 66 (2008): pp. 129-162; Uta Polger, “Imperialism and Empire in Twentieth-Century 
Germany,” History and Memory vol. 17.1-2 (2005): pp. 117-143; and Nancy Reagin, “Recent Work on 
German National Identity: Regional?  Imperial?  Gendered?  Imaginary?” Central European History vol. 
37 (2004): pp. 273-289. Woodruff D. Smith, Ideological Origins of Nazi Imperialism (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1986) remains one of the foundational texts in the debate about colonialism and empire 
in Modern German history. 
14 Susanne Zantop, Colonial Fantasies: Conquest, Family, and Nation in Precolonial Germany, 1780-
1880 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997); and “Colonial Legends, Postcolonial Legacies,” in A User’s 
Guide to German Cultural Studies eds. Scott Denham, Irene Kacandes, and Jonathan Petropoulos (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997), pp. 189-205; and Nina Berman, Impossible Missions? 
German Economic, Military, and Humanitarian Efforts in Africa (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 
2004). 
15 Isabel Hull, Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005); Horst Drechsler, “Let us Die Fighting”: The Struggle of the 
Hereo and Nama Against German Imperialism, 1884-1915 (London: Zed, 1980); David Olusoga and 
Casper Erichsen, The Kaiser’s Holocaust: Germany’s Forgotten Genocide and the Colonial Roots of 
Nazism (New York: Faber, 2010). 
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scholars, such as Lora Wildenthal and Birthe Kundrus, looked at the roles that women 
and gender played in areas of German colonialism, especially as settlers in communities 
abroad and in the domestic colonial movement.16 
The examination of Wilhelmine policy towards Latin America, however, has 
long been understudied.  German historians, for the most part, have considered the 
interactions between Germany and Latin America as only a small part in the vast and 
complex screen of pre-World War I diplomacy.  Indeed, if historians have desired to 
examine the expansionist desires of Germany, the focus is mainly on German colonies 
in Africa or, to a much lesser extent, the Pacific. Until recently, those works which 
have focused on Germany and Latin America have been influenced by the debate 
between domestic and foreign factors influencing Germany foreign policy. 
One of the first attempt to describe German aims and actions in Latin 
America is Alfred Vagts' Deutschland und die Vereinigten Staaten in der 
Weltpolitik.17 In this two-volume study, Vagts looks at the relationship between 
                                                                
16 Lora Wildenthal, German Women for Empire, 1884-1945 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
2001); “Race, Gender, and Citizenship in the German Colonial Empire,” in Tensions of Empire: Colonial 
Cultures in a Bourgeois World, eds. Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler (Berkley: University of 
California Press, 1997), pp. 263-283; “She is the Victor: Bourgeois Women, National Identities, and the 
Ideal of the Independent Woman Farmer in German Southwest Africa,” in Society, Culture, and the State 
of Germany, 1879-1930, ed., Geoff Eley (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), pp. 371-395; 
and “ ‘When Men are Weak’: The Imperial Feminism of Freida von Bülow,” Gender and History vol. 10.1 
(1998): pp. 53-77; Birthe Kundus, Moderne Imperialisten: Das Kaiserreich im Spiegel seiner Kolonien 
(Colonge: Böhlau, 2003). 
17 Alfred Vagts, Deutschland und die Vereinigten Staaten in der Weltpolitik (New York:  Macmillan, 
1935).  Vagts work is of prime importance as it part of the beginning of the debate of the factors that 
influence the formation of foreign policy, namely those of domestic versus outside factors, especially 
in the case of Germany.  Although the debate did not really gain traction until the 1960s, the 
undercurrents are felt in Vagts' work as he argues that, while there were many kinds of influences, 
such as economic, cultural or political, that affected German- American relations from 1889 to 1906, it 
was economic factors and conflicts which most strongly drove German-American interaction.  
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Germany and the United States from 1890 to 1906, and expresses the idea that 
domestic factors, notably economic concerns and conflicts most strongly drove the 
interaction between these two states.  Nonetheless, he focuses only upon the roles 
of the elites in Germany, and not those men who served in Latin America . 
Moreover, his discussion of German policy towards Latin America is framed mainly 
on how it affected relations with the United States, and he does not focus directly on 
the factors that directly influence German interest in Latin America.  
Following the publication of Vagts' work in the 1930s, little else was said 
about Wilhelmine imperialism in Latin America until the 1970s and 1980s.  At this 
time, several scholars turned their attention to Latin America, pioneered  by an East 
German group that included Friedrich Katz and Jurgen Hell.18 They argued that 
Germany had designs on increasing its influence in Latin America, and that there 
were several "peaceful" avenues for German expansion: a concentrated trade 
offensive in all lands; financial investment in neighboring nations designed to 
provide a source of raw materials; and political as well as economic offensives in 
                                                                
Unfortunately, Vagts' chapters on South America, although lengthy, are only several out of many and 
so any insight. in the German aims in South America, are buried, offering a cursory view of the 
situation. 
18 Jürgen Hell, "Das Griff nach Südbrasilien :  Die Politik des Deutsches Reich zur Verwandlung der 
drei brasilianischen Südstaaten in ein überseeisches Neudeutschland  (1890 bis 1914)" (Ph.D. 
Dissertation, Universität Rostock,  1964; and "Das 'südbrasilianische Neudeutschland': Der 
annexionistische Grundzug der wilhelminischen und nazistischen Brasilienpolitik (1895 bis 1938)," in 
Der deutsche Faschismus in Lateinamerika, 1933-1943 (East Berlin: Humboldt-Universität  zu Berlin, 
1966); Ragnhild Fiegbig-von Hase, and Ursula Lehmkuhl, eds., Enemy Images in American History 
(Providence:   Berg, 1997); Thomas Baecker, Die deutsche Mexikopolitik , 1913-14 (West Berlin: 
Colloquium,  1971) and "Mahan über Deutschland," Marine-Rundschau  73 (Jan.-Feb, 1976):  pp.  10-
19, 86-102; Gerhard Brunn, Deutschland und Brasilein (1889-1914) (Cologne:  Bohlau, 1971); and 
Thomas Schoonover, Germany in Central America:  Competitive Imperialism, 1812-1929 (Tuscaloosa:  
The University of Alabama Press, 1998). 
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independent states such as China, Turkey, the Balkans, and South America.19 This 
research was well received, but had shortcomings that were unavoidable given their 
ideological perspective.20  
Nancy Mitchell and Holger Herwig have written perhaps the most complete 
examinations of Germany's interactions in Latin America.21 Although Mitchell 
focuses more on the United States' policies and reactions towards Germany, her 
examination provides the start to an understanding of the international dynamics of 
the region, offering an explanation as to what Germany did in Latin America, 
namely to fulfill its dream of constructing an empire there.  Herwig also provides 
an in-depth examination of Germany's policy towards Latin America, specifically 
in relation to Venezuela.  He emphasized the need to understand the sometimes-
irrational forces of national and imperial pride that drove the actions of technocratic 
foreign policy professionals.  For the people who lived in Germany and those who 
saw themselves as Germans, to stand still and not develop foreign markets meant 
decline and economic stagnation.  Perhaps most importantly, the failure to plant the 
German flag abroad meant a loss of national prestige.  As a result, pressure was put 
on the government to extend the Reich's power and prestige beyond the confines of 
the European continent. Herwig' s work raises important questions about existing 
                                                                
19 Katz, Deutschland, Diaz und die mexikanische Revolution, p. 88. 
20 For the GDR, the nineteenth century was seen as a scholarly dead-zone. In most cases, any discussions of 
imperialism, particularly concerning Germany, was seen as a late stage of capitalism and would ultimately 
lead to the collapse of the state. 
21 Holger Herwig, Germany's Vision of Empire in Venezuela, 1871-1914 (Princeton:  Princeton 
University Press, 1986); Nancy Mitchell, The Danger of Dreams: German Imperialism in Latin America 
(Chapel Hill:  University of North Carolina Press, 1999). 
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work done under the theme of "imperialism" as well as about the image of the 
Germans living in Venezuela during the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.  Although his study only focuses upon Venezuela and does not examine 
other states in Latin America, he has provided a methodological framework for 
examining the ways in which Germany interacted with other Latin American 
states. 
While focusing on specific geographical and/or temporal boundaries, such as 
Latin America pre-WWI, certainly has its merits, a framework like this by itself has its 
limits and has been proven to be too limited. Within this context, German scholars have 
also found it problematic to focus exclusively on official colonial policy debates and 
administrative reforms. It has become impractical to speak about German colonialism as 
a uniform experience as there were widely varying relationships between Germany and 
the colonies, which were influenced by differences of class, confession, and political 
affiliation.22 At the same time, however, approaching German colonialism in ways 
which define it primarily as a flexible discourse that is underwritten by fantasies of 
expansion and conquest, resettlement and economic domination are also problematic. 
Such methods are just as imprecise in their analysis. While they can create productive 
discussions, they cannot, as Bradley Naranch suggests, “substitute for an integrated 
colonial history fully attuned to the dissonances and disruptions that distinguish one 
                                                                
22 Frank Oliver Sobich, “Schwarze Bestien, Rote Gefahr:”: Rassismus und Antisozialismus im deutschen 
Kaiserreich (Cologne: Campus, 2006); and Hans-Christoph Schröder, Sozialismus und Imperialismus: Die 
Auseinandersetzung der deutschen Sozialdemokratie mit dem Imperialismusproblem und der ‘Weltpolitik’ 
vor 1914 (Hannover: Verlag für Literatur und Zeitgeschehen, 1968). 
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form of German expansion from those that came before, that were coterminous, or that 
happened much later and in another context.”23 
Recently, scholars have begun to formulate a more nuance definition of 
colonialism. They have described it, with its multiple forms and functions, as a 
continuous and central concern during the Kaiserreich period, and even afterwards. It 
reached widely, from German transatlantic migration and settlement in North and Latin 
American to the relocation of ethnic German communities in eastern Europe.24 Its topics 
are extremely divergent. Concrete colonial practices in specific overseas locations 
coexisted with more encompassing discussions about internal developments in German 
borderlands in Europe and plans for informal economic expansion in the Middle East, 
Southeastern Europe, South America, and Central Asia. Its impact could be subtle, such 
as descriptions in schoolbooks and periodicals, or as obvious as seizing new territory or 
the destruction of native populaces. If not the ultimate expression of the German empire, 
as George Steinmetz postulated, it was certainly one of enduring expression.25 For most 
                                                                
23 Naranch, German Colonialism in a Global Age, p. 4. See also Andreas Eckert and Albert Wirz, “Wir 
nicht, die Anderen auch: Deutschland und der Kolonialismus,” in Jenseits des Eurozentrismus: 
Postkolonial Perspektive in den Geschichts- und Kulturwissenschaften, eds. Sebastian Conrad and Shalini 
Randeria (New York: Campus, 2002), pp. 373-393; Ulrike Lindner, “Platz an der Sonne? Die 
Geschichtsschreibung auf dem Weg in deutschen Kolonien”, Archiv für Sozialgeschichte, vol. 48 (2008): 
p. 487-510; Jürgen Zimmerer, Birthe Kundrus, Lora Wildenthal, Russell Berman, Jan Rüger, and Bradley 
Naranch, “Forum: The German Colonial Imagination” German History, vol. 26.2 (2008), pp. 251-271; and 
David Ciarlo, “Globalizing German Colonialism,” German History, vol. 26.2 (2008), pp. 285-298. 
24 Vejas Gabriel Liulevicius, German Myth of the East: 1880 to the Present (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009); Gregor Thum, ed., Traumland Osten: Deutsche Bilder vom östlichen Europa im 20. 
Jahrhundert (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 2006). 
25 George Steinmetz, The Devil’s Handwriting: Precoloniality and the German Colonial State in Qingdao, 
Samoa, and Southwest Africa (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007). 
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of the world most of the time, German colonialism was easily ignored; at the same time, 
it could also be invasive, intrusive, and all too real.26  
 What has emerged out of recent studies on colonialism is that the picture of a 
German global empire is one that is considerably complex. In looking more closely at it, 
however, it becomes apparent that it is constructed of smaller and more manageable 
parts. As the narrative of German imperialism, and how it is interpreted, has shifted, the 
field of German colonial studies has expanded into many new directions. In exploring 
new methodologies, scholars have moved away from seeing German colonial policies as 
only originating from leaders in Berlin who enacted policies as they saw fit. By shifting 
the focus to examining life in the colonies, for example, scholars have found new ways 
to track the effects of German colonization, as well as how the German people 
envisioned their role in the empire.27  In this vein, recent scholars, such as Glenn Penny 
and Stefan Rinke, have looked at the role of how Germans settled into new areas, and 
their consumption of German things to explain the origins and character of Germans’ 
                                                                
26 John S. Lowry, “African Resistance and Center Party Recalcitrance in the Reichstag Colonial Debates 
of 1905/06,” Central European History vol. 39.2 (2006): pp. 244-269; John Phillip Short, “Everyman’s 
Colonial Library: Imperialism and Working-Class Readers in Leipzig, 1890-1914,” German History vol. 
21.4 (2003): pp. 419-461; Erik Grimmer-Solem, “The Professors’ Africa: Economists, the Elections of 
1907, and the Legitimation of German Imperialism,” German History vol. 25.3 (2007): pp. 31-51; and 
Bradley Naranch, “ ‘Colonialized Body,’ ‘Oriental Machine’: Debating Race, Railroads, and the Politics 
of Reconstruction in Germany and East Africa, 1906-1910,” Central European History vol. 33.3 (2000): 
pp. 299-338. 
27 Sebastian Conrad, Globalisation and the Nation in Imperial German, translated by Sorcha O’Hagan 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Wildenthal, German Women for Empire; Hull, Absolute 
Destruction; Dreschler, Let Us Die Fighting; Baranowski, Nazi Empire; Friedrichsmeyer, Lennox, and 
Zantop, Imperialist Imagination; Liulevicius, German Myth; Kristin Kopp, “Grey Zones: On the Inclusion 
of ‘Poland’ in the Study of German Colonialism,” in Perraudin and Zimmer, pp 33-42; Boris Barth and 
Jürgen Osterhammel, eds., Ziviliserungsmissionen.  Imperiale Weltverbesserung seit dem 18. Jahrhundert 
(Konstanz: UVK Verlagsgesellschaft, 2005). 
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soft power and the notion of Germanness, or Deutschtum,28 as it was experienced, 
performed, and promulgated.29 
My study builds upon these ideas. While the broad picture is on German 
interactions in South America, I also focus specifically on the Foreign Office and the 
diplomats who were assigned abroad, emphasizing the policies they undertook, namely 
those which fostered development, and how they sought to implement their vision to 
further the Reich’s aims to create a more global German empire. In examining the 
people, information, commodities and capital the flowed across and between networks at 
home and abroad, a more detailed and nuanced picture of German colonialism, and its 
views of its Empire, will appear, both globally and locally. Moreover, in examining the 
lived experience of the settlers, and drawing upon a variety of sources, from the 
diplomats themselves, the Foreign Office, German businessmen, settlers, colonial 
                                                                
28 Deutschtum has no easy English translation. Although usually translated as “Germanness” or “German 
neither captures the nuances of Deutschtum. This is also a term which had a broad meaning and its 
definition varied depending upon who was using the term (i.e. government officials, nationalistic groups 
and societies, irredentists, German settlers etc.) For the purposes of my project, this term encompasses the 
idea of being culturally connected to. and a feeling of belonging to, Germany. As time progressed, and as 
German settlements in South America began to thrive and grow and the effects of German culture on the 
nations where they existed could be seen, the term was used to convey an idea, and sense of, “cultural 
development.” Peter Blickle, Heimat: A Critical Theory of the German Idea of Homeland (London: 
Boydell, 2002); Dirk Verheyen, The German Question: A Cultural, Historical, and Geopolitical 
Exploration (Cambridge: Westview Press, 1999); and H. Glenn Penny, “Latin American Connections: 
Recent Work on German Interactions with Latin America,” Central European History 46, 2 (2013). 
29 Penny, “Latin American Connections”; H. Glenn Penny and Stefan Rinke, “Germans Abroad: 
Respatializing Historical Narrative,” Geschichte & Gesellschaft, vol. 41 (2015); J. P. Daughton, “When 
Argentina Was ‘French’: Rethinking Cultural Politics and European Imperialism in Belle-Epoque Buenos 
Aires,” Journal of Modern History vol. 80, no. 4 (2008): pp. 831–64; Daniel Joseph Walther, Creating 
Germans Abroad: Cultural Policies and National Identity in Namibia (Athens: Ohio University Press, 
2002); Stefan Rinke, “Der letzte freie Kontinent”: Deutsch Lateinamerikapolitik im Zeichen 
transnationaler Beziehungen, 1918–1933, (Stuttgart: Hans-Dieter Heinz, 1996); and Nancy L. Green, 
“The Politics of Exit: Reversing the Immigration Paradigm,” Journal of Modern History vol. 77 no. 2 
(2005): p. 263-89 
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groups, as well as church and school societies, my study will provide a multi-faceted 
perspective on the day-to-day workings of an informal empire. 
Historians have also shown an interest in breaking away from national narratives 
and looking at topics like nationalism and state expansion from global and transnational 
perspectives. This has led scholars to examine globalization during the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, and to write transnational studies of colonialism and 
imperialism. As part of the recent “transnational turn” and focus on early globalization, 
scholars were quick to identify German colonialism in a newer, more expansive form as 
an area rich with possibilities.30 Area specialists, particularly those who focused on East 
Asian and African history, largely encouraged these trends and became a part of these 
discussions by raising important questions about agency, both from the Germans who 
lived and served abroad, and the indigenous population. 
Applying the lenses of globalization and transnationalism have particular 
resonances with the study of colonialism and imperialism. As scholars have argued, 
around 1900, globalization contributed to the popularity of ideas of about distinct 
national characteristics, “because of and not in spite of the fact that it was creating 
upheavals in the political, economic and discursive orders of the world of nations.”31 In 
the late nineteenth century, instead of dissolving national boarders, mass mobility could, 
                                                                
30 Sebastian Conrad, German Colonialism: A Short History, trans. Sorcha O’Hanagan (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012); Dirk van Laak, Über alles in der Welt. Deutscher Imperialismus im 
19. und 20 Jahrhundert. (Munich: Beck, 2005). For a more comprehensive, and conventional, history of 
the colonial period, see Horst Gründer, Geschichte der deutschen Kolonien (Stuttgart: Schöningh, 2000). 
This work also has an extensive and detailed bibliography of the subject. 
31 Sebastian Conrad, Globalisation and the Nation, p. 4 
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as Donna Gabaccia claims, “actually help to explain the intensity of nationalist 
movements and the focus of nation states on ideological nation-building in the years 
prior to World War I.”32 As Sebastian Conrad suggests, the search for particularity and 
for the elements of an unchangeable national identity was not “a threatened relic of a 
pre-global world order, but rather an actual effect of processes of cross-border 
circulation.”33 
These perspectives are supported by new approaches taken in the theoretical 
literature on globalization. For some time, sociological theories of globalization have 
assumed that increases in exchanges, interrelationships and in circulation would lead to a 
gradual homogenization of the world. During the nineteenth century, European 
expansion across the globe was accompanied by optimistic expectations of a common, 
civilized world, that were supported by the joy of free-trade propaganda.34 The 
consequences of such interactions, however, include not only homogenization and 
assimilation, but also restriction and fragmentation. As a result, the process of 
globalization was characterized by cross-border interactions which also contributed to 
the creation and consolidation of these borders.35 The increase in transnational 
                                                                
32 Donna Gabaccia, “Juggling Jargons: ‘Italians Everywhere,’ Diaspora or Transnationalism” Traverse: 
Zeitschrift für Geschichte vol. 12 (2005): p. 54.   
33 Conrad, Globalisation and the Nation, p. 4. 
34 See, for example, Reinhold Wagnleitner, Coca-Colonization and the Cold War:  The Cultural Mission 
of the United States in Austria After the Second World War (Chapel Hill:  University of North Carolina 
Press, 1994). 
35 For literature on globalization theory, see, for example, Arjum Appadurai, “Disjuncture and Difference 
in the Global Cultural Economy: Public Culture vol. 2.2 (1990): pp. 1-24; Roland Robertson, 
Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture (London: Sage, 1992); Arif Dirlik, Global Modernity: 
Modernity in the Age of Global (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2007); Jan Aart Scholte, Globalization: A 
Critical Introduction (New York: Palgrave, 2000); and Jean-François Bayart, Le Gouvernement du monde: 
Une critique politique de la globalization (Paris: Fayard, 2004). 
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interrelationships can thus be viewed as one of the most important factors contributing to 
the consolidation of national categories. As Craig Calhoun aptly phrased it, “no era 
placed greater emphasis on the autonomy of the nation state or the capacity of the idea of 
nation to define large-scale collective identities, but it did so precisely when and partly 
because the world was becoming pronouncedly international.”36 
As a result, transnational histories of globalization needed to also investigate a 
complex web of “shared histories.”37 The formation and development of the modern 
world can be read, as Conrad and Shalina Randeria argue, as a “shared history” in which 
a variety of cultures and societies interacted and interrelated which, ultimately, led to 
homogenizing effects.  At the same time, however, this increasing circulation of goods, 
people and ideas did not only create commonalities, it also resulted in delimitations, 
differences and a need for particularity.38 
As a result, arguments regarding transnational historiography developed. Their 
main goal was to overcome the fixation on national societies alone, excluding their 
regional and global interlinkings.  Such an idea picked up on approaches from 
comparative history and the history of transfers that, since the 1980s, have helped to 
                                                                
36 Craig Calhoun, “Nationalism, Modernism, and their Multiplicities,” in Identity, Culture, and 
Globalization, eds. Eliezer Ben-Rafael and Yitzak Sternberg (Boston: Brill, 2001) p. 463. 
37 For more specifics in this term, particularly as it relates to German history, see Sebastian Conrad and 
Shalini Randeria, “Gesteilte Geschichten: Europa in einer postkolonien Welt,” in Jenseits des 
Eurozentrismus: Postkolonial Perspektive in den Geschichts- und Kulturwissenschaften, eds. Sebastian 
Conrad and Shalini Randeria (New York: Campus, 2002); and Shalini Randeria “Gesteilte Geschichte und 
verwobene Moderne,” in Zukunftsentwürfe: Ideen für eine Kultur der Veränderung, eds. Jörn Rüsen, 
Hanna Leitgab and Norbert Jegelka (Frankfurt: Campus, 1999), pp. 87-96. 
38 Conrad and Randeria, “Gesteilte Geschichten”; and Randeria “Gesteilte Geschichten”. 
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place national narratives in context, and to revitalize them.39 Transnational history, 
however, is critical of the idea that national developments took place autonomously and 
that they can be understood based on a nation’s own traditions. Rather, the links between 
the European and non-European worlds form the point of departure for a historiography 
that is not limited to national teleologies.40 
 Such discussions are not limited to Germany. In Britain, for example, recent 
studies on imperial history, which often focus on the “new imperialism” from the 1890s 
onwards, have examined the question of the importance of the empire for Great Britain. 
Peter Cain and Anthony Hopkins brought the empire back to the metropole with their 
                                                                
39 In this case, when discussing transnational history, it is understood primarily as a perspective that allows 
one to go past the sharp division between “internal” and “external”, and the question of which has 
primacy. For more on this, and comparative history and the history of transfers, see Heainz-Gerhard Haupt 
and Jürgen Kocka, Geschichte und Vergleich: Ansätze und Ergebnisse international vergleichender 
Geschichtsschreibung (Frankfurt: Campus, 1996); Hartmut Kaelble, Der historische Vergleich: Eine 
Einführung zum 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (Frankfurt: Campus, 1999); Michel Espagne, “Sur les limites du 
comparatisme en histoire culturelle” Genèses vol. 17 (1994), pp. 112-121; Johannes Paulmann, 
“Internationaler Vergleich und interkultureller Transfer: Zwei Forschungsansätze zur europäischen 
Geschichte des 18. bis 20. Jahrhunderts” Historische Zeitschrift vol. 267 (1998): pp. 649-685; and 
Matthias Middell, “Kulturtransfer und Komparatistik: Thesen zu ihrem Verhältnis” Comperativ vol. 10 no. 
1 (2000): pp. 7-41. 
40 See, for example, Jürgen Osterhammel, “Transnationale Gesellschaftsgeschichte: Erweiterung oder 
Alternative?”, Geschichte und Gesellschaft vol. 27 (2001): pp. 167-193; Susanne-Sophia Spillotis, “Das 
Konzept der Transterritorialität oder: Wo findet der Gesellschaft statt?”, Geschichte und Gesellschaft vol. 
27 (2001): pp. 480-488; Albert Wirz, “Für eine transnationale Gesellschaftsgeschichte” Geschichte und 
Gesellschaft vol. 27 (2001): pp. 489-498; Conrad, “Doppelte Marginalisierung”; Michael Werner and 
Bénédicte Zimmermann, “Penser l’histoire croisée: Entre empirie et reflexivité,” Annales HSS vol. 58 
(2003), pp. 7-36; “Vergleich, Transfer, Verflechtung: Der Ansatz der Histoire croisée und die 
Herausforderung des Transnationalen,” Geschichte und Gesellschaft vol. 28 (2002): pp. 607-636; Kiran 
Klaus Patel, “Transatlantische Perspektiven transnationaler Geschichte,” Geschichte und Gesellschaft vol. 
29 (2003): pp. 625-647; and Nach der Nationalfixierheit: Perspektiven einer transnationalen Geschichte 
(Antrittsvorlesung: Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, 2004). Transnational approaches can also, in many 
cases, be linked in to the history of international politics: Wilfried Loth and Jürgen Osterhammel eds., 
Internationale Geschichte: Themen, Ergebnisse, Aussichten (Munich: Walter de Gruyter GmbHm 2000); 
Sanjay Subrarahmanyam, “Connected Histories: Toward a Reconfiguration of Early Modern Eurasia,” in 
Beyond Binary Histories: Reimagining Eurasia c. 1830, ed. Victor Liberman (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1997), pp. 289-315; and Serge Gruzinski, “Les Mondes mêlés de la Monarchie catholique 
et autres ‘connected histories’” Annales HSS vol. 56 (2001): pp. 83-117. 
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idea of “gentlemanly capitalism.”41 The “Manchester School” of social history, which 
centered around the work of John MacKenzie, focused on the effects of imperial 
expansion on everyday life in Britain.42 Indeed, many studies of Britain in the areas of 
postcolonial and cultural studies have examined the effects of the colonial experience on 
the home country and have argued that, “British ‘nationhood’ was built up through 
empire.”43 In the United States as well, the national past is increasingly placed in 
transnational contexts. In this case, it is not a formal empire that scholars are examining 
but rather its place in global history.44 
 It is following upon these ideas that I explore Germany’s interactions in South 
America. Around the turn of the century, Europe had expanded to every corner of the 
globe, and was altered and shaped by the experience of this expansion. In the course of 
colonialism and global interchanges that surpassed formal territorial claims, which was 
of even greater importance for Germany, the world increasingly had become a single 
area of action and its constraints had effects on Europe and the German empire. As a 
                                                                
41 Peter J. Cain and Anthony G. Hopkins, British Imperialism, 1688-2000 (New York: Longman, 2001); 
Raymond E. Dumett, ed., Gentlemanly Capitalism and British Imperialism: The New Debate in Empire 
(New York: Longman, 1999); and Anthony G. Hopkins, “Back to the Future: From National History to 
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42 John M. MacKenzie, Propaganda and Empire: The Manipulation of British Public Opinion, 1880-1960 
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44 In particular, see Thomas Bender ed., Rethinking American History in a Global Age (Berkley: 
University of California Press, 2001); and A Nation Among Nations: America’s Place in World History 
(New York: Hill and Wang, 2006). 
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result, I argue that German, and European, history prior to the outbreak of World War I 
occurred in a global context – of which German interactions in South America serve as a 
primary example.45 
 With studies on German colonialism becoming more nuanced, it is becoming 
more and more necessary to examined it in less obvious ways. These examinations 
should, as Naranch points out, stretch “across and beyond the categorical boundaries that 
previous generations had deemed it practical to impose.”46 One area which historians, 
and scholars in other fields, have shown an increased interest in is the origin and 
evolution of policies of development, arguing that these ideas, much like those of 
globalization, stretch back to European and American imperialism at the end of the 
nineteenth century. 
With the rise of neoliberal ideas in the 1980s, combined with the imminent end 
of the Cold War, a period of skepticism about “development” as a global project arose. 
In was in this crucible that scholars began to see development as history. Such a view, 
however, was limiting. The importance of ideas, particularly high policy statements and 
theories, led researchers to become preoccupied with the conceptual or intellectual 
framework of development. This in turn resulted in an inflated, and narrow, conception 
of the nature of development, seeing it primarily from a Western and elitist perspective. 
During the 1980s and 1990s, the neoliberal/postcolonial critique of the state as an agent 
                                                                
45 Sebastian Conrad and Jürgen Osterhammel, eds., Das Kaiserreich transnational: Deutschland in der 
Welt, 1971-1914 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2004). 
46 Naranch p. 9. 
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of development was reaching its limit, and members of the international aid community 
began to sour on the use of the term “development.” The new market-oriented lending 
policies and structural adjustments programs (SAPs) which the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and World Bank introduced during the global debt crisis, appeared to have 
caused more harm than good in many developing countries. The strategy of 
liberalization pursued by the IMF, World Bank, and other global institutions, according 
to Philip McMichael, turned the developmentist state inside out.47 The new global 
economy, scholars argued, turned out to be as unstable as the old one. The IMF’s and 
World Bank’s conditionality policies and restructuring programs had a devasting effect 
on sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, leading to a stagnating or declining GNP per-
capita, reductions in government spending on education and health care facilities, and 
increasing debt-service burdens.48 In short, those studying development were more 
focused on policies of market liberalization, and argued that these policies created a 
world that looked more like European empires at the end of the nineteenth century, with 
the problem of failed or failing states was relegated to the edge of suzerainty, especially 
America.49 
                                                                
47 Philip McMichael, Development and Social Change, (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2012), 
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The limitations to such an approach were clear and since the end of the 1990s, 
scholars have engaged in a series of critiques of the “earlier, binary, and monolithic 
view” of development, by “emphasizing the greater diversity and complexity of this 
history.” Many scholars have recognized that “actually existing” development implies 
looking beyond the metropoles of the West and examining what is happening on the 
ground in the former colonies and territories on the global periphery.50 
The events and fallout of September 11, 2001 proved to be a turning point for 
those looking at the history of development as it provided “an essential backdrop for 
understanding the more recent historiographical moves that have marked the field.” 51 
What occurred on 9/11 served as an awakening for both policy makers and scholars, as 
they became aware of the realities and rising instabilities of the new, post-Cold War 
world. The problem of weak or failed states brought greater exposure to the importance 
of institutions and to questions of institutional reform. This, in turn, fostered a new 
appreciation for setting the complexities and challenges of nation and state building 
within a broader historical context. Even before 9/11, postcolonial critiques of the state 
as an agent of development was reaching its limit.52 
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With the events of September 11, and the resulting military operations in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, the resolution of conflict and nation building became a central 
point of American and, to a lesser extent, European, foreign policy. A renewed emphasis 
on the connection between security and development began to erode the belief in market 
fundamentalism, thus challenging the already teetering neoliberal dream of reducing and 
privatizing the state. Political analysis like Francis Fukuyama argued that September 11 
had reminded the world community of the problem of weak states and the need for state 
building, especially in the developing world.53 The resulting collapse of public 
administration and growing threats to international order had delivered a harsh lesson 
that institutions and governance mattered. 
For many analysts and policy advisors, the lessons of September 11 pointed 
towards a new imperialism deigned to bring stability and democracy to the world’s 
insurgent zones.54 Niall Ferguson, for example, alluding to Rudyard Kipling, suggested 
that the United States had “taken up some kind of global burden…. It considers itself 
responsible not just for waging a war against terrorism and rogue states, but also for 
spreading the benefits of capitalism and democracy overseas.”55 Along those same lines, 
Michael Ignatieff, in an article penned in the New York Times, wrote, “Now we are 
living through the collapse of many of these former colonial states. Into the resulting 
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vacuum of chaos and massacre a new imperialism has reluctantly stepped… But 
gradually, this reluctance has been replaced by an understanding of why order needs to 
be brought to these places…. Bringing order is the paradigmatic imperial task, but it is 
essential, for reasons of both economy and principle.”56 
The pleas from Ferguson and Ignatieff for a new imperialism fit together nicely 
with the revival of interest in the concept of empire, both among historians and 
researchers in fields such as area and literary studies, and discourse analysis. This new 
cohort of scholars, influenced by theoretical perspectives drawn from poststructuralism 
and postcolonial studies, helped lead a resurgence of the field. Indeed, after an initial 
reticence, many imperial historians saw the relevance of postcolonial theory and began 
to incorporate it into their work.57 This historiographic shift, not surprisingly, was 
termed “new imperial history”, and has concerned itself with examining the cultural and 
discursive impact of imperialism, both “at home” in Europe and in the colonial 
peripheries. Conceptually, it challenged earlier, binary models of imperial relations by 
placing the metropole and colony within a single analytical frame in which those 
relations were viewed as mutually vital. Culture and identity in the metropole were just 
as much shaped by empire as the colonies themselves.58 This approach was particularly 
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well suited to the changing political and social landscape of the 1990s as a new era of 
globalization was rising.59 
The events of September 11 also added urgency and relevancy to the study of 
empire, while at the same time challenging the recent historiographical trends toward 
culture and identity and away from politics and institutions. With the Cold War slowly 
fading away and the liberal ideas of the postwar nation-state in trouble, some scholars 
argued that the world was shifting back towards and imperial form of geopolitical 
relations. If the United States and its Western allies, particularly Great Britain, were 
engaged in forging a new imperium, which Ignatieff termed “empire lite”, then it only 
seemed right to examine the interventions of past empires for lessons.60 For scholars like 
Ferguson, who supported this notion, the earlier imperial framework was a model worth 
emulating. Moreover, he believed that the lesson that should be gained from Britain’s 
experience as a global hegemon was the need for long term commitments of manpower 
and resources. Without this, the liberal imperial project was doomed.61 
As scholars, such as Hodge, argue, the “imperial turn” in American and British 
foreign policy in the early 2000s created the backdrop for the creation of new studies of 
development as history. They have increasingly shifted their focus and attention towards 
both the earlier origins and colonial background of development, and the practical 
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analysis of its implementation on the ground. This new development historiography 
builds upon current ideas in the history of colonialism. With researchers from different 
disciplines and subfields taking greater interest in the subject of development, its 
historiography provides a more global and transnational investigation of ideas and 
linkages beyond the Western experience.  
The move away from the view of earlier scholars who only saw development as a 
post-1945 or post-1949 project is one of the key shifts in the development 
historiography. Scholars are now determined to look beyond the Cold War to earlier and 
different contexts, especially colonial precursors, to find the origins of the development 
framework. Seminal texts by Michael Cowen and Robert Shenton, who placed 
development’s roots in nineteenth century Europe but with imperial reiterations, and 
Frederick Cooper, who situated ideas of development in the crisis of the colonial world 
in the 1930s and 1940s, helped lead the way. Nonetheless, the post-September 11 
preoccupation with issues of security and empire ignited a quest for more long-term and 
contextualized histories of development.62 Analysts and scholars have realized that many 
of today’s “failed” and “collapsed” states have their origins in the former European 
empires.63 As a result, their failure also signifies the failure of development, both as an 
imperial project, and as a later nationalist, state project. Reconstructing this history of 
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Origins of the Post-Cold War Era (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
28 
 
expectation, disappointment, and delusion, and its roots in earlier colonial state-building 
projects has become the goal of an expanding cohort of scholars. 
Even before the “imperial turn”, imperial historians such as Stephen Constantine, 
Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, Michael Havinden and David Meredith, and Jean Suret-
Canale, among others, produced important work on colonial development policies.64 
These accounts documented the economic dimensions and high politics surrounding 
European colonial development policies. In the case of Britain, for example, the problem 
of domestic unemployment, the campaign for tariff reform, and the extension of imperial 
preferences drove debates concerning the development of the empire in the early 
twentieth century. Although these earlier works provide valuable insights into the 
political institutions and mechanisms of imperial policy, their authors tend to accept 
colonial ideas about development at face value and view them uncritically as part of an 
unfolding process of administrative and economic change. Moreover, these analyses 
rarely inquire into the changing and varied meanings of development or draw parallels 
between their work and contemporary policy debates. 
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More recent scholarship approach development as an accumulation of shifting 
meanings, interventions, and practices that need to be questioned and unraveled, and 
which has relevance for policy today. This approach began with the pioneering work of 
Cooper, and Cowen and Shelton, and has grown exponentially since the early 2000s. 
Suzanne Moon’s Technology and Ethical Idealism, which examines the Dutch East 
Indies, and Joseph Hodge’s Triumph of the Expert, which focuses on British colonialism, 
are representative texts of this recent scholarship. Although these books explore policies 
and practices of different European colonial powers, they both examine many of the 
same themes, as does much of the literature in this field. 
For both Moon and Hodge, the foundation of developmentalist thinking, at least 
in the colonial context, extend back to the turn of the century when the British and 
Dutch, along with other European powers, embarked on a new approach to their colonial 
empires. In the case of the Dutch, colonial reformers and critics argued that the welfare 
of the indigenous people should be the priority of the Dutch East Indies government. 
This in turn led to a kind of welfare planning, or “development” (ontwikkeling), as it was 
starting to be called, which formed the basis of the colonial government’s new Ethical 
Policies.65 Under the slogan “irrigation, education, and emigration,” the new Ethical 
Policies utilized technologies, such as the selection of better seed varieties, and 
employed technical experts to reshape indigenous agriculture. Similarly, Hodge argues 
that Joseph Chamberlain, the secretary of state for the British colonies from 1895 to 
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1903, first articulated “development” as an intentional practice for the colonies.66 Under 
Chamberlain, Britain proposed a new kind of state directed, “constructive” imperialism 
with the goal of “opening up” what he called the “undeveloped estates” of the colonial 
empire. This program involved capital investments in railways and other infrastructure 
projects, as well as technical assistance and research in areas of tropical medicine and 
tropical agriculture. 
Both Moon and Hodge emphasize the existence of competing agendas of power 
and multiple and conflicting programs and interests operating within the colonial state. 
Although authorities tended to favor rural and agriculture development, this does not 
mean there was not dissention and conflicting standpoints.67 Tensions and meditations 
occurred not just between state authorities and native populations, but also among 
different branches and levels of administration, and between local colonial officials and 
metropolitan policy makers. 
Building upon these ideas, as well as other key shifts in the development 
historiography, I seek to more closely examine the complexities of development both at 
home and on the ground in Germany. For Berlin, South America was a prime spot to 
undertake projects that would build infrastructure. As a result, it engaged in a variety of 
development projects. In doing so, the Foreign Office attempted to demonstrate to the 
states in South America the benefits Berlin could offer: the structures of a modern state. 
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At the same time, the German Foreign Office and its diplomats sought to develop a place 
that was suitable for German use and would allow Berlin to increase its global presence. 
For Germany, I argue, development policies, which were guided by diplomats abroad, 
went hand in hand with increasing German presence both globally and in South 
America.  
As the following chapters reveal, the results of exploring German ambitions in 
South America, particularly as a global enterprise focused on policies of development, 
provide an example of the new form of imperial project, which operated outside of the 
framework of the more classical model built on territorial control and boundaries.68 
“Nation building” went hand in hand with extensive territorial rule in the classical 
imperial vision that flourished in the nineteenth century. Instead of control over a large 
dependent territory, however, diplomats in South America, based upon guidance from 
the Foreign Office, directed their efforts to building a base there from which a larger 
informal presence was erected and maintained. This form of colonialism was less 
expansionist and territorial than intensive and concentrated. That said, in the case of 
South America, Germany also was not able to use standard colonial practices as nation-
sovereign states already existed there. Nonetheless, German practices in South America, 
as I argue, were a part of the new imperialism that was occurring at the turn of the 
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nineteenth century.69 With imperialism moving in a different direction, the link between 
nation building and empire was weakened. To be sure, great powers continued to reduce 
the sovereignty of others, often by force or threat of force, and twentieth century empire 
still invoked a premise of benevolent transformation. The nature of the rationale, 
however, had changed, resulting in an imperial vision that was quite different from 
earlier ones. This new idea was much more global and far reaching with fewer 
entangling commitments involving any particular place. 
German interactions in South America also reveal the possibilities of evolving 
imperial practices. Throughout South America, and in particular Brazil, Chile, Peru, and 
Bolivia, the “colonial” society continued to emerge and change – through migration, 
trade, and building infrastructure. As a result, these areas became complex and highly 
diffuse zones on contact. As a term, “zone of contact” connotes an area where “foci of 
cultural contact on a zone of dispute” can stimulate “cultural dissonance,” as well as 
more open forms of conflict and cooperation.70 Within these contact zones, colonial 
agency was produced, contended with and negotiated among the diplomats abroad, their 
networks, and various social groups, both native and German. South America, then, 
became a place where experiments in commerce and communications emerged. These 
developments challenged the Foreign Office to move beyond the formal colonialism of 
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the previous century as the German Reich competed to control global resources and 
demonstrate that it was a world power. 
My dissertation is an important step forward in the discussion about new models 
of imperialism in an early age of globalization. The ultimate objective for the Foreign 
Office was to demonstrate that Germany was a global power, and it viewed Latin 
America as a fertile spot to build, and increase, its influence. For the Foreign Office, and 
its diplomats, this meant focusing on development projects – building railroads and 
harbors, encouraging the establishment of German communities, which included 
building schools and churches, constructing banks to finance projects, and training local 
armies.  By utilizing policies of informal imperialism, a more flexible form of empire 
emerged that was more global, efficient, dynamic, and less violent. Moreover, in seeking 
to move from having direct control over a territory, Germany was able to exert 
influence, and reap the benefits of it, without having to engage with, and antagonize, 
other world powers, especially the United States. Using settlers to migrate to South 
America and construct settlements, which would help in encouraging German trade, 
allowed Berlin to gain economic and cultural influence, while weakening Britain, 
France, and the United States, albeit indirectly. 
As my study examines the diplomats and various interest groups that affected 
German policy in South America, I devote a chapter to each of these groups, as follows:   
The first chapter, “The Men Who Pulled the Strings,” focuses on the German 
diplomatic service as whole, examining the members of the service and, more 
importantly, the type of men that were chosen to serve in South America.  In tracing the 
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careers of diplomats in South America, it becomes clear that while initially they were 
atypical, as time progressed, they became more common as the Foreign Office, and its 
ideas concerning empire, changed, which necessitated a transformation with the type of 
men who were sent abroad.   
The second chapter, “Establishing a Foothold:  German Kultur- and 
Deutschtumpolitik, and the Development of German Influence Abroad,” looks at 
colonial groups and the establishments of German communities in South America.  From 
early on, Germans grew interested in establishing a strong presence in South America – 
“a Germany for Germans.”  The Foreign Office, and its diplomats were willing to oblige 
as they viewed the communities as a vehicle to encourage, and expand, commercial 
influence. School groups, who requested aid not only to educate Germans, but also, in 
rare cases, to provide education to South American elites, are particularly examined to 
see what type of support they were seeking from the German government and in what 
ways the diplomats (and government) provided it. 
Chapters three and four, “Developing a South American Economy: German 
Trade and Business Influence in Peru, Bolivia, and Brazil” and “The Art of Finance:  
German Trade and Business Influence in Chile”, examine the establishment of trade and 
trade infrastructure in South America and how diplomats fostered these ideas, so it not 
only benefited South American countries, but also Germany.  These chapters focus on 
instances of developing trade for goods such as building saltpeter mines in Chile; 
developing agriculture in Brazil; and the construction of necessary structures such as 
ports for trade and railroads to connect German businesses to major ports, and laying 
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telegraph cables for communication.  The chapters also look at the efforts of German 
diplomats in South America to encourage German banks to send development aid. The 
presence of banks was an important part of encouraging trade and helping develop areas 
in South America.  Just as important, banks relied on the German Foreign Office, and its 
diplomats, to support them in times of need.   
As significant events were occurring in Chile at the turn of the nineteenth century 
– Chile engaged in the War of the Pacific with Bolivia and Peru – it is treated separately 
from the rest of South America, and discussions regarding banks and trade occur in its 
own chapter. Treating Chile separately allows for a more in-depth conversation 
regarding issues with financing German trade as such major events greatly affected 
diplomats’ interactions both in encouraging and protecting German business and trade. 
These same issues occurring in the rest of South America are discussed in the previous 
chapter. 
The last chapter, “Protecting it All – Military, Guns, and Arms Trade,” examines 
the German military missions to South America and their effects on the German arms 
industry.  As trade grew, it became necessary to find ways to protect German interests.  
As a result, Germany trained local armies, which in turn spurred an increase in the trade 
and supply of arms. In the process, Berlin demonstrated to the states of South America 
that it also wanted to help them defend themselves. Germans in South America also 
looked to the diplomats to provide assistance, and the German government relied on its 





GERMAN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE 
 
Gustav Michahelles was a career diplomat who served in the German Foreign 
Office from 1882 until his retirement in 1917.71  Although he came from a wealthy 
family in Hamburg, Michahelles lacked any title of nobility.  Still, he attended the 
University of Freiburg (he later finished his education at the University of Heidelburg), 
where he joined the Corps Vandalia Heidelberg, one of the oldest Burschenschaften 
(student fraternities) in Germany.72 While at the university, he earned a degree in law. 
Shortly after graduating, he completed his clerkship and residency, culminating in him 
passing his law exams, the Referendarexamen (trainee exam) and the Assessorexamen 
(assessor exam), which allowed him to practice law.73   
                                                                
71 During the course of his career, he served as a Vice-Consul in Egypt (1884-87), a General Consul in 
Zanzibar (1887-90) and Trieste (1890-93), a Minister Resident in Haiti (1898-1901), and an ambassador in 
Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador (1901-10) and Brazil (1910-13), before returning to Europe where he worked in 
Bulgaria (1913-16), and Norway (1916-17).   
72 Burschenschaften are one of the traditional student fraternities found in Germany, Austria, and Chile. 
Originally, associations of university students, who were inspired by liberal and nationalistic ideas, 
founded the Burschenschaften in the nineteenth century. These student associations engaged in numerous 
social activities, with their most important goal being to foster loyalty to the concept of a unified German 
national state and strong engagement for freedom, rights, and democracy. Many Burschenschaften 
participated in the Hambacher Fest in 1832 and the German revolutions of 1848-1849 (also known as the 
March Revolution). For more on the Burschenschaft and its history, see, Martin Biastoch, Tübinger 
Studenten im Kaiserreich. Eine sozialgeschichtliche Untersuchung (Sigmaringen, Germany: J. Thorbecke, 
1996); and Lisa Zwicker, Dueling Students: Conflict, Masculinity, and Politics in German Universities, 
1890-1914 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2011). 
73 For more on legal education in Germany, particularly during the nineteenth century, see, Wilhelm 
Bleek, Von der Kameralausbildung zum Juristenprivileg. Studium, Prüfung und Ausbildung der höheren 




Following the completion of his education in 1879, Michahelles returned to 
Hamburg where he worked as a lawyer.  While he was happy in his new surroundings, 
he still felt unsatisfied in his chosen profession.74  As a result, in 1882 the young 
German sought a position in the Foreign Office.  Unfortunately, as he was not a member 
of the aristocracy, Michahelles was at a clear disadvantage in his attempt to join.  Using 
his connections, as well as the knowledge he gained from studying law, the aspiring 
diplomat was not at a total loss.  One factor that worked in his favor was that he was a 
member of the Corps Vandalia Heidelberg.  To the heads in the Foreign Service, 
participation in a Burschenschaft was extremely important as membership was regarded 
as a prerequisite for a successful career in diplomacy.  Moreover, his Assessor certificate 
was particularly appealing as the study in law provided exacting training for the drafting 
of watertight agreements and treaties as well as unambiguous orders for colleagues in 
foreign capitals.  As a result, upon entrance in the Foreign Office, Michahelles was 
placed in the Handelspolitische Abteilung (Trade Division), which was commonly 
referred to as Division II, to start his career since his knowledge of law would be most 
useful in drafting trade treaties.75  
 Since Michahelles was not a member of the nobility, it was nearly impossible for 
him to join the diplomatic service.  This did not mean, however, that he could not still 
rise to serve the German government abroad.  Since the consular service, which was 
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separate from the diplomatic service, made no demands regarding birth or wealth, 
Michahelles chose to serve in distant commercial centers with the expectation that his 
consular status would eventually shift into a diplomatic appointment.  At the start of his 
career, he served as a Vice Konsul (Vice Consul) in Egypt, and General Konsul (General 
Consul) in Zanzibar.  Due to his extraordinary service in those two locations, he was 
rewarded with a transfer into the diplomatic service, assuming positions as Gesandter 
(Ambassador) and Ministerresident (Minister Resident) in Haiti, Peru, Brazil, Bolivia, 
and Bulgaria.76 
 From 1871 to 1914, the number of bourgeois men in the diplomatic service 
increased greatly, with the majority serving in either minor or subordinate posts in Berlin 
or in higher positions abroad. The career arc of Michahelles, then, serves as a prime 
example of what it meant to be an imperial diplomat in the German foreign service. It is 
also illustrative of the changes that were occurring in the Foreign Office as Germany 
was seeking ways to demonstrate the it was a global power, and embarked upon an early 
form of globalization. His background and character are also a clear example of the type 
of man the Foreign Office looked for when choosing whom to send abroad:  well-
educated, especially with knowledge of law, connected to important men within and 
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outside of the Foreign Office, ambitious, possessing necessary social grace, and a 
willingness to serve where needed. 
Although Michahelles, and other diplomats like him, served on the periphery of 
German foreign policy, assuming these positions abroad was important. For these 
aspiring young men, posts in places such as Brazil, Chile, China, and German East 
Africa, allowed them to remain en vue which was critical to receiving a promotion and, 
ultimately, assuming a position in Europe. At the same time, as they were so far from 
Berlin, the Wilhemstrasse (Foreign Office) placed considerable trust in them, allowing 
them to wield significant influence in determining how to enact the policies which 
Germany believed were necessary to increase its influence abroad and demonstrate that 
it was a global power. The activity that these diplomats undertook was the result of a 
push and pull of domestic and international interests, mediated by groups of expatriate 
commercial and religious interests on the ground as well as an equally interested cohort 
of diplomatic specialists. In navigating through these various groups, these German 
diplomats abroad showcased their abilities and merits, helping to shape and transform 
not only the Foreign Office, but also assuming a leading role in helping Germany forge 
its path in an early age of globalization. 
Upon creation of the German Foreign Office in 1871, there existed no formal 
distinction within the service with respect to area of competence.  This changed in 1881 
with the creation of the Political Division, administratively referred to as Division I, and 
was placed under the direct supervision of the state secretary and under state secretary.  
It was entrusted with surveying dispatches from field personnel, making policy 
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recommendations to the state secretary and chancellor, handling press affairs, and 
determining the character of diplomatic and consular posts.  
Division II—designated as the Handelspolitische Abteilung in 1885—managed 
trade treaties, emigration, the protection of German nationals and their property in 
foreign lands, passports, patent questions, extraditions, and border violations, and 
oversaw consular personnel appointments and examined drafts of legislation from other 
branches of the government. Due to this distinction between Division I and II, there was 
a lack of interest from the former in economic matters.  The legal division 
(Rechtsabteilung), which was commonly referred to as Division III, was also established 
in 1885, and in 1890 the Kolonial Abteilung (Colonial Division), was formed.  A 
different director, under whom the counselors and their assistants served, headed 
Divisions II, III, and the Kolonial Abteilung.  The Kolonial Abteilung was unique in that 
its director had direct access to the Emperor.  
 Men such as Michahelles and Karl Georg von Treutler were a product of these 
divisions.  Most of the men assigned to Latin and South America served in Division II.  
It was in the Handelspolitische Abteilung that Michahelles and Treutler received the 
training that would prepare them to serve in areas such as Brazil, Peru, and Chile, and 
other countries in Latin and South America.77  While assignments in Division II were 
seen as less prestigious than those in Division I, the training that these young diplomats 
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received, particularly in matters concerning trade and politics, was important in helping 
assure their success when they were sent to regions so far from Berlin, and where they 
would have to take a leading role in dictate policy. 
In the early stages of the Political Division’s history, Otto von Bismarck 
(Chancellor from 1871 to 1890) handpicked the its counselors, and they were the only 
ones who had the privilege of direct access to him.78 Therefore, service in the Political 
Division placed a special luster on a diplomat when he went into the field, as he had 
firsthand acquaintance with the highest officials at the Foreign Office.  Prior to his first 
assignment as Minister Resident to Chile (1903-1907), Friedrich von Reichenau was part 
of the political division.  Although most likely not handpicked by Bismarck—Reichenau 
joined Division I in 1887--the fact that he was a part of this department showed that he 
was highly qualified for service abroad, particularly in important places.79  In the mid-
1880s, Richard Krauel also secured valuable connections and skills in Division I before 
being appointed as an envoy to Argentina (1890-1894) and later Brazil (1894-1898).80  
Initially, the staff of the Political Division was the most aristocratic and Prussian 
contingent in the Foreign Office, and its counselors spent little time, either social or 
professional, with their colleagues in other divisions.  As a result, a counselor in 
Division II responsible for following the economic affairs of a foreign power could, only 
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in exceptional cases, persuade the Political Division to let him examine intelligence on a 
nation in question.81  Not surprisingly, the Political Division was resented, but such 
feelings had to be handled with care because of its control over personnel.  To run afoul 
of its members, particularly the eminence grise, Friedrich von Holstein, could adversely 
affect one’s future.  On the other hand, a diplomat could use contacts in Division I to 
further his own career.   
In the Political Division there was a continued interplay between its staff and 
diplomats in the field.  On entry into the service, each up-and-coming envoy was 
temporarily placed under a Division I counselor or assistant who was responsible for 
introducing him to the regimen of the Foreign Office.  Once assigned abroad, every 
diplomat then came under the supervision of the counselor in charge of the geographical 
area where the post lay, who observed the new diplomat’s behavior, surveyed his 
dispatches, and recommended changes in his assignments.  Reichenau’s first assignment 
was to the Prussian legation to Hamburg in 1887, which as even he recognized, was 
“really not a diplomatic post … still [it] was closer to diplomacy than to a consulship.”82  
While serving here, he received the training needed to prepare for future posts, gaining 
valuable insight into how the Foreign Office operated. 
The careers of men assigned to the other divisions differed greatly.  Officials in 
these areas rarely received assignments in the field, and, if they did, it was often only in 
the twilight of their career for a terminal appointment as a minister to a post in South 
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America or the Far East.  Bismarck himself was dissatisfied with this differentiation in 
careers and, over time, he sought to change this.  In his estimation, the members of the 
Political Division spent so much time abroad that they lost sight of domestic affairs, 
while the personnel in the other divisions often did not have enough service abroad to 
appreciate foreign problems.  Therefore, he saw to it that the young diplomats that were 
likely candidates for later service in Division I served some time in the other areas 
before being posted overseas.  Bismarck also tried to introduce the personnel of other 
divisions to foreign duty.  While he had little overall success with this plan, several 
highly qualified men benefited from his attempts at diversification, including 
Michahelles, who spent time in Division II, Reichenau in Division I, Krauel in Divisions 
I, II, and the Kolonial Abteilung, and Treutler in Division II. 
In addition to imperial diplomatic assignments, there were also consular positions 
available to junior diplomats.83  When a young man joined the foreign service, he had to 
choose whether he would apply for the diplomatic or consular branch.  Some who chose 
to join the consular service did so with the intention of making it a lifetime career; others 
selected it with the expectation that their status would eventually shift into a diplomatic 
appointment.  A consular official could apply for transfer to the diplomatic service, but 
such a move usually only occurred when a consul’s work caught the attention of 
Bismarck or a counselor in the Political Division.84  This transition could also occur in 
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the opposite direction.  Bismarck encouraged such an idea because he considered 
exposure to consular affairs highly desirable.  Michahelles is a prime example.  He 
began his career in the consular service, serving as a Vice Konsul in Egypt (1884-1887), 
and General Konsul in Zanzibar (1887-1890).  Due to his extraordinary service in these 
two locations, he was rewarded with a transfer into the diplomatic service, assuming 
positions as Gesandter and Ministerresident in Haiti, Peru, Brazil, and Bulgaria. 
Young candidates were usually given the post of General Konsul, which was the 
highest consular post.  As a result, many in this position were anxious to advance to 
more prime positions in the diplomatic service before they retired.  The Foreign Office 
sometimes obliged by elevating them to ministerial positions.  Such situations were 
uncommon, however, and so these general consuls were usually only promoted to South 
American and minor Asian capitals.  Nevertheless, while regular diplomats might have 
resented the absorption of consuls into the diplomatic service, a clear relationship 
gradually developed between the two departments.  About one in every four diplomats, 
including some of the most well-known -- Count Johann-Heinrich von Bernstorff, Count 
Paul Wolff Metternich, Johann Maria von Radowitz, Count Anton Monts -- combined 
consular and diplomatic careers. 
For the men who joined the Foreign Office, career advancement in the diplomatic 
service was open to talent as well as one’s connections.  All candidates had to satisfy a 
complex path of requirements in order to be promoted.  Still, for every rule, there was an 
exception, and for every seemingly unsurpassable barrier, there was always an avenue 
for appeal.  When one’s talents or qualifications became a hurdle, family and friends 
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would often provide an effective remedy.  As a result, the imperial diplomatic corps was 
an “assemblage of men of real ability in some cases, of little other than luminous lineage 
in others.”85  In the end, most diplomats could claim evidence of both during their 
careers. 
Any young man, provided he was twenty-five and a citizen of one of the German 
states, could apply to serve in the diplomatic or consular service.  Those born with 
patrician pedigrees could frequently depend on relatives already in the service or on 
connections at court or in the bureaucracy to provide easy access to entry-level positions.  
Chancellors and state secretaries were particularly adept at obtaining places for their 
sons or nephews in the service.  Bismarck, for example, arranged for both of his sons to 
work in the Foreign Office, with his elder son, Herbert, ultimately ascending to the 
position of Secretary of State while his father was chancellor.  In the end, during the 
period 1871-1914, there were altogether twenty-four diplomat fathers who produced 
twenty-nine diplomat sons.  Two of the most notable families in the Foreign Office were 
the Bülows and the Richthofens, each of whom produced three generations of diplomats 
during the Imperial era.  
Nevertheless, members of the Foreign Office did not need to be connected by 
blood to obtain high-ranking posts.  Often, protégés of chancellors, state secretaries, or 
envoys were not family relations.  Bismarck in particular closely watched for young men 
who showed prospects of maturing into accomplished diplomats.  He personally selected 
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Bernhard von Bülow, for example, to serve as a state secretary due to his natural charm, 
even though he was an inexperienced young man.86  Men also made themselves known 
to Bismarck and his successors through requests for admittance to the diplomatic 
service.  Perhaps one of the best examples is that of Richard von Kühlmann, who 
ultimately became a state secretary in 1917.  His father had known Chlodwig zu 
Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst (Chancellor, 1894-1900) since the 1860s.  Hohenlohe had 
once told Kühlmann’s father that if any of his sons should ever desire a diplomatic 
appointment, all they needed to do was come to Berlin.  Young Richard applied directly 
to the chancellor, who forwarded him his application to the Political Division. Although 
his application was initially rejected, Hohenlohe took matters into his own hands.  He 
invited Richard to dinner at his residence, ordering him to arrive early.  Once he 
appeared, the chancellor placed the young man at his side at the head of the stairs, 
greeting each of his guests with, “May I introduce you to Herr von Kühlmann, who is 
entering the Foreign Office at my wish.”  Later that evening, his commission arrived.87 
Familial influence, however, did not solely dictate positions in the diplomatic 
service.  Indeed, when choosing young men to serve as diplomats, the Foreign Office 
was surprisingly independent, often selecting men it found highly qualified and rejecting 
those whose skills seemed deficient.  Only rarely did external forces encroach upon its 
freedom of choice.  While circumstances such as those regarding Kühlmann did arise, it 
was a rare case. Usually, external pressure was little more than recommendations from 
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rulers, anxious parents, or military commanders, and the heads of the Foreign Office still 
acted as they wished. 
While personal connections with higher-ups in the Foreign Office was one path 
towards obtaining a post, most men joined the diplomatic service after passing a series of 
examinations.  To qualify for a “four-year assignment as a probationary, unsalaried 
attaché, a candidate had to certify that he had passed the primary legal examination 
(Referendarexamen).  This test, which the federal states administered after three or four 
years of university study, was an arduous affair.  After passing the exam and serving his 
four-year internship, the young officer was promoted to a regular position of a paid 
secretary of legation.   
Alternatively, a university student could complete the Referendar and then 
practice law or work in the bureaucracy for four years before presenting himself for a 
secondary legal exam called the Assessorexamen (trainee exam).  If successful, the 
aspiring diplomat would receive a doctorate in jurisprudence, and then be granted a one-
year probationary term as an unpaid attaché before becoming a salaried secretary.  The 
Foreign Office tended to prefer candidates passed the Assessorexamen, as legal work 
relied upon precision of argument and expression. Study in this subject thus provided 
necessary training when it came to drafting watertight agreements and treaties as well as 
orders for colleagues in other capitals. 
Both Michahelles and Reichenau entered the diplomatic service by taking 
examinations.  Following his entrance into the University of Freiburg in 1875, 
Michahelles passed his Referendarexamen in June 1878.  In February 1879, he passed 
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the Assessorexamen which, allowed him to practice law in the three Hanseatic towns – 
Bremen, Hamburg, and Lübeck.88  Although he did not enter the diplomatic service until 
1882, the fact that he had passed legal exams made him a very attractive candidate to the 
Foreign Office.  For this reason, Michahelles was placed in the Handelspolitische 
Abteilung to start his career, since knowledge of law would be most useful in drafting 
trade treaties.  Reichenau was also an appealing applicant, having passed the Referendar 
in 1880 after three years of study in Heidelberg, and then earning his Assessor certificate 
in 1886, shortly before he joined the diplomatic service.  As a result, he was briefly 
assigned to Division II, before being transferred into Division I, due to his high 
qualifications. 
Along with taking the legal exams, a student interested in the Foreign Service 
would then sit for the diplomatisches Examen (diplomatic exam), which was usually 
taken two years after being admitted as an attaché.89  Each envoy entering the 
provisional ranks was assigned three subjects on which he was expected to prepare 
essays.  The first had to discuss an aspect of history, law, or economics, the other two 
consisted of analysis of specific diplomatic problems.  The topics of these essays varied 
greatly, but the Foreign Office tried to assign subjects on which a candidate could be 
considered an expert. 
                                                                
88 Michahelles, p. 2. 
89 This exam could be taken as early as six months of serving as an attaché, but one could not wait more 
than three years to sit for it.  For more information, see Rudolf Nadolny and Günter Wollstein, Mein 
Beitrag:  Erinnerungen eines Botschafters des Deutschen Reiches (Cologne:  DME Verlag 1985), p. 18. 
49 
 
Once the written examinations were successfully completed, the candidate would 
then present himself for an elaborate oral examination.  This event was held before a 
panel chaired by the state secretary or undersecretary, and was conducted in German, 
French, and English.  The test covered seven areas of study: European history since 
1648, political geography, German constitutional law, constitutional law of other major 
foreign nations, political economy, international law, and international commerce and 
finance.  In addition, an impromptu discussion on documents chosen from the Foreign 
Office archives was required. For those candidates whose background on financial and 
commercial questions was weak, the Foreign Office encouraged them to take positions 
in banks or businesses.90   
Although neither Michahelles nor Reichenau offered any description of the 
diplomatisches Examen, Herbert von Hindenburg, who took his examination in 1900, 
provided a detailed picture of what the process was like.  One judge concentrated on 
legal questions; Dr. Otto von Glasenapp, the vice president of the Reichsbank (Imperial 
Bank), questioned him on commercial law, banking, and coinage; another examiner 
asked for an account, in French, of the history of the period from 1800 to 1840.  The 
exam ended when the chairman, Under Secretary of State von Mühlenberg, tested him of 
his familiarity with various aspects of diplomatic practice.  Hindenburg did remarkably 
well and was posted to Rome as third secretary.91  
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Although the examinations inspired fear in those who took them, it is doubtful 
that they were very arduous.  The written parts of the exam, for example, were taken at 
home and ample time was given for preparation.  Candidates borrowed books and old 
exams from their more advanced diplomatic friends and gave their finished essays to 
them for criticism before submitting them to the Foreign Office.  In 1874, for instance, 
Bernhard von Bülow sent Herbert Bismarck reading material to help him with his 
exams.  Otto von Bismarck himself also provided friends, such as Philipp Eulenberg, 
with information about the exams.  Help such as this was not considered inconsistent 
with the oath that accompanied the essays which stated that the work was their own.  
Even still, there were several ways in which an applicant could be exempted 
from all, or part, of the examinations.  In the case of those who passed the Assessor 
examination, such as Michahelles and Reichenau, the oral consisted of only European 
history since 1648, and the archival analysis.  If the written assessments were of a high 
level of distinction—such as was the case with both Karl von Schölzer and Eulenberg—
a candidate might be excused from the oral.  Transfers from the military were sometimes 
allowed to substitute an essay on jurisprudence for either the Referendar or Assessor 
examinations and were also frequently exempted from the diplomatisches Examen. 
The fact that the examinations could be made much easier or avoided altogether 
suggests that the Foreign Office did not take them entirely seriously.92  In most cases, 
the impression a candidate made in conducting his duties was considered more important 
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than his performance on the tests.  Grace in society and quickness of mind were often 
preferred to academic training and intellectual insight.  No one was more susceptible to 
subjective standards of measurement than Bismarck, and no one was more suspicious of 
self-styled “experts.”  According to other accounts, the Iron Chancellor did not care 
much for the examinations and did not trust them.93   
Bismarck even refused to be bound by the results of a candidate’s performance 
on the examinations.  Ambassador Bernstorff recalled that the chancellor had hand-
written instructions on the diplomatic examinations that read, “I reserve the right to 
accept the candidate for the diplomatic service if I think him suitable, even though he 
may not have passed the exam.”  Treutler recounted that Bismarck, on being asked about 
revising the tests, answered:  “The diplomatic examinations must be constructed in such 
a way that a candidate whom I wish to have in the service cannot fail, while such 
examinees whom I cannot use will have to fail, no matter how intelligent they may 
be.”94  Clearly, when it came to entering the diplomatic service, test results mattered 
little so long as Bismarck, or any other head in the Foreign Office, believed a candidate 
was qualified. Indeed, for Chancellor Bismarck, the best method of evaluation was to 
scrutinize a candidate in a social setting in order to measure his adroitness in 
conversation, his social ease, and his capacity for drink.  Such a test would reveal 
whether or not the man in question had the proper style, a virtue he referred to as 
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Kalvierperspektiv.  To Bismarck, tactlessness was the worst defect in a diplomat, a 
failing that only could be detected through personal engagement.95   
In the case of Michahelles, social engagements with the Iron Chancellor helped 
him secure a position in Zanzibar.  The young envoy had already started to prove 
himself a capable diplomat while serving as a vice consul in Egypt under Ernst von 
Treskow and Eduard von Derenthall.96 Due to this success, he was considered for an 
appointment as Generalkonsul to Zanzibar in May 1887.97  As a result, Bismarck invited 
the Michahelles to dinner so that he could evaluate his talents as a prospective diplomat.  
The evening began well with the Chancellor commenting upon some of his talents, 
stating that “he had so often seen my signature and he was glad that my reports had been 
kept clear and factual.”98  Still, the aspiring diplomat needed to show that he had the 
social skills to handle his new position, and he afforded himself well: drinking 
prodigiously, speaking discreetly, and displaying his manners handsomely. During the 
course of the dinner, Bismarck posed a question to Michahelles concerning the 
difficulties of learning Arabic.  Instead of providing a direct, but short, answer, he 
recounted a story when he became lost in Egypt and sought help from a fellah, an 
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Arabian peasant:  “I rode up to him and asked him how I could come closest to Cairo, 
the man had looked at me in amazement, shook his head and replied to me in Arabic, he 
was sorry, he understood no French.”99  The Iron Chancellor laughed heartily at this 
story, clearly having enjoyed his evening.  In the end, Michahelles received the post as 
Generalkonsul, and his career in the diplomatic service began to rise.    
Bismarck’s successors continued their evaluations in a similar manner.  Prince 
Karl Max von Lichnowsky, who served as the Political Division’s counselor for 
admissions from 1899 to 1904, liked to find “social culture” in applicants and confessed 
that, “as a general rule examination marks do not count so much as personality… I made 
it a practice to watch the candidate as he entered the room.  Then I knew pretty well with 
whom I had to deal.  The conversation that ensued soon showed what sort of intelligence 
he possessed.”100  Similarly, Holstein found sure command of “usage du monde” a 
critical trait, while Chancellor von Bülow believed the requisite qualities for a diplomat 
were “intuition, tact, a feeling for nuance and a refinement of judgment.”101 Good form – 
in appearance, manners, and accomplishments – was in high demand.  A diplomat 
needed to converse with delicacy in both French and German, be agile on the dance 
floor, and remain tireless in the execution of social rituals.  The von Bülow family is 
perhaps the best example of exhibiting a flair for diplomatic behavior.  Bernhard, in 
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particular, was known for his “virtuosic powers of social intercourse.”102  At a meeting 
with the deputies of the Reichstag in 1906, he expressed that diplomats needed to be 
similar in the manner of Alcibiades, “who was intellectual among the Athenians, 
abstemious in Sparta, and wrapped in a caftan when with the Persians.”103  For the 
Bülow family, charm was the root of diplomacy, and those men who were adroit in this 
manner rose quickly in the ranks of the Foreign Office. 
Even still, there were a few German diplomats, some of whom rose to eminent 
positions, who were lacking in social graces or even physical attractiveness.  Count 
Georg zu Münster was considered arrogant beyond redemption and quite a bore; Baron 
Adolf Marschall von Bieberstein was excessively gruff.  Others such as, Graf Anton 
Monts was extremely sarcastic; Reihold Klehmet’s clothes were ill-fitting; Georg von 
Werthern was antisocial and eccentric; and Kurd von Schlözer was grotesquely ugly and 
sometimes embarrassingly frugal.  Regardless, these men, and the many other diplomats 
whose appearance or manners were lacking, overcame their shortcomings either by 
establishing themselves as popular envoys, entertaining in style, or through displaying a 
special gift for uncovering and reporting sensitive information. 
 Even if a prospective diplomat could successfully navigate the prescribed course 
of examinations, there were still other barriers which he had to negotiate before his 
admission was assured, or his career advanced. The Foreign Office maintained a 
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reputation of being the privileged domain of wealthy nobles in order to deter upper 
middle-class, and middle-class candidates, especially those of modest means, from 
trying to enter the diplomatic service.  Potential candidates were warned that, without a 
title, a bourgeois diplomat could only compete successfully with aristocratic colleagues 
if he possessed great wealth.104  For Reichenau, this was not a problem.  His family had 
been a part of aristocracy since at least the time of his grandfather, Fritz.105  
Michahelles’ entrance into the Foreign Office, however, was harder.  Although he came 
from a wealthy family in Hamburg, his lack of title made it difficult for him to rise in the 
service.  Since the consular service made no demands regarding birth or wealth, men like 
MIchahelles satisfied themselves with consular positions in distant commercial 
centers.106    Herbert von Bismarck expressed the Foreign Office’s attitude towards the 
desirability of titles aptly in 1886.  At this time, Bülow had asked Bismarck’s help in 
securing admission for his cousin, Martin Rücker-Jenisch, a reserve lieutenant from the 
wealthy Hamburg suburb of Klein Flottbek.  While the younger Bismarck at once 
acceded to his friend’s request, he also added that, if he were Rücker-Jenisch, he would 
obtain a title.107  Treutler, whose father was awarded his title in 1884, a few years before 
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he entered the service, also confirmed the usefulness of a noble pedigree, as he believed 
the Wilhelmstrasse would not have accepted him without the distinction of his title.108 
The attitude of most young nobles on their entry into the diplomatic service, 
however, was distinctly cavalier.  Many believed that they had been forced into 
diplomacy only because it was one of the few pursuits socially suitable for men of their 
standing.  Furthermore, many young diplomats found their initial tasks at the Foreign 
Office trivial and boring.  They entered with visions of participating in the highest 
diplomatic negotiations, but instead were instructed to handle petty affairs such as the 
retrieval of personal property misplaced in railroad stations by itinerant and 
absentminded Germans.   
While many of the young nobles in the Foreign Office behaved in this manner, 
not all held such an outlook on their position.  Reichenau, for instance, looked at his time 
in the foreign service as a chance to understand his homeland’s struggle for prominence 
in the world, and as a way to express his feelings of pride in his nation.109  From a very 
young age, he remarked that he was drawn to a career in diplomacy as a way “to take a 
look at the transmission of the gears by which the destinies of nations are guided, to 
explore the causes and effects of the great events of the world, and to fight with the 
weapons of the spirit for the power, size and international reputation of my beloved 
homeland.”110  Michahelles held similar desires upon his decision to enlist in the foreign 
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service.  While at the University of Freiburg, he became a member of the 5th Baden 
Infantry, Regiment 113.  The young man enjoyed his time in the regiment because of its 
“tight Corps discipline, [and] the unconditional support of the ‘One for All’ ” mentality 
of fighting for and defending the fatherland.111  Although he enjoyed his time as a 
lawyer in the Hanseatic cities, he “still felt unsatisfied” and “was not able to acquire a 
taste for the legal profession in the long run.”112  When the opportunity to join the 
Foreign Office presented itself, the future diplomat anxiously signed up, welcoming the 
chance to work for his homeland in various capacities.  Such beliefs and desires made 
Michahelles and Reichenau attractive candidates and caught the attention of higher ups 
as they sought to place the right men in important positions. 
Within the diplomatic profession, as in noble society at large, a distinction was 
drawn between old and new nobles.  For many within the service, the more ancient a 
candidate’s ancestry, and the loftier his title, the more useful his service could be to the 
Foreign Office.    Peers of venerable origins argued that only in their own ranks could 
diplomats be found who could maintain independent judgment, particularly in the 
sensitive situations in which men of the service could find themselves.  Furthermore, 
men of nobility believed that, as long-standing aristocrats, they would be more inclined 
to interact with the common people of the land in which they served as part of noblesse 
oblige.  Newly minted nobles, who were always aspiring to social triumphs, would be 
eager only to bow before the pillars of society.113  Titled diplomats were also clearly 
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more effectively employed abroad than in the Foreign Office, where work occurred 
behind closed doors rather than in the bright light of society. Moreover, aristocrats were 
viewed as more politically reliable. With their innate refinement, aristocrats were more 
likely to possess the social attributes that Berlin considered desirable in conducting 
diplomacy.  Such nobles could also draw upon the cosmopolitan connections of their 
families.  
The German bourgeoisie, on the other hand, regardless of its talent for 
moneymaking, lacked the experience, the sophistication, and the connections found in 
the nobility. Middle-class men, in some cases, were simply less effective than nobles, 
and this could prove an embarrassment for the Foreign Office.  Sometimes, aristocratic 
courts slighted bourgeois envoys, which was a painful experience for those diplomats 
and an affront to German honor.  Good relations were poorly served by such incidents, 
and they needed to be avoided.  Bourgeois diplomats, therefore, tended to be sent to out-
of-the-way posts or to consular stations. 
Social factors also favored aristocrats.  The Foreign Office emphasized the 
desirability of a diplomat possessing social graces and knowing languages, which was 
common in noble households.  Although a diplomat might work tirelessly at imitating or 
studying noble behavior as an adult, ultimately, he would lack naturalness and ease in 
social interactions.  As Mortiz Busch, a diplomat, wrote, “the education a wealthy 
nobleman receives is undoubtedly better for the court circles in which an envoy is called 
to live and work than that which is provided for the children and half grown-up sons of 
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the middle class.”114  As a result, the Foreign Office believed that there was no need to 
provide young diplomats with manuals on how to behave socially.  Rather, the instinct 
that was the tradition of genteel and noble birth would be sufficient to whatever a 
diplomat might encounter in the world.115 
Although the Foreign Office was determined to preserve its noble, and Prussian, 
character, over time, those who joined the service, came from many different locations 
in Germany and various levels of nobility.  From the 1870s onwards, leaders in the 
Wilhelmstrasse complained that they were not attracting a sufficient representation of 
aristocratic talent, especially from old Prussian nobility. Numerous attempts were made 
to increase Junker representation, but in the end, their numbers in the corps stagnated.  
One reason for this was Bismarck himself, who was partial to non-Prussians, as he 
believed that these men possessed better personalities and character.  More importantly, 
he also thought that the inclusion of men from states other than Prussia would promote 
the solidarity of the new German Reich.116  These factors strongly favored men like 
Reichenau, who was born and raised in Wiesbaden, Hesse-Nassau, and Michehelles in 
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Hamburg. Moreover, with his fervent belief in serving a new, united Germany, 
Reichenau helped foster Bismarck’s desire to put forth a unified Germany.117 
Another reason for the decline in the percentage of diplomats recruited from 
Prussian families was due to the enormous increase in the number of bourgeois 
diplomats. Such a rise was not due to a change in the Foreign Office’s policy of favoring 
aristocrats, but rather was related to the expansion of Germany’s diplomatic network.  
The creation of new posts, most of them in distant countries, required additional staff, 
increasing the responsibilities of its personnel.  While nobles disdained diplomatic 
assignments in these remote stations, the Foreign Office still considered them posts that 
could be suitable for men of bourgeois origin.  The bourgeois proliferation in the service 
only affected subsidiary positions, but even still, it provided opportunities for men such 
as Michahelles to play increasingly larger roles in the diplomatic service. 
While noble birth was the surest means for aspiring diplomats to rise in the ranks 
of the Foreign Office, it was not the only way.  Ambitious young men could form 
powerful connections through membership in university fraternities (Burschenschaften), 
marriage to daughters of aristocratic houses, and commissions in elite regiments of the 
army.  In these respects, a bourgeois, or a newly aristocratic, young diplomat would be 
able to extend, initiate, and cultivate advantageous relationships.  
For the German nobility, especially those from Prussia, membership in a 
fraternity was commonplace.  The Borussia at Bonn, the Heidelberg Saxo-Borussia, and 
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the Göttingen Saxonia were among the most significant Burschenschaften for diplomats.  
Their members prided themselves on their noble composition, and were prone to engage 
in complex genealogical investigations to determine relationships between corps 
brothers.118  With over seventy percent of its members drawn from the nobility, the 
number of aristocrats in these three fraternities from 1871 to 1904 is strikingly high.   
Although neither Michahelles nor Reichenau were members of Borussia, Saxo-
Borussia, or Göttingen Saxonia, both were members of other prominent corps.  While 
studying at Heidelberg, Michahelles joined the Corps Vandalia Heidelberg.  It was one 
of the oldest fraternity in the German Empire, and drew its members mainly from noble 
families in Mecklenburg and Hamburg.  It was a home for many future politicians, as 
well as members of the Foreign Office, including the Bülow family.  Reichenau, on the 
other hand, was a member of the Corps Rhenania Heidelberg.  The fraternity dates to as 
early as 1702, although its current form was founded in 1849.  It was a very old and 
well-respected Burschenschaft that drew its members from all over the world and 
included politicians, academics, writers, and members of the Foreign Office.  The Corps 
also had close relationships with other fraternities including the Corps Vandalia, 
Göttingen Saxonia, and the Saxo-Broussia. 
Fraternity membership, like military service, or a legal education, was regarded 
as a prerequisite for a successful career in diplomacy.  As Prince Alexander Hohenlohe 
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remarked, “there was no better means to gain entry into the diplomatic career than if a 
young man had been a member of a fashionable fraternity during his stay at a university.  
For that reason, the progeny of the wealthy bourgeoisie strove to get into the corps, 
seeing therein the first step on the ladder to the highest positions in the government.”119  
Indeed, although fraternity membership was expensive, families were eager to enroll 
their sons.  In 1877, for example, Treutler, paid an annual sum of 567 marks, a more 
than modest amount at the time, to be a member of Saxo-Borussia.  As the cost of 
membership rose, members were expected to go into debt to keep up. 
Regardless of the expense, enrollment in a Burschenschaft was worth it for those 
eager to enter the Foreign Office.  While at university, young men, such as Treutler, 
established friendships with future colleagues or valuable contacts outside the service.  
Among the members of the Borussia class of 1882, for example, was Count Unico von 
der Groeben, who rose to be first secretary in Paris; Baron Ernst won Heintze-
Weissenrode, who became minister to Cuba; and Count Botho von Wedel, who served 
as envoy to Weimar and then became the Political Division counselor in charge of 
personnel, a valuable contact for any young Borussia.  As a member of the Corps 
Vandalia, Michahelles was connected to many, or soon-to-be, prominent members in the 
Foreign Office including Treskow; Max von Prollius, who served as an envoy to 
Mecklenburg; Theodor von Holleben, who became minister to Argentina, and also 
served as the vice president of the German Colonial Society; and several members of the 
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Bülow family including, Bernhard Ernst, the father of the future chancellor, and Rudolf, 
who was a minister in Madrid and Paraguay. 
Old members who had found positions in the Foreign Office looked after the 
career interests of younger fraternity brothers.  As Prince Radowitz, who eventually 
became an ambassador himself, acknowledged, the association between corps brothers 
after graduation provided a “quicker and more secure basis for identity and cooperation 
than would otherwise have been possible.”120  Recommendations from former members 
served as a guarantee of a young diplomat’s abilities as he proceeded through the 
Foreign Office. 
The corps were also seen as places to instill character and polish manners, 
qualities that were critical to the Foreign Office.121  This was an important function of 
the fraternities, for even some members of the Prussian nobility admitted that not all of 
their brothers were noted for their refinement, or breadth of outlook.122   Describing his 
experience at Bonn among the Borussia, Graf Harry Kessler acknowledged that the 
Burschenschaften had succeeded in bestowing some degree of elegance on nobles who 
had arrived at the university bereft of any grace or sophistication.  In describing the 
young men who were a part of the Borussia, he remarked that, “their prominence in the 
bureaucracy was not due only to their ‘connections’ – although these without question 
contributed to it – but just as much to their deportment, which in a preponderantly 
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bourgeois and plebian bureaucracy served them as a weapon with which they could 
strike down their middle-class competition.”123  
Given Bismarck’s indifference to formal education and his insistence on grace 
and tact, it is not surprising that he was an enthusiastic supporter of the 
Bursschenschaften.  He was an exuberant member of the Göttingen Hannovera, and in 
his later years he remarked that “the decent, dependable character, for which we 
Germans gladly praise our ruling class, is basically to be found only among officers and 
Korpsstudenten.”124  Herbert Bismarck, a member of the Borussia, regularly attended 
fraternity reunions and was known to be susceptible to hiring and advancing corps 
members in the Foreign Office.  As Under State Secretary in 1884, he wrote to Holstein 
concerning the young Count Otto von Dönhoff, who desired to become a diplomat.  The 
younger Bismarck commented that, “the only thing I know about him is that he was the 
chapter head of my old Bonn fraternity, and that makes me rather in his favor.  Even so 
he may be a shiftless fellow, but I think that I’d nevertheless take him.”125  Even 
Wilhelm II, who liked dressing in his Borussia jacket, endorsed the notion of favoring 
men who were members of the fraternities. 
Marital status also was an important consideration in the Foreign Office.  Those 
who were single were expected to maintain a discreet bachelorhood, and flagrant 
violations of such a careful existence were uncommon and rare.  An inability to find a 
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wife suitable for such an exacting role, the relatively modest expense of maintaining a 
celibate establishment, and the hardships of many foreign posts, may all have been 
factors encouraging a single life.  Perhaps the greatest reason for remaining single while 
in the Foreign Office, however, was because in some cases, unmarried men enjoyed a 
tactical advantage over those with a wife.  Higher ups in the Wilhelmstrasse believed 
that since bachelors spent much of their time idling in elegant clubs, they were in an 
especially good position to flush out sensitive information.126 
Bismarck himself was very concerned about diplomats and their marital status.  
He found little professional advantage for married men, even expressing that it would be 
better if envoys took up vows of celibacy.127  One of the chancellor’s main objections 
was that married envoys became too involved in family life and, consequently, neglected 
their professional obligations.128  Such reservations may help explain why, in the early 
stages of establishing German developmental policy in South America, men like 
Michahelles were assigned there. Michahelles remained a bachelor until well after he 
retired, an advantage that may have helped him establish himself, particularly in his 
early years, with Bismarck and, later, Bülow.  With the lack of a wife and/or family, 
these men could focus solely on their position and furthering the objectives of the 
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Foreign Office.  To that end, even if a diplomat was highly competent, Bismarck was 
willing to dismiss him from the diplomatic service if he made an unsuitable marriage or 
insisted in staying with an impossible wife.129 
The decision where to post a young diplomat lay with the Political Division.  To 
that end, the Foreign Office tried to match the man with his post.  In attempting to do so, 
several factors were considered including the candidate’s predecessors, connections, 
personality, means, and, perhaps most importantly, his ability.  Even if the nominee 
seemed a natural choice due to his personal qualities, the Wilhelmstrasse also had to 
consider carefully the ramifications of the appointment within the service. Candidates 
whose finances were slender often were assigned to less expensive, quieter legations; 
those in frail health were sent to sunny climates.130  After his initial appointment, a 
candidate’s merits usually played a greater role than his circumstances, and diplomats 
with modest means and poor health might even find themselves in St. Petersburg, or 
Vienna, two of the costliest and most mortal of all assignments.  
 As a novice diplomat, nothing was more vital than an ability to ingratiate oneself 
with the initial chief of the mission, whose personality and character was critical to their 
current, and future, success.  In the opinion of many young diplomats, one of the most 
important factors in their assignments was the degree in which their future of heads of 
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mission would be qualified to teach them something about diplomacy.131  If the chief 
was generous, he might personally train the new diplomat in the arts of intelligence 
gathering and report writing, and if the relationship prospered, the younger man might 
even become the senior official’s protégé.  Therefore, if the chief of mission moved 
ahead in the service, it was not unusual for him to request the Foreign Office to send him 
a young secretary whose intelligence, behavior, or personality he found pleasing in the 
course of an earlier assignment.132  Many young diplomats could draw upon the helpful 
assistance of senior friends or relatives who might influence a head of mission to ask that 
he be added to a legation’s staff.133 
 Both Michahelles and Reichenau were fortunate when it came to their training.  
In his first post in the legal division, Michahelles worked under Friedrich Wilhelm 
Michelet von Frantzius, who previously had served as an envoy to Brazil from 1876 to 
1878.  While commenting upon his training, the young diplomat remarked that Frantzius 
was “regarded as authority for extradition treaties.”  Although he was “feared by his 
subordinates for his meticulousness” and because “he demanded much of his assistants,” 
Michahelles “gratefully acknowledged, how useful the strict training in his department 
had been.”134  It was this attention to detail that caught Bismarck’s attention, and would 
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ultimately lead to the aspiring diplomat’s first assignment abroad.  The fact that 
Frantzius had served in Brazil, and trained Michahelles, may also have been a factor 
when it came to send him there later in his career.  When Michahelles finally served in 
the field as a vice consul in Alexandria, he was fortunate again to work with von 
Derenthall. Along with providing important training for his protégé, he provided the 
young envoy with important connections.  The members of the von Derenthall family 
were Prussian nobles who were active in politics, law, and the army.135  Just as 
important, Eduard was married to Luise du Bois, whose father, Henri Charles, served as 
a royal Dutch ambassador.  In times of need, particularly from 1890 to 1897 when 
Michahelles was at odds with Chancellor Bülow concerning the Helgoland-Zanzibar 
Treaty, the influence of von Derenthall and his family helped keep him active in the 
Foreign Office, and, ultimately, led to him receiving a new assignment to Peru in 1898. 
 Much like Michahelles, Reichenau received an excellent training from von 
Kusserow in Division I of the Foreign Office.  Von Kusserow was well regarded in 
issues of colonial policy and served as a member of the Foreign Office since 1860.136  
Reichenau was “very satisfied with this position,” particularly since he found that “from 
there the transition to diplomacy is very easy.”137  Due to his service in Hamburg and the 
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support of von Kusserow, he was transferred to Rome in July 1888, where he served as 
the Prussian envoy to the Pope.  Although he was not yet the German envoy, this was 
still a significant appointment, and one that he most likely would not have received had 
he not developed a good relationship with von Kusserow in Hamburg.138 
 On the other hand, the Foreign Office was quick to recall any subordinate that 
had displeased his chief.  A frequent problem lay in the inability of some members of a 
legation to get along comfortably, which was especially critical in posts in distant 
countries.  In such circumstances, the personnel, often almost exclusively bachelors, 
lived and worked within embassy walls.  When trouble arose, the offender had to be sent 
away, no matter how remarkable his talents might be.  For Michahelles, and Reichenau, 
such concerns were minimal, as both men were very friendly with their surrounding 
personnel.  Such good relations while so far from Berlin may well have been a strong 
factor—along with their respected talents—in sending, and keeping, them in South 
America. 
 As junior diplomats advanced in their careers, they had to be careful to avoid 
certain pitfalls.  One was to escape the Foreign Office classifying them as a specialist in 
Asian or African matters, as the diplomat’s career might stagnate, and future posts, 
particularly in Europe, might never be granted.  As Hebert Bismarck once noted, the 
most important thing for an aspiring diplomat to do was to keep himself en vue and in 
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the mainstream of European politics.139  At the same time, however, circumstances could 
arise which made it inadvisable to decline an undesirable post.  As a result, Bismarck 
and his successors were careful to consult all diplomats before making an assignment, as 
turning down a prospective appointment might irritate the state secretary or chancellor.   
 Reichenau faced such a situation when it came to his appointment to Chile in 
1903.  Initially, he was assigned as an envoy to Guatemala in 1901, but due to illness, 
was unable to accept the position.  It was a very serious decision to turn down this 
appointment, particularly since Prince Lichnowsky, the current head of Division I, had 
told Reichenau that this post was “intended as an honor and should not be put off any 
longer.”140  By turning it down, even for health reasons, he found himself on the edges 
of the Foreign Office, and by 1902, he believed that “I must finally give up the hope of 
playing the diplomat further.”141  Luckily, the aspiring envoy received another chance, 
as he was finally offered a position in Chile.  As he remarked upon hearing the news, 
“the distance to Chile is very large, but we all together have the desire for the 
overwhelming journey due to the irrepressible two-year waiting period.”  Although this 
may not have been Reichenau’s preference, he recognized that he had little choice in the 
matter; he had to accept it so that he could “enter back to active duty through this 
appointment.”142  After serving with distinction in Chile, he once continued to move up 
                                                                
139 Herbert von Bismarck to Bülow, 13 April 1887, Bülow, Bundesarchiv-Berlin, Nachlass 66; Herbert 
von Bismarck, 8 March 1883, Bismarck Nachlass, Bundesarchiv-Berlin, FC 3014/1082.  
140 Reichenau, pp. 165-166. 
141 Ibid., p. 183. 
142 Ibid., p. 191. 
71 
 
in the Foreign Office, first spending a year in Brazil (1907), and then taking a European 
post: Serbia, 1908-1910. 
Considerations of seniority, which was based upon a time-in-rank formula, were 
also a factor.  A first secretary, for example, could not continue to decline appointments 
as a minister, even if to a mediocre post, lest the position, and its seniority, go to another 
first secretary.  The rule for the Foreign Office appears to have been that a diplomat 
might decline an initial offer, but with a second refusal, he would lose his claim to 
seniority.143 Although some counselors in the personnel section strictly adhered to 
considerations of seniority, not everyone did.  Men like the younger Bismarck took a 
more elastic view and preferred to measure candidates by standards other than their 
longevity.144 
For appointments as an envoy, a variety of factors came into play to determine 
who would receive which post.  Approval by the state to which a diplomat was to be 
accredited was requested, and, in most cases, easily obtained.  The Foreign Office also 
had to contend with determining whether a particular candidate would accept the post in 
question, as well as if the diplomat would meet the Kaiser’s approval.  Royal consent, 
however, could not always be counted on, and often, the sovereign rejected the Foreign 
Office’s proposals.  Such royal preference underscores the point that, in the selection of 
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envoys, the opinion of the crown, not the government, was decisive.  Reichenau’s 
appointment as envoy to Chile is a prime example of how influential the Kaiser’s 
inclinations were.   In late 1902, Reichenau had the chance to dine with Wilhelm II in 
Potsdam at the Neu Palais.  The future envoy readily accepted such a meeting in hopes 
of trying to obtain a post abroad.  Shortly before this meeting, however, he had a long 
conversation with Oswald von Richtofen (State Secretary, 1900-1906), in which he told 
Reichenau that there was “little chance for [him] regarding an early reinstatement.”  
While he was at the royal place, however, the Kaiser greeted him, and was so impressed 
that he inquired, “if I [Reichenau] was ready to pack again.”145  As a result, even though 
the Foreign Office was not yet eager to grant him a post, he secured one in Chile due to 
the Kaiser’s influence. 
As far as the diplomat’s personal preferences, the Foreign Office was generally 
careful to consult candidates about a post, particularly as to whether they would accept 
it.  There were several factors a prospective envoy had to consider in taking a position:  
the location, cost, and salary of the post; which counselor in the Political Division was in 
charge of it; the nature of German relations with the power in question; and, especially, 
the effect accepting or rejecting the assignment would have on his future career.  As a 
result, then, diplomats could be very preferential towards certain assignments. 
To diplomats, capitals on the edges, and outside, of Europe, such as 
Constantinople, Rio de Janeiro, and Santiago (Chile), had good and bad features.  The 
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dependence on German diplomatic and military officials made even lesser positions in 
the embassies critically important.  In some cases, such as Pera, Turkey, or Santiago, 
Chile, the reliance of the legation secretary would provide an opportunity for a young 
diplomat to show he was ready for an ambassadorship.146  On the other hand, the heat, 
squalor, and remote location of these cities made them unhealthy and inaccessible to 
Germany.  This was a clear disadvantage for an ambassador concerned with maintaining 
a close connection with the powers in the Foreign Office. Overseas capitals were also 
viewed as socially backward and unhealthy.  Such concerns were at the forefront of 
Reichenau’s mind when Lichnowsky first asked if he would be willing to go to Santiago.  
He was unsure at first, and so he asked for some time to think the decision over.  While 
considering Lichnowsky’s proposal, he “inquired of the current colonial director [Oskar 
Wilhelm] Stübel, who was over there until 2 years ago” about how healthy Chile was 
both hygienically and socially.  The colonial director gave “highly satisfactory answers 
concerning the climate, the neighborhood, activity, sociability.”  Moreover, he 
commented that the people themselves were “proficient, decent people.”147  With such 
high remarks, any fears that Reichenau had about traveling abroad to Santiago were laid 
aside, and he readily accepted the prince’s offer. 
The lack of safety also made it difficult for wives or children to accompany a 
diplomat abroad.  This is one reason why the service had a high percentage of bachelors 
in its ranks, and why many were assigned to places far from Berlin.  Treutler, who 
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served as the minister to Brazil from 1901 to 1907, was the only member of his legation 
to take his wife overseas.  He remarked that his existence there was bearable because he 
and his family lived together year-round in the capital and imported almost everything 
from Europe.148  The trip home from such distant posts was long, and the Foreign Office 
would only pay for the cost if the journey came at the termination of an assignment.  
Even vacations, which were uncommon, were paid out of one’s own pocket.  As a result, 
then, it is not surprising that a diplomat who had served for several years in an overseas 
post felt entitled to a European assignment as a reward for his time abroad, a claim the 
Foreign Office was usually prepared to honor, either soon thereafter, or in the near 
future.  This was certainly the case for most of the men who held posts in Brazil, Chile, 
and Argentina.149  Some counselors in Berlin, however, were willing, and anxious, to 
accept posts in South America and the Caribbean in order to acquire experience in the 
field or ministerial dignity.150 
In making its assignments, the Foreign Office also took into consideration the 
preferences of the governments to which an envoy would be accredited.  Its choices were 
almost always accepted without cause, which reflected the care with which they were 
chosen.  Although the candidates the Foreign Office preferred usually satisfied foreign 
governments, the latter did not hesitate to ask for the recall of unsatisfactory envoys.  
Despite the Foreign Office’s precautions, some diplomats proved to be ill-suited to their 
assignments and when they suddenly showed themselves to have a deplorable lack of 
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judgment or refinement, they were quickly removed.  As a result, the placement of 
diplomats abroad, particularly in South America, required men whom the government 
could trust to behave in a manner appropriate to their position, requiring little oversight 
on its part.  While Bismarck was in power, foreign governments occasionally suggested 
the recall of a German envoy, but they never insisted upon it.  This is a strong indication 
that the Iron Chancellor was very careful in choosing and watching over his diplomats. 
A diplomat’s financial means were also a factor in his career path.  Because of 
the enormous demands the service placed on one’s income, particularly if sent to a 
faraway post, the Foreign Office made some attempt to see to it that its less wealthy 
members (especially older ones) were not accredited to expensive capitals.151  It believed 
that the impression that a diplomat’s style and that of his diplomatic establishment made 
on a foreign court or government, as well as on its press and public opinion, affected the 
relationship between nations.  An unkempt embassy could be seen as a sign of German 
indifference.  If the legation of one great power was noted as a well-known center of 
society, it became necessary for the other powers to keep up.  One of the first things that 
a newly assigned diplomat did, particularly when serving so far from Germany, was to 
furnish the embassy, and his home, in a style that was similar to those in Europe.152  As a 
result, this required money, political grace, and socially adept wives, or mistresses. 
Diplomatic polish was also a factor that the Foreign Office considered in its 
assignments.  In some capitals, social grace was more useful than enthusiasm for 
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furthering German interests.  Still, in other cases, the complicated nature of diplomacy 
required men who were more adept at negotiations and subtleties in conversation.153  
Any inkling of crude manners was unthinkable in Munich, Vienna, or London, but not 
necessarily ruinous in New World capitals such as Washington, Port au Prince, or 
Santiago, where a high degree of diplomatic skill was more important.154 
Advancement in the service was related to a number of criteria. Many, such as 
birth, wealth, sociability, or even the tastes and attractiveness of one’s wife, went well 
beyond skill in negotiation.  If one had all, or even some, of these attributes, promotion 
could be expected and was usually forthcoming without complication or delay.  
Nonetheless, over the course of his career, every diplomat had to be careful not only to 
maintain good relations at foreign courts, but also ingratiate himself with officials in 
Berlin.  The greatest asset a diplomat could possess was the good opinion of his 
superiors, and young men in the Foreign Office had to be wary of the capricious nature 
of elder counselors, directors, and state secretaries.  Diplomats who worked in the field 
had to appease these men and their heads of mission.  At the same time, they also had to 
stay on the good side of kings and chancellors and their subordinates, both civil and 
military, none of whom hesitated to involve themselves in the careers of men who served 
as diplomats.  If an envoy could successful negotiate all these potential pratfalls, a 
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ESTABLISHING A FOOTHOLD:  GERMAN KULTUR- AND 
DEUTSCHTUMPOLITIK, AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF GERMAN 
INFLUENCE ABROAD 
 
On 17 January 1910, twenty-one German boys and girls began their education at 
a newly constructed elementary school in Lima, Peru. For several years, the German 
men and women living in Lima had petitioned their ambassador, Gustav Michahelles, to 
establish a school so that their children could receive the benefits of a German education 
even though they were so far from home.155 Having finally secured the funding for 
establishing such a school - mostly from a generous donation from a local merchant in 
Lima - Michahelles informed the German Foreign Office that the plan to open this 
school could begin. The German ambassador’s report subsequently secured the 
remaining financial support from Berlin. Ultimately, the school was also opened to local 
children, provided that they attend the it from the beginning, and take their lessons in 
German. The Reich willingly supported Michahelles’ plan to fund the school, as it saw it 
as another way to promote its overall policy in South America: encouraging the 
development of the country in order to strengthen its ties with Germany. Although the 
ambassador met with difficulties in obtaining enough financial support for the school 
during its first five years, through his efforts, which were granted tremendous support 
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and latitude from the Foreign Office, the school began to flourish. This marked another 
step for Germany in fostering the growth and development of Peru, and, in the process, 
creating a stronger bond between the two nations. 
Assisting in building German schools in places like Lima, Peru, and thus creating 
a “Germany” abroad, was not uncommon for the German Foreign Office. Prior to the 
outbreak of World War I in 1914, German communities sprang up throughout South 
America, particularly in Peru, Chile, Brazil, and Bolivia, and with them, representations 
of Germany and German culture, like schools and churches. At the center of these 
symbols was a sense of shared identity and/or cultural belonging to Germany, 
connecting Germans, both at home and abroad, to the nation. This idea, and these 
feelings, which can be defined as “Deutschtum” guided the Foreign Office, colonial 
groups, German settlers, and diplomats in their desire to help build and support these 
communities abroad.156  
More than any other institutions, German churches and schools became sites 
where the production and consumption of German things, particularly German culture, 
was concentrated and multilayered. Consistencies and variety of Germanness that were 
centered and evolved in South America also gained their clearest articulation in these 
places. Wherever Germans settled in significant numbers, they quickly founded schools 
and churches. The creation and maintenance of these places was perhaps the key 
                                                                
156 The term “Deutschtum” is not an easy term to translate as it encompasses many different meanings. 
Broadly speaking, however, it can be translated as “German” or “Germanness”. For more information see 
footnote 28 in the introduction. 
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similarity across discrete German communities that emerged in South America in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.157 The literacy the schools and churches 
promoted, the content of their study plans, the social experience of attending and 
maintaining them, all tied these eclectic, and hybrid communities together and linked 
them to Germany and similar communities around the world.158  
For the German government and Foreign Office, support of these places, and the 
Deutschtum they represented, would keep the people who embraced German culture 
connected to Germans within the nation-state. This, in turn, would guarantee markets in 
those regions for German goods. As a result, the communities would help facilitate 
German influence both culturally and, ultimately, economically. 
The process of creating a place, and a community, to live was integral to the 
development of soft power which Germans in South, and Latin, America enjoyed. 
Representations of German places identified by Celia Applegate “which bring together 
multiplicity and familiarity” were never limited to Europe and the German nation-state’s 
brief colonial possessions (1884-1918).159 As Issac Marcosson and similar authors 
lamented, such places became ubiquitous in Argentina, Chile, and other South American 
                                                                
157 For a general discussion on the founding of schools and churches in German communities abroad, see 
Henry Werner, ed., Deutsche Schulen im Ausland, vol. 1 (Berlin: Westkreuz-Verlag, 1988); and Peter 
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American Connections. 
158 For more on the global character of these institutions abroad, see Manz, Constructing a German 
Diaspora. 
159 Celia Applegate, “Sense of Place,” in Helmut Walser Smith, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Modern 
German History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 49-70.   
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nations by the turn of the nineteenth century.160 These communities flourished because, 
as Applegate indicates, there was ample room in the German imagination for this 
multiplicity of places and the cultural hybridity that came with them. They were also 
joint productions of the diverse Germans who went abroad and whose purpose 
sometimes overlapped with, but were not always dictated or controlled by, those who 
remained at home, or their agents abroad.161 
While Deutschtum was an underlaying idea regarding German communities, 
there is an ambivalence in how the Foreign Office, German settlers, and diplomats 
viewed the term. Each of these groups used it differently as they attempted to shape the 
policies that they hoped would extend German power and influence abroad. For the 
Foreign Office, supporting and encouraging German elements such as schools and 
churches in communities in South America was a large part of its Kultur- and 
Deutschtumspolitik (cultural and “Germanness” policy). German settlers and colonial 
groups, on the other hand, viewed these buildings, and the towns and villages that sprang 
up around them, and the Deutschtum that they represented, as a means to connect the 
settlers to their homeland that was thousands of miles away. German diplomats were 
more ambiguous in their use of the term and in how they viewed German areas in South 
                                                                
160 Issac Marcosson was a financial editor for the Saturday Evening Post in the 1920s. In 1925, he wrote a 
noteworthy article that warned his readers that “the Germans are becoming our [America’s] strongest trade 
rivals” in Latin America. This article is both noteworthy and typical of popular American journals and 
magazines after World War I which sought to cast the presence of well-integrated, influential, and highly 
interconnected Germans, their businesses, and communities in Latin America as a unitary “German 
presence” that served the interests of the German nation-state. Issac F. Marcosson, “The German in South 
America,” Saturday Evening Post, 1925: p. 36. 
161 Penny, “Germans Abroad: p. 182. 
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America. They saw these areas not only as a way to encourage Germans to emigrate to 
places far from home, but also as a means to demonstrate how Germany could aid in the 
development, and modernization, of countries in South America, which would also 
further German attempts at globalization. They served as a permeable membrane for the 
Foreign Office and the settlers and their views of Deutschtum, as they strove to shape 
German policy in South America. The diplomats mediated between the desires of these 
two groups to create and foster a safe and comfortable place for Germans to conduct 
business, visit, live, and feel at home. 
In this chapter, I will examine the development of Kultur- and Deutschumspoltik 
and demonstrate that it was an underlying principle governing German policy in Latin 
America, specifically, and was a part of Germany’s globalization policy more broadly. 
As the idea, and feelings, of Deutschtum was important to the various groups interested 
in developing a Germany abroad, this chapter will also trace the ways in which this term 
affected the development of German presence abroad, and the creation not only of 
German communities, but also a sense of shared cultural belonging. For settlers and 
colonial groups, they viewed Deutschtum as a way to bring a piece of their home with 
them. The Foreign Office, on the other hand, used it as a means to bring the best of 
German culture, and way of life, to other foreign nations, with the result of allowing 
Berlin to exert its influence and presence as these other nations slowly adopted it and 
developed. German diplomats, while they were dedicated to following the Foreign 
Office’s policies, also were committed to helping to enact, and protect, the vision that 
settlers, and colonial groups, had intended for Germans in South America, namely to 
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establish and preserve their connection to their homeland. Thus, they served as 
mediators between the Foreign Office and the German settlers and colonial groups, 
enacting policies that reflected the desires of Berlin and listening to, and heeding, the 
wishes and desires of the Germans who lived abroad.  
While there was an ambivalence in how the term Deutschtum was defined and 
used, at its core was an idea of a shared identity and belonging to Germany. This was a 
feeling which, no matter how far one was from Berlin, never dissipated. Much of 
Germany’s success in settling in to South America was facilitated by the consumption 
and production of German things. As Leona Auslander points out, jointly reading books, 
using identical objects, and wearing similar clothes all built inter-subjectivities. They 
created community.162 The influx of German things into Latin America was part of the 
larger flow of European objects, and Latin America’s upper classes also attached 
importance to German things in their efforts to modernize their countries.163 By 
examining the creation of German communities, and the role of Deutschtum, a better 
understanding of German soft power in South America, and elsewhere, will emerge.164 
Armed with a policy of development in South America, and diplomats like Michahelles, 
Treutler, and Reichenau, to help both the settlers and the Foreign Office, Germany was 
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able to establish itself in South America and gain influence as it sought to demonstrate 
that it was a European, and global, power.165 
Before one can discuss the implications of the Foreign Office’s Kultur- and 
Deutchtumspolitik, it is necessary to investigate its origins, and why it was seen as a 
critical part of German foreign policy. After the founding of the Reich in 1871, the idea 
of Deutschtum, and the feelings it evoked, developed, especially within the borders of 
Germany. As the idea of increasing Germany’s global presence grew, the importance of 
colonies, and colonizers became more significant. As Eduard von Liebert, the German 
governor of German East Africa, remarked in 1896, “the Germans abroad are our most 
important colony.”166 This thinking ultimately became the motto of all Deutschtum 
intentions: "For they [the Germans], are destined for greatness. And as they are in the 
middle of Europe's peoples, they are at the heart of humanity. They are chosen by the 
spirit of the age to work on the eternal building of human education.”167 As a result, the 
goal, and reward, became “to maintain and increase the external position of our race, and 
internal expansion of our facilities to the highest national and universal impact, and we 
will serve the world as the Fatherland equally brave and equally successful.”168 
                                                                
165 Treutler served as the German Ambassador in Brazil, 1900-1907. 
166 Eduard von Leibert, Die deutschen Kolonien und ihre Zukunft (Berlin: Dossische Buchhandlung, 
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Due to this thinking, proponents of Deutschtum established the Zentralstelle für 
die Erforschung des Deutschtums im Auslande (the Central Office for the Exploration of 
Germans Abroad) to investigate the objective of German emigration, so that the 
emigrants could be incorporated into German history, and to demonstrate the importance 
of these expatriates for increasing German economic and cultural interests. The German 
government was also willing to adopt this idea. 
Groups such as the Allgemeine Deutsche Schulverein zur Erhaltung des 
Deutschtums im Auslande (the Universal German School Association for the 
Preservation of Germanness Abroad) commonly were at the center of such efforts, and 
by 1913 membership in the Allgemeine Deutsche Schulverein reached a high of 
50,00.169 German churches too, especially the Protestant church, made the preservation 
of Deutschtum one of their primary causes. To further help, a number of organizations, 
such as the Verein für das Deutschtum im Auslande (Association for Germans Abroad), 
published magazines like the “Deutsche Erde“ (“German Soil”), and “Der 
Auslandsdeutsche“ (“Germans Abroad”) in Germany and distributed them widely. 
Magazines and newspapers that focused on specific areas were put together. In the case 
of Brazil, for example, two of the most widely circulated periodicals were the “Deutsch-
Brasilianische Verein” (“German-Brazilian Association”) and “Blumenau-Stiftung” 
(“Blumenau Foundation”). These publications were important in alerting Germans at 
home to the need to support those who were not within the specific borders of the 
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homeland, and the German government, as well as organizations interested in seeing 
Germans spread across the globe, used magazines and newspapers to help garner 
support.   
Due to these views and undertakings, the mission and the responsibility to take 
care of the Germans abroad was clear. In southern Brazil, the number of German-
speaking settlers was estimated at 350000 in 1902. While this represented only two 
percent of Brazil's total population, most German settlers lived in the southern states, 
where they had a large share of the population. In the state of Rio Grande do Sul, which 
shares a border with Uruguay, 150000 Germans lived alone and thus represented fifteen 
percent of the total population. The “most German” state was Santa Catharina, which 
had a population of 80,000 German-speaking inhabitants and represented twenty percent 
of the total inhabitants.170  
Chile also had a relatively sizable German population. While the German settlers 
spread throughout the country, the majority was located along the southern coast in 
Osorno, Valdivia, Concepcion, and Santiago. By 1905 in Valdivia, “the oldest and 
largest German colony” in Chile, the majority of the 14000 inhabitants were of German, 
or of German descent, allowing visitors to enter any shop and be able to communicate in 
German. In Osorno, which had a population of 17000, nearly half of those who lived 
there were German, and in Concepcion, of the approximately 4000 inhabitants, ten 
percent were German.171 
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 As more and more Germans left their homelands, officials in Berlin were faced 
with a conundrum of how to handle this exodus. Italy also faced a similar problem as it 
saw some thirteen million Italians depart from the peninsula between 1880 and 1915. To 
accommodate this mass departure, Italy recast itself as a “global nation.” As part of this 
plan to make itself more “global”, and to make up for its modest colonial territories, Italy 
sought to capitalize on the presence of Italians abroad.172 Such efforts did not escape the 
notice of German officials, and it was those ideas which brought about changes for the 
settlers, such as the transformation of the German citizenship law. Starting in 1871, 
when Imperial Germany was founded, those who left without the intent to return faced 
disenfranchisement, and Germany faced the loss of those people and their connections. 
The 1913 citizenship law changed that as it formally bound those Germans who went 
abroad to the German state through the codification of jus sanguinis, which, as Nancy 
Green argues, was “not simply an ethnicizing concept of citizenship but also a powerful 
way of constructing the nation even across space.”173 
The Germans in southern Chile serve as a clear example of how the combined 
efforts of these groups (German diplomats, settlers, and school and church groups) 
nurtured the Germanness in Chile and helped to create a strong German presence.174 In 
the middle of the nineteenth century, Germans had begun settling in isolated regions in 
southern Chile, whose chief cities were Concepcion, Orsorno, and Valdivia. There they 
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retained a vibrant German identity which their churches and schools supported, far from 
the auspices of the Chilean state. Although the settlers were not completely isolated, they 
were a distinct minority. Many arrived with capital, and as a result Valdivia and the 
other port towns soon developed an industrial character. After 1870, as roads linked the 
areas around Lake Llanquihue to the ocean, those subsistence economies transformed 
into an export economy, which grew considerably after German companies, at the urging 
of German diplomats and the Foreign Office, helped build a railroad to the north and 
later extended it as far south as Puerto Montt. By that time, southern Chile had evolved 
into one of the most prosperous agricultural regions in Chile.175 Throughout these 
growths and changes, German influence in the area was always present, and “decidedly 
apparent.”176  
Although the Germans settlers in Chile suffered from a strong confessional 
divide between Catholics and Protestants, they all supported their schools and their 
connections to German-speaking Europe. They also had a vibrant press, and created 
many of the same social clubs that commonly found in German communities, especially 
choirs, fraternal organizations, and gymnastics clubs.177 Just as important all these 
aspects of German culture received support from the German diplomats abroad, who in 
turn encouraged the Foreign Office to provide aid, who did so to varying degrees. The 
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settlers created schools, churches, clubs, fields, houses, and roads. These were all objects 
based on models the settlers brought with them from their homeland.  
Schools and churches flourished because they not only received support from 
Germany, but also Chile, which actively encouraged their creation and helped financially 
support them. For Chile, it agreed to provided funding for the schools in exchange so 
long its own citizens could attend. It also used German schools as a model for its own 
public schools, and hired many German teachers to work in, and reshape, them.178 By 
1903, there were thirty-two German schools in Chile, and Valdivia had the largest 
German school outside of Germany, boasting 444 students, twenty-two teachers, and 
lessons plans based on a Prussian Model. 
When German ambassadors arrived in Chile, one of the first steps they took was 
to take trips to gain a sense of the German communities under their control. In 
November and December 1902, Reichenau travelled throughout southern Chile, and 
returned with the belief that the German schools were the glue that helped hold these 
communities together, and that these institutions did the most to preserve the settlers’ 
Deutschtum (German character). The schools, he wrote to the Foreign Office, “were not 
only of moral value for us, through their protection of the German language and 
manners. Rather they also offer a clear material profit through the preservation of old 
and creation of new economic relationships. Moreover, those “who attend the German 
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schools,” he explained, “direct their attention during their professional lives to the 
German market,” and for those reasons, towns and cities, especially Concepcion, 
Santiago, and Valparaiso, needed to have schools that were similar to the German 
Realschule (secondary school). The children of wealthy merchants lived in these cities, 
and they needed to be trained to complete in international markets with goods that 
German Chileans produced and imported from Germany. The schools, he argued, were 
not only the “nerve center and backbone of Germanness in Chile, they were also a 
crucial factor in our economic success here.”179 
When German ambassadors ventured into German towns in South America, with 
their ports and industries, there was considerable talk of trade, but there was also an 
attention to the smaller details of the towns – the wooden houses one might expect in 
southern Germany but not in Chile or Peru, the meetings that appeared so “heimisch” 
(native to Germany), the comfortable associational culture, the warmth and hospitality of 
the beer halls, and the care and attention placed on the schools and churches. In 1913, for 
example when Ambassador Eckert travelled through Chile, he wrote a report on his trip 
from Santiago to the German colony of Contulmo, which contained about two hundred 
Germans. In it, he remarked that he found the colony nestled in an area that reminded 
him of the Schwarzwald (Black Forest) in southern Germany. Since its founding in 
1884, he wrote, it had been engaged for decades in “fantastic cultural work,” which left 
him with a “curious and satisfying impression.” Since then, the colony engaged in 
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“fantastic cultural work,” which left him with a “curious and satisfying impression.” As 
Eckert rode out of the rainforest and into the valley, he remarked, “a patch of earth, 
transformed by German order and culture,” greeted him, and was filled with “well 
maintained paths, gardens, and orchards.” The residents enthusiastically greeted him, 
and promptly took him to the church, and then the school, where one of its students, “a 
child of Chilean background,” greeted him in German and presented him with flowers. 
That experience, he confided, confirmed to him how deep “the inner strength of 
Deutschtum is in Chile and how worthy it is of support.”180 
As in other places in South America, German settlers to Chile, while they 
became loyal citizens of their new state, remained proud members of a German 
Kulturgemeinschaft (cultural community). They believed that this “community” was 
bound together by certain values: its members were loyal, orderly, peaceful, reliable, and 
perhaps most importantly, hard-working. This pride in their Deutschtum, their 
Germannness, and their particularly German contributions to Chile was recorded in 
countless books and journals, such as Deutsche Arbeit in Chile (German Work in Chile), 
which the German Scientific Association of Santiago issued in honor of Chile’s one 
hundredth anniversary.181 
For its part, the German Foreign Office agreed with Eckert’s evaluation because 
it confirmed what other observers consistently described. In 1904, for example, the 
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commander of the SMS Falke, a warship that visited the area, reported to the Kaiser that 
the farmers around lake Llanquihue “could not be more ur-German.” These settlers had 
reproduced their homelands in South America. All around their homes they recreated the 
most essential German things: clean walkways, tidy farms, flourishing gardens and 
orchards, tools and transport, and schools and churches. They were also engaged in 
active trade, producing agricultural goods for world markets, and buying items from 
Germany with their profits. As the commander of the Falke remarked, “German goods 
were to be found all over the territory.”182 
In their initial stages, 1820s-1850s, however, German settlements in South 
American struggled, even though they were grouped around certain key aspects. The 
small farmers, craftsmen, members of retail trade, and owners of small industrial 
companies represented the German settlers, i.e. the German-Brazilians, German-
Chileans, German-Bolivians, and so forth. They created an economically active middle 
class, and gave a new modern element to their respective societies. Nonetheless, in most 
cases, these settlements were in the middle of the wilderness, and secluded the settlers 
from all links to transportation, making it nearly impossible to even establish contact 
with other local communities. Furthermore, the settlers suffered from any substantial 
cultural development. 
The German settlers were also isolated from local societies due to virulent 
ethnocentrism. They were viewed as a minority, and barriers erected against them. This 
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forced the settlers to continue to hold onto their cultural traditions and previous ways of 
life.183 Religion and education, especially, further alienated the German settlers in the 
early days. In Brazil, for example, while the state religion of Brazil was Catholicism, 
most German settlers were Protestants, which created strong opposition from the 
government. Germans faced similar alienation in Chile. In 1852, the Chilean government 
admonished Bernhard Eunom Philippi, a German colonizing agent for Chile, for sending 
too many Protestant settlers, and not enough Catholics.184 Due to this physical and 
cultural isolation, German subcultures were created, and became a symbol for the 
settlers. They cultivated a certain sentimental solidarity amongst themselves, strove to 
hold onto German traditions, observed German-nationalist Catholic days, and hosted 
traditional gymnastic (Turner), singer (Sänger) and marksmen (Schützen) festivals. 
Initially, while the German consuls and ambassadors wished to support the 
settlers, they were unable to because so few of the settlers were German nationals. Any 
steps taken to assist these settlers would have reinforced xenophobic measures against 
them, as the South American governments would have seen these efforts as an attempt to 
seize control of their nation. In Brazil in 1892, for example, Consul Koser wrote that the 
slightest suspicions of interference in Brazilian affairs would lead to the withdrawal of 
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Germany’s exequatur.185 The ineffectiveness of the consular activity and the precarious 
relationship between the German consuls and the various South American governments 
meant that the mixed German populations, i.e. the German-Brazilians and so forth, could 
not call for German assistance in public or through the press.  
Due to this isolation from the German nation-state, an increased assimilation 
began to occur in the late nineteenth century, especially in urban areas. The formation of 
larger communities and small towns allowed for more socially diverse settlements, It 
Brazil, for example, this permitted the German-Brazilians to assume jobs which were 
previously reserved only for native Brazilians. As a result, contact with the Brazilian 
middle class began to develop. Similar situations also occurred in Chile, Bolivia, and 
Peru, as interactions between the German populations and the local middle class 
increased. 
As assimilation into the South American societies continued to grow, the German 
language, which, above all, had helped keep German cultural traditions alive, began to 
recede more and more.186 Knowledge of Portuguese and Spanish grew in importance as 
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they were the only means to communicate with authorities and official contacts. As a 
result, young men, particularly sons of leading families, were increasingly sent to 
schools in Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Porto Alegre to learn Portuguese, and 
Santiago, Valdivia, La Paz, and Lima to learn Spanish.187  
Nonetheless, while some German settlers sought to assimilate into the local 
culture, just as many fought to hold onto their connection to their fatherland and preserve 
their Deutschtum, their cultural identity.  Moreover, the tendencies of Germans towards 
assimilation did not escape the notice of the German diplomats and those in Germany 
who valued the “loyal devotion and undying love for the fatherland.”188 In Chile, for, 
example, Reichenau commented that German settlers certainly were capable of 
preserving their Deutschtum.189 In 1900, upon his return from a trip to southern Brazil, 
Ambassador Acro-Valley lamented how depressed he was at the current situation of the 
Germans in the area.190 
After his own trip through Southern Brazil in 1902, Arco-Valley’s successor, 
Treutler (1901-1907), encountered a similar situation, writing that the picture was not 
altogether very pleasing. The reason for such distressing circumstance, he reported, was 
due to the strong will of those in power in the Brazilian government to assimilate the 
Germans, and because the conditions which would help preserve the German elements, 
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such as a constant influx of immigrants, and traditions in remembrance of their army or 
campaigns, slowly disappeared. For the German ambassador, the Germans faced a crisis 
in areas like Rio Grande do Sul, and he feared it would only grow worse if action was 
not taken.191 Treutler encouraged the Foreign Office “to preserve our morally established 
rights in Rio Grande do Sul and continue [to be] strong so that a safe outlet is created for 
our domestic products and a good base for any future events… we must not leave our 
kinsmen without strong help.” He further punctuated his point with a warning to his 
leaders back home: “The last few years have happily awakened interest that must be 
indulged more actively than before, both privately and by the state.” To do otherwise 
would result in a “risk of regression”192 
Such thoughts underscore that actions of the German settlers and ambassadors 
abroad, and both the Foreign Office and non-governmental groups eagerly embraced 
these ideas of preserving, and strengthening, the settlers’ Deutschtum. In the case of the 
Foreign Office, many different methods were proposed: they demanded that Germany 
encourage a more intense economic activity in South American communities; 
investment of capital, reinforcement of shipping; and relaxing legal obligations such as 
fulfilling mandatory military service. Perhaps most important, they pushed for cultural 
connections with Germany through lecture tours, provisions for libraries, and frequent 
visits from Germany fleets.193  
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In 1897, Berlin began to foster and increase the feelings of Deutschtum by 
creating better organizational conditions. One of the first steps was to establish more 
consulates. In Brazil, embassies were opened in Florianopolis (in the state of Santa 
Catharina) and Curitiba (in Parana); in Chile in Concepcion and Victoria; in Oruro and 
Santa Cruz in Bolivia; and Tacna and Piura in Peru. The new consulates in Brazil were 
particularly significant as with those already in Porto Alegre, Rio de Janeiro and Rio 
Grande do Sul, Germany now had more in southern Brazil than it did in all of Latin 
America.  
The Foreign Office also sent warships to the area, where they served as screening 
agencies and recruitment offices to facilitate conscription in the army for the Germans 
living abroad. For many settlers, one of the main reasons for giving up their citizenship 
to their fatherland was because of the cumbersome rules and expensive trip to Germany 
to serve in the army or navy. Beginning in 1896 in Brazil, new laws were passed which 
made it easier to keep one’s citizenship and, in certain cases, granted dual citizenship to 
the settlers.194 
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More than any other institution, however, German schools were the center of the 
production and consumption of German things and became the embodiment of 
Deutschtum, both for the settlers and the Foreign Office. Wherever Germans settled in 
significant numbers, they quickly founded schools.195 The creation and maintenance of 
these schools emerged as the key constant across German communities in Latin America 
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.196 German settlers, migrants, 
citizens of mixed ethnicity (German-Brazilians, German-Chileans, etc.) and many non-
German elites, all valued these schools because they offered rigorous, bilingual 
curriculums, and many ultimately awarded internationally coveted degrees which the 
German Ministry of Education endorsed.197  
The cultural, economic, political, and social interactions schools fostered were of 
great value to nation-states. Growing numbers of these schools gained the attention of 
the German government after the turn of the century. For government officials, schools 
were at the top for countering the process of de-Germanization (“Entdeutschung”).198 In 
discussing schools and churches, wrote Treutler, “it can only mean when asking for the 
resources to keep the Germans connected with the home country.”199 By the same token, 
political leaders in Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and other nations embraced these schools as 
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models and hired German teachers to develop and shape their own educational systems, 
and they, along with their counterparts on other Latin American states, recognized the 
economic benefits at the base of these interconnections.200 
By 1914 there was a significant push from the Foreign Office, and in particular 
from the German diplomats, to assist German schools. The establishment of a schools 
was of great importance for German migrants as it was one of the clearest cultural 
institutions in a community, and they took it upon themselves to build them. Initially, the 
vast majority of these schools emerged independently, supported by the efforts of their 
local communities and funded overwhelmingly by tuition, dues association members 
pain to school boards, fundraisers, and donations.  
 Still, in the early days of the German settlements, the schools, and communities, 
faced several problems. For the most part, the standards of the schools were miserable, 
and far below that of a German elementary school. There were few trained teachers, and 
the pay was meager. In more rural areas, which constituted a lot of places for the 
Germans, attendance at the schools was erratic at best, as the children of the settlers were 
seen as indispensable workers, and thus worked as much as possible in the fields.201  
While there were a number of secondary schools that were founded, they were spread far 
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apart from each other. In all of Brazil, there were only three secondary schools – one in 
Rio de Janeiro, Blumenau, and Porto Alegre; in Chile, the only ones were located in 
Santiago, Osorno, and Validivia.202 The situation was even worse in Bolivia and Peru, 
where there was only one throughout each country. 
Nonetheless, officials in Germany placed a large demand upon the schools. 
Those in Berlin saw the teaching of the German language as the primary focus for these 
schools to preserve the settlers’ feelings of Deutschtum. This was particularly important 
when it came to German children as they would more easily lapse into Portuguese or 
Spanish if they only saw the German as a means to communicate and not as a method to 
reinforce their identity.203 Along with using German to transmit the “most sacred 
possessions of the nation”, officials in the Foreign Office believed that the schools 
should affect character building and sustain German virtues and values as a basis for 
global validation of the German character.204  
Meeting such “national” tasks, however, would not be easy as the German 
schools throughout South America lacked seminar-educated teachers, teaching materials, 
and aid for normal day-to-day business. Nongovernmental organizations in Germany, 
however, seeing the value of these schools in preserving the settlers’ cultural ties to 
Germany, began enthusiastically to champion efforts to support them. The Allgemeine 
Deutsche Schulverein (German School Association) was one of the most important 
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groups.205 Its founders argued that the best way to preserve German culture abroad was 
to support German schools, and they worked vigorously, expanding their membership 
through chapters spread across the German nation-state and extending their interest in 
schools far beyond Eastern Europe. The creation of a chapter in Hamburg in 1904, for 
example, led to a concerted effort to support the centralization and reorganization of 
German schools in Brazil, and to supply them, and other schools throughout Latin 
America, with professional teachers.206 In 1908, the organization redefined itself as the 
Verein für das Deutschtum im Ausland (VDA) (Association for Germans Abroad) and 
expanded its attentions.207 
 Schools associations were not the ones concerned with assisting the German 
communities abroad. By the turn of the century, a variety of individuals, groups, 
associations, businesses, and even city and state governments were taking an increasing 
interest in these settlements and preserving their Deutschtum.208 In 1904, the Blumenau-
Stiftung, for example, had books and maps distributed to twenty school libraries in 
southern Brazil.209 At the same time, the Foreign Office, recognizing the importance 
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behind this action, granted the school association its official support and assisted with 
sending more wall maps to schools. Due to a personal connection with the Hamburg-
Südamerikanische-Dampfschfffahrt-Gesellschaft, Ambassador Treutler was able to 
secure transport of these maps free of charge to schools in Brazil.210 Together, these 
various groups and actors, working with the diplomats abroad, lobbied the Foreign 
Office, to also support those communities. Their arguments were always framed in terms 
of two sets of goals: to support German cultural development wherever it occurred, and 
to increase and improve economic interconnections and relations between the Reich and 
other areas and nations around the world.211 
As many of the schools were connected to either the Catholic or Protestant 
religion, numerous religious groups provided aid. Among the evangelical groups support 
came from the Langenberger Verein, the Gustav-Adolf-Verein, and the Evangelische 
Gesellschaft für die Deutschen in Amerika (Evangelical Society for Germans in 
America).  After 1902, the Protestant Oberkirchenrat provided most of the aid to 
Protestant schools, including teachers and financial assistance. For Catholic schools, 
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most of their support came from the Franciscans, who sent teachers, and provided as 
much funds as they were able.212 
Further assisting the schools in connecting the German settlers to their homeland, 
and thus preserving their sense of Deutschtum, was the press, both local and German, 
which printed reports about the schools and their communities. Local newspapers such 
as the Blumenau Zeitung, Florianopolis Zeitung, and the Rosariner Zeitung, were full of 
articles which highlighted the German communities, their history, and efforts, and were 
also full of advertisements for German businesses and goods. In the 18 October 1913, 
the Rosariner Zeitung printed a special issue commemorating German life in the city of 
Rosario, and the state of Santa Fe, on the one hundredth anniversary of Napoleon’s 
defeat at the “battle of nations” outside of Leipzig.213  
While this special issue included a lavishly illustrated history of the battle of 
Leipzig, perhaps more interesting, were the stories placed around it. The editors of the 
newspaper chose to surround a seminal moment of past German glory between images 
of current German success: an advertisement for “Cerveceria Santa Fe,” the province’s 
“best brewery” with its modern bottling facility and “high-quality” pilsner, short 
histories of the “German colonies”, and an introduction to its many schools. The editors 
also underscored that while Germans, which included German speakers from Austria, 
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Russia, and Switzerland, were not the largest groups in the territory, their “abilities” in 
trade and industry made them very important. Those skills, the editors wrote, arose from 
their communities, and so the issue was also devoted to the history of the state’s German 
institutions which held the communities together, set them apart, and made them 
successful in trade and industry – the churches and schools. 
The issue also followed with several essays on the German Evangelical 
communities and churches in the area, the German association and its club, which 
brought them all together, the German hospital, the German men’s choirs, the German 
Overseas Bank, and the breweries. The editors also included a photograph of the 
German, Austrian, and Russian consuls who helped tie these communities and their 
businesses to their former homelands. A great majority of the special issue, however, 
focused on the history and character of the German schools and the associations that 
created, managed, and helped secure them funding. The two schools in the city, and the 
twelve in the neighboring communities, each received an essay that described its size 
and history, named the important members of its staff and school board, and underscored 
its German character. 
Such reports were not limited to the local newspapers, and they were 
disseminated across the international networks that linked German schools, and 
communities, abroad. Die Deutsche Schule im Auslande (German Schools Abroad) was 
one of the most well-known journals to carry such essays, and it often published 
abridged annual reports from the German schools. In 1907, for instance, the director of 
Valdivia’s (Chile) First German School reported that over 200 children had attended his 
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school in the previous year. His report also listed the arrivals and departures of teachers 
and discussed conferences which they held to analyze teaching methods, and debate the 
study plans which the German schools were using in Chile, Brazil, and Argentina. The 
account also detailed the children’s many field trips to German industries in the city.  
The new classrooms which were built that year, particularly the science labs, received 
considerable attention. Perhaps most importantly, the director wrote that during the 
second half of the school year the faculty was delighted to receive the school supplies 
that they requested from Germany, including equipment for the new labs and maps, and 
that in late July of 1906, the school board organized an exhibition that showcased the 
“beauty, utility, and richness” of those materials for everyone in the community to see. 
The exhibit highlighted items from the chemistry and natural history collections and the 
new maps. The director’s report also praised the gymnastics equipment the school had 
desperately sought, which was a gift that the German Ambassador Reichenau had 
procured for them. He also acknowledged the receipt of more German books for the 
school’s library that the German periodical, Das Echo, donated, and a large 
thermometer, hygrometer, and barometer from a Herr Schellhas, a natural scientist who 
lived in Berlin. Due to its efforts in trying to strengthen the German community’s 
feelings of Deutschtum, the school received 10,000 Marks from the German Foreign 
Office that year, and 300 Marks each from the Hamburg-Amerikanische Linie, the 
Hamburg Südamerikanische Dampfschifffahrts-Gesellschaft (also known as the 
Hamburg Süd) and the Hansa-Linie. The school’s director also stressed that the board 
was currently planning to renovate the school so that it would be the pride of not only 
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the local German community but also the entire region. To help cover the costs, the 
school would hold a bazaar at the end of the year.214 
The importance of Die Deutsche Schule im Auslande, and other journals and 
newspapers like it, cannot be overlooked. Stefan Manz, whose work focuses on the 
global construction of a German diaspora, argued that Die Deutsche Schule im Auslande, 
in particular, was extremely important in that it “gave teachers the opportunity to 
compare their own experience with that of colleagues in very different geographic 
locations and cultural contexts, and thereby contributed to a common group identity 
which was not bound by state boarders.” The journal also allowed teachers abroad to be 
“well integrated into a global stream of communication which not only conveyed 
professional information but also a sense of global diasporic connectedness across 
borders and oceans, both with the Heimat [homeland] and with each other.”215 
 Journals and newspapers, however, accomplished even more. In the case of the 
German school in Valdivia, the city was a secondary port city (Santiago served as the 
primary port), and while Reichenau, and other German ambassadors, saw its importance, 
neither the city, nor its German schools, gained as much support as Santiago. With that 
in mind then, the reports in Die Deutsche Schule im Auslande served as a means for the 
school’s director and board to promote what they achieved, by underscoring not only the 
size of the student body and the quality of its staff, but also the wealth of German objects 
one could find in the school: the latest scientific equipment, a growing library of German 
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books, bigger rooms filled with updated maps and illustrations direct from Germany, and 
sporting equipment delivered by the German ambassador himself. This was a complete 
and recognizable German place, which was defined by its German objects. 
Concurrently, the Foreign Office also focused efforts on increasing the presence 
of the German press, after years of neglect. In Brazil, for example, Richard Krauel, the 
German Ambassador (1894-1898), spurred on this endeavor through reports to his 
superiors back home. He expressed that while the number of newspapers had increased 
from three to thirteen, they lost all importance due to competition from local 
newspapers. Furthermore, with no support from Germany, this led to an inevitable 
decline in the number of subscribers. The ambassador encouraged the Foreign Office to 
support the German press because it “is a treasure not to be undervalued as factor for 
preserving Deutschtum”, and for its connection with the economic situation with the 
Reich.216 As part of his plan, he recommended that the Foreign Office should not create 
a subsidy to support the press - this would only arouse the suspicion of the Brazilian 
government and only harm the reputation of the newspapers - but rather should seek to 
obtain influence on the editorial staffs of the papers, and use it to communicate 
appropriate messages, and sway them to respond to questions of Brazilian interests in 
ways which would benefit Germany. As a result, Kraul decided, for example, to send the 
entire speeches from the Secretary of State, von Bieberstein, concerning consular 
protection to the German newspapers to assure that Berlin’s efforts were put in a good 
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light. In the past, such speeches were mutilated and would spread with comments to 
disgruntled German newspapers.217 The results of his actions impressed the Foreign 
Office, and it encouraged Krauel, and others in South America, to continue such 
practices.218 
The German ambassadors in South America, and the authors of the reports and 
stories about the German schools, also recognized the underlaying purpose for 
publishing such articles. As with any institution which is dependent on patrons, those 
who donate enjoy seeing their names in print, and those names might inspire others to 
follow suit. Also, the directors of other schools would see these reports, and could 
compare them with their own and those from similar institutions and learn how to 
acquire similar items and create similar German places while settling in to their own 
non-German spaces. 
Advertisements for German items, especially those which might help German 
students and teachers, accompanied the yearly reports in Die Deutsche Schule im 
Auslande, and other German journals and newspapers. Such items included: books of all 
kinds ranging from Grimm’s Fairy Tales to dictionaries, encyclopedias, and German 
grammar books for non-native speakers; “complete sets of school supplies for teaching 
female crafts” from Jsidora Dreverhoff in Dresden, which the Saxon Ministry of Culture 
and Education highly recommended; microscopes from F. W. Schleck in Berlin; 
complete natural history collections and models, and anatomical and botanical 
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collections; and even desks of all types from P. Johannes Müller in Charlottenburg. One 
could also order art supplies from Wwe. Grave & Sons in Hannover, or look to the 
Höpfel Brothers in Berlin, who could obtain any item for home, or school. Hermann 
Mathias in Berlin offered mops “used at many German schools abroad”, which the 
Royal Prussian Ministry of the Interior endorsed. At the same time, Eric Brandes in 
Dresden catered to more personal concerns, as his company advertised bathtubs fit for 
1.75-meter-long bodies, which would allow Germans abroad, including teachers, to 
“bathe as if at home”, with packing and shipping included. 
 Nonetheless, while the use of journals and newspapers garnered some support for 
the schools, such aid, by itself, was not enough to keep the schools running, and to allow 
them to achieve Germany’s mission of preserving the settler’s Deutschtum. As a result, 
beginning in the 1890s, state support was also given to the schools. One of the first 
instances of state aid begin in 1892 in Brazil when the preußische Kulturministrum 
(Prussian Ministry of Culture) established an annual grant of 1,000 Marks and 
commissioned a seminar director to create a collection of educational aids for Rio 
Grande do Sul.219 In Chile, due to the support of the preußische Kulturministrum, 
settlers established schools, especially middle schools, according to the plan of Prussian 
schools.220 
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Due to the success of this program as a particularly effective means to strengthen 
the settler’s cultural connection to Germany, similar programs continued in Brazil, with 
new ones being developed by German diplomats in other South American nations.221  In 
1900, for example, General Counselor Zimmerer wrote to the Foreign Office saying that 
in Florianopolis, the Brazilian government had no power to keep the Germans apart from 
the Luso-Brazilians, nor was it able to fight against the preservation of the German 
character. More importantly, the Brazilian government did not have the resources to 
establish its own educational system to combat them. This situation, Zimmerer wrote, 
left a tremendous opportunity for Germany. To seize this chance, however, it would be 
necessary for the Foreign Office to provide support for the German schools, but it had to 
be done without attracting any attention in order to “prevent any conspiracies from the 
top.”222 Shortly after receiving Zimmerer’s report, the Foreign Office agreed to his 
suggestions. 
In Chile in 1905, Reichenau, expressed similar sentiments regarding schools. He 
remarked at the tenacity and strength which the Germans held in persevering their 
heritage, and how they spared no sacrifice for such a purpose.223 As a result, in an effort 
to preserve their culture, the settlers submitted a petition to him with a request for 
provisions to build a school. Like Zimmerer in 1901, the ambassador wrote to the 
Foreign Office expressing the need for support. Just as important, Reichenau wrote, 
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providing such funding would be a tremendous opportunity for Germany to strengthen 
its presence in Chile, as it would “contribute, to a large extent, to refreshing the German 
feeling [Deutschtum], and the disposition of the German element in Chile.”224  
Every year, more resources for promoting schools flowed to South America from 
the school funds of the Foreign Office. While the amount sent was considered generous 
given the location it was sent to, overall, it was still fairly modest. In 1899, for example, 
a total of only 29000 Marks was provided for seventeen German-Brazilian schools; by 
1902, the number of schools that received funds tripled to 56, but the amount provided 
was a total of only 42000 Marks, not even double of what was previously given.225 In 
Chile, at the same time, Germany supported twelve schools, providing only 15400 
Marks.226 Preference was given to schools located in areas with large German 
populations, or where the preservation of Deutschtum was deemed highly important. In 
Brazil, these areas included Petropolis, Blumenau and Rio de Janeiro, which received 
3000-4000 Marks annually; the lowest amount, given to much smaller areas, was 300 
Marks each year. Chile, Bolivia, and Peru received similar amounts, with the more 
populous areas, such as Santiago, Concepcion, La Paz, and Lima, receiving the most 
support.227  
To convince the Foreign Office to provide funding for schools, the German 
ambassadors proposed various plans in which Berlin could give incentives to German 
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communities for establishing schools. In the initial stages, the Foreign Office would 
receive no direct material gain. Instead, for the time being, the ideal situation would be 
to preserve the German culture and nature, as well as revive the feelings of connection to 
the fatherland.228 In doing so, the German schools would prevent German immigrants 
from becoming “fertilizer of other people” (“Völkerdünger”) and thus cease to exist 
within the local racial mixtures.229  
Although incentive plans did not gain much support from the Foreign Office, 
they still recognized the importance of supporting German schools. As a result, a 
discretionary fund was made available to the ambassadors, from which they could 
distribute bonuses for deserving teachers or to provide, on an ad hoc basis, smaller sums 
for educational materials. When the fund was started, in 1903, it only contained 2000 
Marks; two years later, because it was working so well, the fund tripled, to 15000 Marks. 
As comparison, without it, only 60000 Marks total, for all schools, were available, and 
did not include emergency funds for educational needs.230 
As part of its support, the Foreign Office, at the encouragement of its diplomats 
abroad, helped finance a German reader for schools in South America. The contents of 
these books contained references to the events and circumstances in Germany, stories 
from Grimm’s Fairy Tales, and scenes from the life of the Kaiser. As the chairman of 
the Rio Grande do Sul teachers’ association explained to Treutler in 1905, “at an early 
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age the German schoolchildren in Brazil will be filled with pride that, as part of their 
heritage, they descend from one of the first civilizations.”231 The first edition of this 
book appeared in 1906, and by 1914, four further editions were produced. In Brazil, it 
also contained a Portuguese appendix; for Spanish speaking countries, such as Peru, 
Chile, and Bolivia, it had a Spanish appendix. By the time World War I broke out, this 
textbook was used extensively in German populated areas throughout South America.232 
While the responsible for distributing the funds belonged to the regional 
teacher’s associations, the Foreign Office still retained control, as its diplomats in each 
respective region served as the head of the associations. The teacher’s associations, 
which had formed in the early 1900s, were the perfect vehicle for both the Foreign 
Office and its men, as their aim was to improve the financial situation and social status 
of the teachers.233 In a report to the Foreign Office in 1906, Reichenau requested that 
Berlin provide aid to the school in Tome, Chile. The school itself had only recently come 
into existence, and while the members of the school association were making monthly 
contributions, the school still suffered a debt of 800 Marks. He wrote that, “to allow the 
[school] association…to not burden the national work with a debt,” he requested a grant 
of 1000 Marks.234 The German ambassadors and consuls continually pushed for funds 
from the Foreign Office in order to create a better situation for the teachers, as doing so 
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would mean better teachers, which in turn would help improve the German schools.235 In 
the end, Reichenau was successful in obtaining the necessary funds for the school. 
Since only members of the teacher’s associations could receive aid, their 
membership increased. Still, in the early 1900s, throughout South America close to half 
of the teachers avoided the associations because they, or their school communities, did 
not want Germany, its consuls, or even the associations, to regulate them.236  In Rio 
Grande do Sul, for example, the number of members in the Protestant association stood 
at 105, and for the Catholics it was 90. Recognizing the need for teachers to participate 
in these groups, the current ambassador in Brazil, Reichenau, contacted the Foreign 
Office and advised that any regulation that occurs must be done with care so as not to 
damaging the current nature of the community.237 In response, the Foreign Office 
proceeded cautiously both in the creation and collaboration with local associations. 
Efforts such as these eventually led to an increase in the number of teachers participating 
in the associations, with almost eighty percent of all teachers in South America joining 
by 1912.238 
Although Germany wanted to provide more funding for schools, at the 
suggestion of its ambassadors in South America, aid was kept low in order not to arouse 
“the jealousy and displeasure…of the nativists”, i.e. nationalists in places such as Brazil 
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and Chile.239  Still, the Foreign Office was not averse to adapting and altering its policy 
towards funding in response to popular demands from its agents abroad. In Puerto 
Montt, Chile, which contained a large German population, the community desperately 
needed a new grade school for the young children in the area. Aware of the importance 
that this school could provide in persevering the young settlers’ Deutschtum, 
Ambassador Reichenau sent a request to the Foreign Office “for a one time increase in a 
grant to the local German school community for the purpose of construction and 
establishment of the strictly necessary” grade school. To stress the urgency of this 
project, he asked for 15000 Marks in order to complete the school as soon as possible.240 
The Foreign Office agreed with Reichenau’s argument, and was willing to oblige his 
petition, even though a grant of 15000 Marks was much larger than was normally 
granted. Overall, even though the Foreign Office normally provided only modest 
financial support, ambassadors did not complain greatly about the amount they received, 
as they viewed what successes that could achieve as positive. As Treutler wrote to the 
Foreign Office in 1905, with the aid he received, “many schools had been preserved 
from destruction or decline.”241  
While strides were being made in supporting the German schools, and thus the 
German settlers, there were also obstacles which the Foreign Office faced, and which it 
relied on its diplomats to resolve. In 1904 in Brazil, for example, the German efforts 
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attracted the attention of the regional authorities, who believed that culturally stable 
enclaves of ethnic minorities would be a threat to Brazilian nationality. As a result, a 
seventh of all Brazilian government aid for public schools were granted to Rio Grande 
do Sul, which had a sizable German population.242 According to a report form Teutler, 
this was a troubling development – government supported schools were “springing up 
like mushroom”, and, so long as support for teachers and learning aids from Germany 
remained sparse, the Brazilian government would effectively beat Germany with its own 
weapons.243 
A similar development also started to occur in Chile, when the government began 
to open its own schools to combat the German element. Aside from just opening schools, 
however, the local governments also provided salaried teachers and did not charge any 
fees for children to attend. The result was a decline in children attending the German 
schools, particularly German children. In a report concerning funding for schools in 
Chile in 1905, Reichenau, wrote that a number of German and Chilean boys and girls 
had to withdraw from the German school in order to obtain further education in the 
Chilean supported Liceo de ninos and the Catholic Girls’ School. Recognizing the 
significance in a decline in attendance at the German schools, the Reichenau urged the 
Foreign Office to provide more support. Without it, the many “young Germans will lose 
their Deutschtum when …they receive their education at the Liceo” because, he 
continued, they were only taught in Spanish and thus would be, “easily assimilated into 
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the local culture.” He concluded that that only method to confront this competition 
successfully was through strong support of capital from Germany.244 Upon receiving his 
report, the Foreign Office met his requests, and provided what capital it could to assist in 
funding the schools in Chile.245 
To further combat local governments from enticing their settlers to send their 
children to local schools, the German diplomats proposed that the schools teach Spanish 
and Portuguese classes. To encourage schools to teach the local languages, those which 
did not, would lose their government subsidies. 246 Reichenau, while serving in Chile, 
reproached those German school boards which wanted to abolish Spanish and 
Portuguese lessons for their lack of political and worldly wisdom.247 Due to the advice 
of the German diplomats, particularly Reichenau and Treutler, the schools which offered 
courses in both German and Portuguese or Spanish, were successful and they received 
funding from both the German and local governments. By 1912, apart from a few federal 
districts, attendance at the German schools were high, and assisted Berlin in keeping a 
strong influence on both the German and local populations.248 
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 Along with schools, the German Foreign Office also turned to churches, 
particularly the Protestant Church, to assist in preserving the German cultural element in 
South America. In grouping into a community, settlers often built a school, a church, and 
a parsonage first.249 In many cases, when a teacher and pastor were hired, one person 
filled both roles. Such a practice was due more to cultural tradition than as an act of 
piety. This lack of a true religious connection to Germany was frustrating to the pastors 
in South America, and they sensed these German communities represented a tremendous 
opportunity for the Protestant Church.  As a result, they sought assistance to remedy this 
problem. 
 Due to the suggestions of Protestant pastors in South America, and German 
settlers and diplomats, many associations, like the Rhenish Missionary Society, the 
Gustav-Adolph Association began to send pastors, teachers, doctors, and midwives to 
South America. The most successful association, the Evangelische Gesellschaft 
(Protestant Society), sent clergymen who already had experience in South America, and 
who could also provide expert advice in organizational matters, particularly in training 
other preachers.250 The society’s efforts were impressive – by 1914, in Brazil, 117 
ordained ministers were sent to Rio Grande do Sul alone; between 1905 and 1915, 
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between Brazil and Chile, over 380000 Marks was donated to improve the clergy’s 
pensions, increase their salary, and even provide teaching training at nearby colleges.251  
 Support even came from the main Lutheran churches in Germany. Since 1902, 
the Oberkirchenrat (Ecclesiastical Council) in Berlin aided the communities. By 1909, 
the Council had already sent fourteen ministers to locations throughout Peru, Bolivia, 
and Brazil, and had plans to increase the number over the next five to seven years.252 It 
established a “treasury” to be used to assist the pastors in South America, with the 
majority of the aid being given out to locations with significant German populations, 
such as in Santa Catharina and Parana (Brazil), Valdivia and Orsorno (Chile), La Paz, 
and Lima. 
 The Evangelical Churches were particularly active in Brazil. In 1886, after two 
previously failed attempts, several of the evangelical churches founded the first synod, 
located in Rio Grande do Sul, called the Riograndenser Synode. From the beginning, 
however, it struggled, as it was hampered by financial, organizational, and staffing 
difficulties. Still, with its establishment, Protestantism now had a voice to confront the 
Brazilian, and Catholic, authorities in Rio Grande do Sul. As a result, schools were taken 
over, and institutes of the inner mission, such as orphanages or homes for the elderly, 
were created.253 
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 In 1911, building upon the success of the Riograndenser Synode, Pastor 
Braunschweig254 suggested that the loose association of Protestant pastors in Santa 
Catharina convert into the “German Evangelical Association of Municipalities of Santa 
Catharina” (Deutsche Evangelische Gemeindeverband von Santa Catharina). Shortly 
thereafter, through another recommendation from the pastor, the Protestant churches 
formed the “Central Brazilian Synod” (Mittelbrasilianische Synode). This organization 
united all the communities scattered across Central Brazil. As a result of these efforts, by 
the end of World War I, over 119 municipalities, consisting of 187,000 followers, were 
now organized, and worked, together.255  
 In almost all cases, the ordained priests who were posted from Germany seized 
upon the initiatives of the Mittelbrasilianische Synode and the Riograndenser Syonde. 
Such a strong drive was due, in part, to the efforts of Braunschweig, whom the Berlin 
Oberkirchenrat sent to Brazil in 1907 to explore the relationships between the various 
Protestant communities in South America, and to determine if they could be brought 
together. The Prussian state church was also interested in organizationally strengthening 
the German church communities. Partially to more easily solve the ecclesiastically 
problems and delineate duties, but also to more consistently work towards preserving the 
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Deutschtum in the German communities. For the pastors in South America, their desire 
to join together was out of a need to more effectively help one another, as well as to limit 
the overwhelming influence of the municipal councils and improve their social position. 
When they first arrived, particularly in Brazil and Chile, pastors faced a low social 
status, as well as an irregular income and pension. Beginning in 1900, however, the 
pastors were presented with the chance to enter an affiliation with the Evangelische 
Landeskirche der älteren Provinzen in Preußen (Protestant Church of the Old Province 
of Prussia). This allowed the priests to join into a pension fund, and secure funding for 
church projects such as orphan and widow care, as well as purchases for their churches, 
such as a new rectory, and an organ.256 
 To further assist the Protestant ministers, in May 1900, a new church law was 
enacted, which regulated the status of foreign communities, and enabled them to join 
together. This law also gave the Oberkirchenrat the ability to assure that pastors who 
spent a few years abroad could have their own parish once they returned to Germany.257  
On the eve of World War I, churches throughout South America, especially in Bolivia, 
Peru, Brazil and Chile joined into local communities. In Peru, for example, twelve were 
part of the Evangelical Association in Peru; in Brazil, 47 joined the Riograndeneser 
Synode; and in Chile, thirteen were part of the Synod in Valdivia.258 
                                                                
256 Schröder, Brasilien und Wittenberg, p. 378; and Frankfurter Zeitung, 22 October 1913. 
257 See, for example, Schröder, Brasilien und Wittenberg, p. 378; and Geissler, Die Kulturbedeutung der 
deutschen evangelischen Kirche in Brasilien, p 60. One of the side benefits of such a policy is that by 
guaranteeing they would receive their own parish upon return, more priests were willing to travel abroad 
in order to assist the Prussian State Church in safeguarding German settlers. 
258 Geissler, Die Kulturbedeutung der deutschen evangelischen Kirche in Brasilien, p. 81; and 
Michahelles, p. 201. 
122 
 
 Together with the efforts of the pastors and Church, the communities voiced 
strong nationalist feelings. Of all the various institutions which tried to preserve the 
connection of the German settlers with their Heimat, the evangelical church stands 
firmly at the forefront, along with German schools. Already in 1881, the Evangelische 
Gesellschaft issued a proclamation, which took up the widely publicized idea for 
emigration: “It is an established fact that the descendants of European or semi-European 
origin ruling in South America are unable to absorb the German immigrants, as is often 
the case in North America. Herein lies the legitimate, and in recent times, so often 
emphasized expectation that with increasing German emigration to South America the 
branch of our people will prove to be important in both the national and economic 
relationship.”259 
 The language of this proclamation was retained, albeit in a modified form over 
time. Hereafter, Protestant creed and the German language were viewed as an 
inseparable unity. Church leaders saw the Protestant Church throughout South America 
as a German National Church, and its nature belonged to the German church in the 
homeland.260 The characteristic trait in all the German municipalities was holding 
sermons and performing religious rites in German. By adhering strongly to the use of the 
German language, the Protestant Church stated, it would be able to slow down the 
assimilation of the settlers into local societies.261 “Therein the greatest influence lies… 
which the Church can exercise through its appointed ministers in preserving Deutschtum 
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abroad, that in all sermons its Germanness repeatedly is commemorated in the German 
Heimat.”262 In this way, the ministers argued, the practical drive and idealistic viewpoint 
of the colonists could be preserved. Moreover, the people could be educated about 
diligence, devotion to duty, a sense of truth and order, love of humanity, piety, and an 
enthusiasm for all that is good, true, and noble.263 In a similar way, then, the clergy also 
worked tirelessly during the German national festivals. Patriotic celebrations, such as the 
Emperor’s birthday, government anniversaries, and the centenary of the Battle of 
Leipzig, presented the pastors with festival services and prayer, especially ones which 
were of a religious and national dedication.264  
 The German Foreign Office, through its ambassadors and other agents, such as 
Pastor Braunschweig, became aware of these efforts, and, sensing a great opportunity, 
undertook efforts to provide aid to the churches abroad. In 1906, an earthquake struck 
Chile, causing significant damage in the city of Valparaiso. Knowing the importance of 
churches, Reichenau, through his contacts with the pastors, encouraged the Foreign 
Office to help the local churches rebuild. Not only would this help the churches resume 
their functions more quickly, but it would also demonstrate to the people in Chile, both 
the German settlers and native population, that Berlin could be counted upon in times of 
need.265 
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One problem that the settlers lamented, was the frequent exchange of the pastors, 
whose length of service in South America was usually about six years. Part of the reason 
that the ministers had a fixed term was that, from the viewpoint of the Foreign Office 
and the Oberkirchenrat, with every new priest, the people, especially in those areas with 
little to no German immigration, would receive a strong refreshment of the German way 
of life.266 Eventually, through reports from Pastor Braunschweig and Zollner, the 
General Superintendent of the Oberkirchenrat, permanent representatives were sent 
abroad. This was done was to provide on the spot church welfare and unity among the 
different local interests and confessional dispute. In nationalistic terms, the consolidation 
of the Protestant German element was viewed as especially important.  
In 1911, the Foreign Office sent Braunschweig to South America as part of the 
request for a permanent representative of the Protestant Church.267 Upon his arrival, he 
was immediately depressed by what he saw. In Chile, the Protestant Church struggled to 
gain a foothold. “Protestant churches are still seen very reluctantly because, due to the 
Chilean Constitution, the religion of the Republic [Chile] is apostolic Roman Catholic”, 
which resulted in limitations being placed upon those who did not follow the Catholic 
faith.268  Although more Protestant churches had begun to appear in Chile, when 
Braunschweig visited in 1911, there still were far too few churches. 
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As a result of his travels, in 1912, Braunschweig wrote a report to Berlin in 
which he encouraged action to be taken: “So the decisive hour for the Germans…draws 
near; it will also be the decisive hour for the German Protestant Churches…, which rises 
and falls with the German language of its parishioners. The more urgent the danger, the 
more necessary a work with concentrated power for this endangered property, whose 
preservation I must also explain today quite possibly for a long time.”269 While the 
Foreign Office and the Oberkirchenrat appeared willing to assist in rectifying these 
problems, it is difficult to gauge what, if any, success they had, as the outbreak of World 
War I curtailed their actions. 
With regards to Catholicism, the Jesuits and Franciscans were mainly responsible 
for the German Catholics in South America. In comparison to the Protestants, they were 
able to adapt better to the different cultural milieus, particularly in Brazil and Chile, 
which were heavily Catholic countries. Unlike the Protestants, they attempted to 
integrate aspects of both cultures. In the schools, for example, Portuguese and Spanish 
were used alongside German. Even still, German nationalist ideas were spread among 
them, and were an active part of their actions.  
The Jesuits and Franciscans possessed great influence in South America. Due to 
the decline of orders in South America, particularly in Chile and Brazil, the Franciscans 
took over several large monasteries in each country.270 More importantly, their schools 
were exemplary, particularly by the standards of their host nation. In Chile, for example, 
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the Jesuit college in Valdivia was highly regarded, and was known throughout the 
country and region. In Santa Catharina, the German Jesuits ran the only high school.271 
Even during World War I, the power of these groups remained large. Their schools 
largely remained open due to their practice of teaching Portuguese and Spanish, and 
their willingness to hold classes in both languages.  Still, due to their connection to 
Germany, and their strong orientation towards providing a German education, many of 
the schools faced hostility from the local populace and suffered considerable damage 
during the war.272 
The Jesuit and Franciscans zeal for preserving the German language and culture, 
and their reverence for the Kaiser was unquestionable.273 Despite the suspicions from the 
Protestants that they were “the gravediggers of Deutschtum,” the German ambassadors 
consistently reported about the German education which the children received in their 
schools.274 The Franciscans and Jesuits also had the support of the Kaiser. After 
Wilhelm visited Jerusalem in 1898, the Catholics received the news with great joy. Even 
though the shock of the Bismarck’s Kulturkampf could still be felt, religious clerics still 
remarked that, “since the time [of the trip to Jerusalem], we know we have an equal-
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representative Emperor.”275 Indeed, support from the government and the Foreign Office 
was sent to both the Catholic and Protestant groups in South America. 
 Popular consensus also played a role in the founding of Catholic groups 
throughout South America. In Rio Grande do Sul, for example, the desires of the 
German settlers helped in the establishment of the Catholic People Association. Clubs 
like this were created throughout South America, “out of a need to lift the cultural level 
of the German part of the Catholic faith.”276 As part of their goals, these groups aimed to 
care for the Catholic parochial schools, call for the publishing of good press, and provide 
education through open lectures, and meetings, among other methods. The associations 
also proved political centralization, harnessing the combined strengths of the different 
political groups. By 1913, the clubs had a significant number of members, and their 
influence was substantial enough that, according to the Stein, the German Consul, these 
groups could be regarded as a means of strengthening Deutschtum through good will.277 
From the very start of its interest in creating an influence abroad, the Foreign 
Office viewed the establishment of German communities as an important part of 
Germany’s development and foreign policy. Enacting such a strategy, however, 
especially at such a far distance, was difficult for the leaders in Berlin. As a result, they 
turned to the German diplomats and consuls to follow through with their vision. These 
men enthusiastically embraced the Foreign Office’s kulturpolitik, and continually 
                                                                
275 Treutler, 30 June 1902, PA-AA, R 38733. 
276 Deutsche Volksblatt, October 1902. 
277 In Rio Grande do Sul, for example, the Catholic People’s Association has over 6500 members. Consul 
Stein, 11 September 1913, PA-AA, R 38736. 
128 
 
submitted proposals for the promotion of Deutschtum to create a base for possible future 
events. Generalkonsul Zimmerer, for example, expressed his sentiments that the German 
element will once again dominate in areas with large German populations.278 
 Nonetheless, the German settlers faced several roadblocks in their attempts to 
preserve their Deutschtum, with the most serious threat coming from the governments of 
Chile, Bolivia, Peru, and Brazil. As a result, the diplomats had to temper their 
enthusiasm, and they, and the Foreign Office, had to proceed with caution in order to 
prevent upsetting the local governments. Indeed, in 1900, Zimmerer warned against 
entering “with its head through the locked front door”, and advised that it, “creep 
through the open back door.”279 
 Whether acting cautiously or not, the diplomat’s actions were necessary to fulfill 
the desires of the Foreign Office. In viewing their efforts in light of preserving the 
settlers’ Deutschtum, it is difficult to deny the undercurrents of “informal imperialism” 
present in the policy-making of the Foreign Office, and the actions of its diplomats in 
South America. On the eve of World War I, the German character of many towns 
throughout Brazil, Chile, Bolivia, and Peru was pronounced. As one visitor to Chile 
remarked, “Valdivia, situated at some distance from the coast, on the Calle-Calle River, 
is a German town. Everywhere you meet German faces, German signboards and 
placards alongside the Spanish. There is a large German school, a church and 
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various Vereine [German clubs], large shoe-factories, and, of course, breweries.”280 
Clearly, the efforts of the German settlers and diplomats were reaping benefits. These 
efforts did not go unnoticed either. As the London Standard remarked in 1909, 
“Germany’s growing influence over the South American States [was] again evident,” 
due, among others, to the establishment of German schools and churches, sending 
schoolmasters to establish new schools, and sending teaching aid.281  Without a policy of 
development in South America, and men like Michahelles, Treutler, and Reichenau, to 
help implement such a plan, Germany would not have been able to gain as much 
influence as it did in South America, and would have struggled in its “economic and 
ethical conquest of the land.”282 
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DEVELOPING A SOUTH AMERICAN ECONOMY: GERMAN TRADE 
AND BUSINESS INFLUENCE IN PERU, BOLIVIA, AND CHILE 
 
With the proper personnel in place to become the main influence in South 
America, the German government’s next concern was to articulate a policy, with the 
help of the Foreign Office and its diplomats, to achieve this goal. One of the most 
important aspects of this was to assist South American nations in their development and, 
in the process, promote the primacy of German economic presence. From early on, the 
German government recognized that South America would be an ideal place for buying 
and selling goods, but it initially struggling to gain a firm foothold with the South 
American nations. Moreover, with other imperial powers, such as Britain, France and the 
United States, also seeking to exert their influence in South America, German diplomats 
needed to find ways to do this without raising objections from nations in South America 
and antagonizing other foreign powers. The diplomats, then, relied on outside groups, 
and their personal connections to them, to encourage large trading firms, banks, and 
communication, railroad and shipping companies, among others, to invest in the area and 
help increase German economic presence. One such group that received their attention 
were the German communities that were established in South America, especially in 
Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Peru, and Bolivia. 
With more and more German communities appearing in South America, the 
German diplomats assigned abroad saw an opportunity to bolster their nation’s presence. 
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As a result, they sought support for them from the Foreign Office, and from interested 
groups, such as the Verein für das Deutschtum im Auslande (VDA). By the turn of the 
twentieth century, through the efforts of the diplomats, a variety of individuals, groups, 
associations, city and state governments in Germany, and businesses took ever-greater 
interest in German communities abroad. Together, these various actors, along with the 
German ambassador, lobbied the German government to support those communities. 
Their arguments were always framed in terms of two goals: to support German cultural 
development (Deutschtum) wherever it occurred, and, perhaps most important, to 
increase economic interconnections and relations between imperial Germany and other 
regions and states around the world.283 
For the Foreign Office, and the German government, the argument that caught 
their attention was that not only would support for these German communities keep the 
people who embraced German culture linked to Germans within the nation-state, but that 
those connections would also enable the development and expansion of trade with the 
regions in which those Germans lived. That, in turn, would guarantee markets in those 
regions for German goods, and the general assumption that the bigger and stronger the 
German communities became abroad, the better the markets would be.284 Trade, in short, 
would follow culture and language.  
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As was demonstrated in the previous chapter, schools were a large part of these 
German communities. Wherever they appeared, families among local elites sent their 
children to them. Germans settlers, the diplomats there, and the business and political 
elites in Germany recognized the benefits of this: incorporating the children of native 
elites into the German schools was a shrewd, long-term investment in future trade 
relations. These schools would help build cultural, economic, and political connections 
with local elites. In short, lending support to German communities, was an easy means to 
cultivating soft power, and benefiting from it.285 
While the Foreign Office, its diplomats, German businesses, and pan-Germanists 
all shared the same goal, to increase German economic presence in South America, they 
also held different views of how best to utilize the settlements to accomplish their 
objectives. For the pan-Germanists, sending emigrants to places in South America and 
building communities would help extend Germany’s global presence and would also 
create markets to import and export German goods. The Foreign Office, and its 
diplomats abroad, viewed these settlements not only as a ready place to sell German 
goods, but also to establish a foothold in South American markets. As the markets within 
the German communities grew, businessmen and their advocates, the diplomats abroad, 
looked to the areas beyond the settlements to expand. Banks, transportation companies, 
especially railroad and shipping, telegraph and agricultural industries, and German state 
governments all saw South America as a good opportunity to increase their, and the 
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nation’s, global presence. Establishing and protecting their economic interests in South 
America was critical to the Foreign Office as it believed a strong economic presence 
would ultimately prepare Germany for political annexation of these areas.286 
Still, when examining the success of trade in the nations in South America, the 
results were mixed. For every place where Germany found success, such as Chile and 
Argentina, there were other places, such as Brazil, Peru, and Bolivia, that were less so. 
In the case of Brazil, few businesses turned a profit, with most losing a significant 
amount of capital.  As Australian scholar Ian Forbes demonstrated while examining 
trade patterns, it was not the sheer presence of Germany in a country that determined 
economic expansion and success, but rather the internal conditions of the country 
itself.287 Still, while Forbes’ point is valid, determining whether German business 
ventures succeeded or not is to do so not only by applying modern definitions of 
business success and failure, but also using hindsight to what Berlin was, or was not, 
doing. For German businessmen, members in the Foreign Office, and settlers and 
diplomats in South America, the results of their efforts were neither preordained nor 
self-evident. These groups believed that they could find success throughout South 
America, and expended as much energy as they could in establishing, and fostering, 
trade that would succeed. 
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Beginning in the early nineteenth century, early supporters of German 
Weltpolitik, and globalization, assigned South America, and countries like Brazil, Chile, 
Peru and Bolivia, an important role in securing the economic position of Germany on the 
global stage. As producers of tropical products, such as coffee and rubber, and long-term 
buyers of industrial products, the nations of South America had an ever-increasing 
importance in the world market. For Germany, which lacked economically dependent 
territories in the world, the development of trade in South America was a vital necessity. 
In this hemisphere, which was poised for economic expansion by industrial nations, 
Berlin had to secure a proper place, and it needed to gain a share in the economic 
conquest of this continent.288 
Trading in Latin America, and establishing an economic influence, was 
complicated and difficult. Each nation in Latin American viewed German interactions 
differently, and the German government also had to navigate how the United States and 
other European states, most notably Britain and France, saw its actions. As a result, 
actions that were effective in one nation-state were not always useful in an another. 
Moreover, events both in Latin America and in Europe, such as German immigration 
during the late nineteenth century and the War of the Pacific, impacted, and influenced, 
the actions of the German diplomats abroad and the instructions they received from the 
Foreign Office.  
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There are, however, some similarities, particularly the use of German diplomats 
to encourage and protect the growth of German economic presence. To develop my 
argument, then, about German successes, and, in some cases, failures, the beginning of 
my discussion focuses on general economic policies in South America, and the various 
transnational networks which affected them. From there, I examine specific examples 
from Brazil and Chile, not for the sake of comparison, but rather to show that while the 
same underlying principles guided the growth of German economic influence, there 
were subtle differences as well. In the examples from Brazil, which the remainder of this 
chapter looks at, the efforts of emissaries of the Germany were less pointed and more 
disparate and focused more upon using soft power, such as German communities, to gain 
advantages. The following chapter examines the efforts in Chile, which were much more 
pointed as the German diplomats, businesses, and Foreign Office attempted to use events 
there to channel and shape its presence and influence, thereby hardening the soft forms 
of German power there.289   
Although Germany had been trading with Latin America throughout the 1800s, 
interest in trade with South America did not begin until the second half of the nineteenth 
century. While this was late compared to other areas, German ideas of a trade empire in 
South America expanded rapidly.290 With industrialization, the development of the 
banking system, and the growth of shipping companies, markets in South America were 
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beckoning. By 1890, Brazil, for example, was Germany’s main supplier of coffee; Chile 
saltpeter; Bolivia and Peru metals, such as iron, tin, copper and zinc. Initially, the nations 
of South America were mainly a source of supply for the Germans, but hopes were high 
that these areas could become viable markets for selling German goods. 
There were several factors that attributed to German success in the South 
American market. These included the high-level performance and overall quality of 
German goods, and, perhaps most importantly, the fact that the goods they sold were 
cheap.291 The British consul in Bahia, for example, wrote that while British items still set 
the standard for quality, they were nevertheless pushed out by inferior, but cheaper and 
more pleasing, German products.292 The German diplomats and consuls sent similar 
statements, and reports, to the Foreign Office. As a result, the Foreign Office pushed its 
diplomats in Brazil to encourage more German business to ship their goods there. 293 
Another decisive factor that increased the expansion of German exports were 
ambitious German middlemen. They received training at business schools in Germany, 
and applied what they learned to markets in South America. These men adapted their 
sales methods to the requirements of individual customers and to the local habits of their 
sales areas. Moreover, German industry, at the behest of the German diplomats, was 
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ready and able to respond to changes in requests, even for small orders. By doing so, 
they very quickly gained the goodwill of buyers in South America.   
Under guidance from German diplomats, businessmen gave importers in South 
America, particularly those in Peru, Bolivia, and Brazil, specific guidelines on how to 
package, present, and execute orders, and these rules were strictly followed. Helping the 
situation further were short delivery periods and the extension of long-term credit to 
buyers. They also used many customers’ preference for British and French goods to their 
advantage by selling their products with misleading names of origin. Jewelry from 
Pforzheim, Hanau or Schwäbisch Gmünd would receive French stamps and be sold as 
Parisian goods.294 Voß, the Handelssachverständige (trade expert), at the German 
embassy in Rio wrote to the Foreign Office that the preference for everything French 
also benefited German goods when they also appeared on the French market in Brazil, 
and South America with these French stamps.295 Commentators from various countries, 
including the United States, Britain, and France, agreed that the German businessmen in 
South America were more numerous, more aggressive, and smarter.296 In 1903, David 
Thompson, the U.S. ambassador to Brazil, reported that, “Germany has for a long time 
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worked steadily to monopolize the South American markets and German drummers are 
very active and numerous in Brazil.”297 
In the case of exports to government agencies in South America, which were able 
to assume a considerable amount of expansion of the public sector and modernization of 
the cities, German merchants adapted to the customs of the country to attract 
stakeholders, and, in some cases, offered officials considerable sums and other favors to 
gain their business.298 Shipping lines, for example, offered prominent South Americans 
free passage on their ships, and industrial companies then hosted them in Germany.299 In 
1904, with the help of German diplomats in Chile and Brazil, the Zentralverein 
deutscher Industrieller (Central Association of German Industrialists) sent experts to 
both countries to report on the prospects for the German economy.300 
Clubs, such as the Deutsch-Südamerikanische Gesellschaft (German-South 
American Society), Deutsch-Südamerikanische Handelsverband (German-South 
American Trade Association), and the Deutsch-Brasilianische Handelskammer 
(German-Brazilian Chamber of Commerce), worked with the German Foreign Office to 
cultivate links between German companies involved in trade, publicly in South America, 
                                                                
297 David Thompson to John Hay, 13 November 1903, National Archives, Washington D.C. (hereafter 
cited as NARA), RG 59. 
298 See, for example, Treutler, 30 December 1901, PA-AA, R 18020; and Gustav Michahelles, 19 June 
1913, PA-AA, R 18035.  
299 See, for example, the efforts made by Lauro Müller and Rodrigues Alves during their trip to Europe in 
1908, which can be found in correspondence between Albert Ballin, Gustav Krupp, Hamburgisch-
Südamerikanische-Dampf-Schifffahrtsgesellschaft (HSDG), Hugo Fürst von Radolin (German ambassador 
to France), Gustav Adolf von Götzen (Prussian ambassador in Hamburg), and Reichenau, PA-AA, R 
18020. 
300 Ramelow, Reisebericht, pp. 80ff. 
139 
 
agitated for closer trade relations, and maintained contacts with trade authorities in South 
America.301 The South American authorities themselves welcomed the efforts from these 
clubs as they also saw it as a method to promote the sale of their products in 
Germany.302  
Many German representatives, with assistance from the diplomats abroad, were 
well-trained at technical and business colleges and travelled to South America. 
Following the example of the men whom the Foreign Office chose to represent it in 
South America, these representatives had excellent language skills, and maintained 
close, personal contact with their customers, which was extremely important, especially 
in Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Bolivia. In these places, all business was concluded as 
personally as possible, with the customers rarely leaving anything to be decided via 
correspondence or telephone. The German diplomats and traders took advantage of this, 
whether it was the diplomats arranging one-on-one meetings, or the representatives 
frequently visiting their customers in order to secure deals. German banks, which were 
admired for their customer service, strongly supported these efforts.303 A similarly 
indispensable aid to exports was the German shipping companies, which were well-
regarded due to their fast and regular connections. Their careful handling of the loads 
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which were entrusted to them, and their extensive customer service, were well-known 
and highly valued.304 
Generally, import and export houses, usually located in major trade cities in 
South America, mediated trade between Germany and South America. They also served 
as representatives for large Germany industrial companies. In Brazil, for example, there 
were between thirty and forty commercial houses in Rio; in Peru, around twenty-five 
were found in Lima.305 The high price levels in South America, especially in Brazil, 
Chile, and Peru, ensured a satisfactory profit for importers, but the business itself was 
very demanding due to its many difficulties including fluctuating currencies, constant 
tariff quarrels, questionable business ethics of customers, and a certain degree of legal 
uncertainty.  Only exceptionally skilled men were able to handle such difficulties, 
namely those at the import and export houses, and the diplomats which Berlin sent 
abroad.306 Some companies had become big business enterprises and recorded very 
significant revenues.307 
One of the most well-known import and export house was that of Theodor Wille, 
which had offices throughout South America, although its primary locations were in 
Brazil. Along with facilitating trade, it also conducted banking transactions. In 1901, for 
example, Wille was able to loan 100000 pounds to the state of Rio de Janeiro. The 
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company primary was the agent of several large shipping companies and for many years 
was the largest coffee exporter in Brazil. From 1900 to 1912, the company by itself 
exported seventeen percent of the Brazilian coffee harvest, which was mainly grown on 
the company’s own plantations. It also controlled the power supply of several major 
cities in South America, particularly around Sao Paulo, Santiago, and Lima. 308 
Another major German import and export company was the Hermann Stoltz 
Company. It arranged 250 shiploads a year between Germany and South America, built 
factories, and even owned a few smaller ones. The Bromberg Company, another trading 
company, was the largest of its kind in South America. By itself, the company made 
large profits from its sale of wire, but it was also involved in constructing factories, 
owned rice plantations, built railroads, and setup electricity supply in many cities. 
Between its headquarters in Hamburg and its companies in South America, it employed 
nearly 3000 employees and workers. Karl Höpke was a relatively unknown businessman 
who worked mainly in Brazil. He started a small company in Santa Catarina and, 
ultimately, became the owner of one of the largest businesses in the area. Other 
important companies in Brazil, Chile, Bolivia, and Peru include agents of Krupp, an 
arms manufacturer; members of the Hasenclever family, which brought cement and 
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other building materials; Luiz Eisengarthen, the first company in the cotton trade in Rio; 
and Dusendschön and Cmok & Pook, rubber exporters.309 
Due to the efforts of these, and other trading companies, the German government 
was able to gain an advantage over its North American and French competitors, which 
had no companies of comparable size and resulted in them, at least partly, relying on the 
German house to distribute their goods. Only the British had trading houses of similar 
importance, but they only had a few in comparison to the numerous German ones.310 
Moreover, due to the constantly fluctuating rates and sales, expert knowledge of the 
economy was necessary, and so both German businesses and the Foreign Office turned 
towards its ambassadors for assistance to take advantage of the incredibly complicated 
customs tariff and to avoid many customs penalties.311 
 Although German manufactures began to rely more heavily upon German agents 
in South America, complaints about the lack of effectiveness and low enthusiasm for 
trade, especially exports, became more and more frequent. Making matters worse was 
the fact that there were no price wars or competition among traders in South American 
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markets, especially in the Chilean and Brazilian markets.312 There was room for British, 
French, German and even American goods. Importers did not help the situation by 
selling goods for all nations based purely upon what would make them the most money 
as opposed to being loyal to their home country. Specifically, the German businesses 
were becoming too international to be, as the Foreign Office hoped, an instrument of 
German economic nationalism. With the import companies being so international, and 
thus displaying a lack of commitment to national resources by allowing equitable 
distribution of goods from Europe and the United States, the Foreign Office, and its 
diplomats abroad, reproached the them for their competitive favoritism.313 According to 
a report from the British Consul General in Rio, for example, while the number of 
British import companies had declined, their imports had not. They remained steady 
because German trading companies were distributing the British goods, along with the 
German ones. As a result, German manufacturers and diplomats frequently lamented that 
even at the express request of German businesses, sometimes German goods were not 
received, and British and French items were recommended.314 
 Due to the discord concerning the activity of importers, representatives from 
German businesses increasingly were sent to South America to make direct contacts 
between the manufacturer and the buyer. In many cases, the representatives and the 
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German diplomats worked in concert and communicated heavily with one another in 
trying to bolster German trade. To further their ambitions, and circumvent the import 
houses, they made concessions to vendors in South America. While not all companies 
could afford to send men to South America, with the assistance of German diplomats, 
the transformation away from import houses became so strong that, for example, in 
Bahia, German import companies were rarely used.315 
 While German banks were late in entering the South American market, their 
establishment in the late 1880s also helped manufactures to circumvent import 
houses.316 The banks assumed responsibility for commodity loans, which thus reduced 
the risk of collection. At the same time, upon the departure of the goods, exporters and 
manufacturers would sent the original documents related to the goods to their banks, 
which they turned over to the buyer. A fee of approximately two percent of the bill of 
exchange was usually charged to the purchaser of the goods.317 In using the banks in this 
manner, both the exporters and manufacturer could assure that the buyers received their 
goods from customs and avoid any hassles which usually occurred with the import 
houses.318 
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 The call for German banks to promote exports only grew louder beginning in the 
1890s as Germany industry was beginning to boom. In Brazil, for example, it was 
estimated that annually three to three and half million marks in dues were sent to British 
banks. Looking closer at those charges, German diplomats and businessmen observed 
that from bills of 100000 marks, only 2000 marks were transferred to Germany.319 With 
exports from South America continuing to increase, German businessmen, with 
encouragement from their diplomats in South America, pushed for the banks to take 
control of money transfers of German exports. Starting in the 1890s, then, as the banks 
assumed control over exports, they were able to largely free German trade from the 
British currency and positively influence the German balance of payments.320 
 In the early 1880s, however, initial forays into establishing banks in South 
America met with little success as the focus was primarily on the earnings of the banks. 
Beginning in 1887 with the emphasis more on safe investments, and not earnings, the 
banks began to achieve more success. Precise demand regarding German economic 
interests was one of the primary tasks of the banks, along with price and gold trading. In 
the 1880s, in Brazil, the Brasilianische Bank opened branches in Rio de Janeiro, Sao 
Paulo, Santos, Bahia and Porto Alegre. Soon afterwards, the banks paid a five percent 
dividend on the paid-in capital, which gradually increased to an average dividend of nine 
                                                                
319 Karl Strasser, Die deutschen Banken im Ausland (Munich: 1924), p. 23; and Erwin Wiskemann, 
Hamburg und die Welthandelspolitik: von dem Anfangen bis zur Gegenwart, (Hamburg: Friederichsen, 
1929), p. 235. 
320 Hinden, Deutsche und deutscher Handel, p. 255. 
146 
 
percent, and paid close to fifteen million marks to investors.321 The Brasilianishce 
Bank’s payment of nine percent was the highest paid profits on capital which any 
German banks in Brazil paid. While very good, it never approached the yields of the 
British banks, which, at their height, paid a dividend of twenty percent. Along with the 
Brasilianische Bank, the Deutsche Überseeische Bank and the Deutsch-
Südamerikanische Bank also established branches in Rio, Sao Paulo and Santos.322 
 Again and again, German diplomats in South America, and German 
businessmen, called for capital investments, which could foster their influence and, 
ultimately, equal and surpass the British and French. “If we do not want to play the role 
of being thick-headed in the distribution of goods,” Treutler, the German ambassador in 
Brazil, wrote to the Foreign Office in 1905, “then we must invest capital through 
specialists.”323  
Regardless of such encouragement, South American assets were rarely traded on 
the German stock market. In the 1890s, for example, the Disconto Gesellschaft, a 
German bank, was initially assigned to work in Brazil after consulting with the Deutsche 
Bank. One of its major transactions was issuing a five percent loan of 22 million marks 
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to the Oeste de Minas railway company, and used the Brasilianische Bank für 
Deutschland as its intermediary. The railway company, however, was unable to turn a 
profit, and by the end of the decade, the company had become insolvent and its buyers 
suffered heavy losses. As the company could not pay its obligations in gold, investors 
looked to the state of Minas Gerias, where the railroad was being built, to assume the 
company’s debt; the state refused, referring to several clauses in the treaty that stated it 
was under no obligations to honor the company’s guarantees. It was only after several 
years of negotiations, which the German diplomats in Brazil headed, that the Brazilian 
government met German demands - the creditors were paid compensation with money 
from the state of Minas Gerias, which covered about fifty percent of the loss.324  
The effects of the failure to repay the investors for so long had a long-lasting 
impact on German bank investments, particularly in Brazil. When in 1902, the German 
Foreign Office submitted a plan to the Disconto Gesellschaft for a loan to the state of 
Rio Grande do Sul, the bank declined, afraid that its loan would not be repaid. Still, the 
Foreign Office, and its diplomats, did not give up in their attempts to bring German 
invests into South America.325 
In efforts to continue development of German economic interests and 
engagement, the Foreign Office also undertook more traditional methods. Two such 
ways were either to secure a share, or monopolize the extraction of a specific raw 
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material, such as coffee or cotton, and to invest capital in public service companies in 
order to attract construction contracts for the industry.326 For example, German 
companies would build and control electricity plants, participate in railways, set up 
sewer systems for the cities or expand port facilities for modern shipping.327 
 While German trade representatives and diplomats in South America were 
frequently recommending opportunities, they, along with the Foreign Office, struggled 
to convince German businesses to invest capital in South America. Unless there was a 
clear belief that an opportunity would be profitable or lead to political influence, many 
banks and companies were hesitant to provide finance or capital.328 Even in support of 
Deutschtum, it could be a struggle to obtain money from banks as the financial prospects 
were not seen as very attractive. Still, the Foreign Office did not stop its efforts to 
convince German companies and banks to assist in increasing German influence and 
presence, and it continued to rely on its diplomats and trade representatives to provide 
recommendations and assistance. 
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 Some areas that did see an influx of German money and capital was in the 
brewing and tobacco industries in South America. In Brazil, for example, development 
was so favorable that it was possible to cover the entire domestic demand quickly. 
Regarding tobacco specifically, Gerhard Dannermann, the founder of Dannermann 
Cigarrenfabrik which has become a well-known and popular German cigar maker, 
employed 20600 people in his factory and plantations throughout Brazil.329 
 Other areas which the Foreign Office, through its diplomats in South America, 
encouraged investments were in service sectors such as electric and cable. Siemens, for 
example, emerged in South America in the late 1890s. In 1898, with assistance from 
Deutsche Bank, it founded the Brasilianische Elektrizitätsgesellschaft with a capital of 
five million marks. At the same time, through a competition with the American 
Telephone & Telegraph Company (AT&T), Siemens won the right to develop the 
telephone system in Rio and other cities in Southern Brazil. The successes from these 
projects encouraged the company to finance more projects throughout South America. 
By the early 1910s, Siemens built electrified tram lines in Southern Brazil and Chile, and 
had begun to construct lines in La Paz and Lima.330 Although none of the projects 
Siemens financed turned a huge profit, the Foreign Office used the fact that the company 
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was still able to make gains to encourage more businessmen to invest in projects 
abroad.331 
 Coastal shipping was another area where German investing achieved moderate 
success through the encouragement of German diplomats. Initially, in both Chile and 
Brazil, coastal navigation was reserved only for their nationals. The existing lines in 
those countries, such as the Lloyd Brasiliero, however, failed to turn any profit, and 
consumed so many subsidies that the Chilean and Brazilian governments could no 
longer support them and looked towards foreign companies to assume control. Sensing a 
great opportunity for Germany to gain a stronger foothold in South America, German 
ambassadors, particularly Reichenau in Chile and Treutler in Brazil, wrote to the Foreign 
Office recommending to their leaders to encourage German companies to invest in South 
American shipping.332 In November 1871, for example, the owners of Amsinck, 
Woermann and Laeisz, a Hamburg shipping company, established the Hamburgisch-
Südamerikanische-Dampf-Schifffahrtsgesellschaft (HSDG) with an initial capital of 1.25 
million thalers.333 In 1871, the HSDG began service with three ships which could 
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transport a total of 5000 tons, with each ship making three round trips. In 1890, the 
company had twenty-seven ships, and had a net worth of twenty-five million marks, a 
drastic increase over its initial investment only twenty years earlier. On the eve of World 
War I, the HSDG was the second largest shipping line among Brazilian and Chilean 
shipping companies, and was the second largest shipping company in Hamburg.334. By 
the end of 1912, its fleet contained 53 steamers with a total tonnage of 330000 tons. 
There were 284 round trips per year with around 100000 people and 1.5 million tons 
transported.335 Since the HSDG was earning a profit, and due to good prospects for the 
future, shipping to South America, particularly to Brazil and Chile, soon attracted 
competitors. In 1876, the Norddeutscher Lloyd started to ship people and goods. Its 
primary focus and strength was transporting emigrants to towns and cities along the 
coast, particularly in Chile, Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, and Peru.336  
The Hamburg America Line (HAPAG), which had also just started transporting 
goods to North Brazil in the 1890s, seized upon the growing financial opportunities in 
South America, and in 1900 established lines to central and south Brazil, as well as to 
Chile and Argentina. Due to its successes in the area, a few years later, HAPAG bought 
the Freitas Line, another German shipping company, turned it into a brokerage firm to 
secure its client base, and then concluded its own pool agreement with the HSDG. As 
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part of the contract, HAPAG and HSDG established a uniform timetable for the routes to 
north, central and southern Brazil; for the La Plata route, which brought goods to the Rio 
de La Plata area and included stops in Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay; and for a route to 
Chile which also stopped in Argentina, Peru, and Bolivia. Two-thirds of the steamers on 
these routes belonged to HSDG, and the other third for HAPAG. At the end of each year, 
the profits made from these trips were divided accordingly. 
In September 1902, HAPAG and HSDG met at conferences in London and 
Ostend, Belgium, through the assistance and urging of German diplomats in South 
America, and agreed to a common tariff policy with other European shipping companies 
which travelled to South America. A particularly valuable part of this conference was 
the agreement made with the British Booth Line which transported goods to north 
Brazil. From it, the German lines were able to secure a monopoly between the Amazon 
region and Europe, much to the satisfaction of the German shipping companies, the 
Foreign Office, and its diplomats in South America.337 Due to the efforts of the 
diplomats and shipping companies, between 1870 and 1913, the German share of ship 
traffic from foreign nations increased dramatically; in Brazil, for instance, its shares rose 
from five to twenty-four percent. Although German shipping saw a positive increase 
during this period, it was not able to overtake the British, as it was able to expand its 
traffic by an even greater extent than the Germans. Only in a few ports in Peru and 
southern Brazil, were the German companies able to overtake the British by 1913.338 
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German diplomats, and the Foreign Office, however, were not deterred. Throughout this 
period, both parties firmly believed that the Reich could gain control of shipping in 
South America, and they constantly encouraged shipping companies in Germany to 
continue to invest in the area.339  
The laying of undersea cables to South America was another area in which 
German diplomats and the Foreign Office were politically and economically motivated. 
The Reichspostamt (Imperial Post Office) first proposed the idea to place a German 
cross-country cable to South America in 1904. The line would first reach Pernambuco, 
Brazil and then stretch across Brazil and into Chile, Argentina, Peru and Bolivia, among 
other places. The idea to undertake such a project occurred as an extension was sought 
on the transfer of transnational cables between Portugal and Brazil. The British 
previously had a monopoly on such transfers, but its control over it had expired. At the 
same time, the Spanish government wanted to provide its Western Telegraph Company 
with a monopoly on the cables between Cadiz, Spain and Tenerife (the largest of the 
Canary Islands) for twenty-eight years. In doing so, however, this would have excluded 
cable connections between Germany, West Africa and South America.340 Sensing a 
unique opportunity, the Reichspostamt reached out to the Foreign Office to seek 
assistance in gaining control of cables connections to South America, and of telegrams 
transmitted between there, West Africa and Germany. Despite the strong telegraph 
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traffic between Germany and South America – in 1904, for example, approximately 
42100 telegrams with 354400 words were sent from South America to Germany – the 
Reichspostamt’s interest, however, was less in the connection to South America than the 
one which would run to the German colonies in West Africa. Still, it viewed the South 
American cable as a method to compensate for the deficit that telegram traffic with the 
German colonies would generate.341 
Prior to 1904, telegrams from Germany travelled along the cable to Vigo (located 
in northwest Spain), and then to South America via the British Western Telegraph 
Company. For the Germans’ planned cable, however, the cheapest route was to go 
through Portugal and the Cape Verde Islands. Such a possibility, however, failed, after 
Portugal extended the monopoly of the British Western Telegraph Company.342 Since 
negotiations with the Portuguese ha, Berlin turned to the Spain and Liberia to gain the 
right to lay cable. The German delegation once again faced strong opposition from 
London, but ultimately, through the efforts of the Foreign Office and its diplomats, it 
was able to gain the right to place cable in Monrovia via Vigo.343 With the route from 
Germany to West Africa now secured, the Germans shifted their focus to obtaining land 
rights in South America, especially in Pernambuco, which was to be one of the main 
cable centers. Along with Reichenau, the German Ambassador to Brazil, a commissioner 
of the Felten-Guillaume cable factory, Spoerer, travelled to Rio for negotiations, which 
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began in March 1908. The talks, however, became very difficult due to the fact the 
commissioner had little knowledge of Brazil, did not know Portuguese, and rarely used 
“baksheesh” to control negotiations with the Brazilian government and obtain the 
concessions that the German government was seeking.344 Nonetheless, on 30 July, the 
Reichspostamt, through the German Foreign Office, especially Reichenau, received a 
commission to lay cable to Pernambuco.345 
 On 29 May 1911, the Deutsch-Südamerikanische Telegraphengesellschaft finally 
opened and the cables which it laid were made available to the German merchants. It 
took a long time, however, before the company was used with any regularity. Initially, 
potential customers in South America, particularly in Brazil, Chile, Argentina and Peru, 
did not know how to transmit messages over the cable, telegrams were garbled and, in 
some cases, took longer to send than those from the British Western Telegraph. 
Although the German ambassadors and consuls used the German company, and 
encouraged businesses and other government officials to utilize it, advertisements for it 
were lacking. The Deutsch-Südamerikanische Telegraphengesellschaft also suffered as 
the British Western Telegraph was more accommodating, providing its customers with 
discounts and correcting any telegrams that were garbled or transmitted incorrectly. 
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Although they had little proof, the German diplomats in South America suspected that 
the British company was trying to sabotage the efforts of the German company.346 
 Because of reports from diplomats in South America stating that development 
was unsatisfactory and containing numerous complaints, the Foreign Office issued a 
circular decree to embassies, diplomatic missions, and consulates in Brazil, Argentina, 
Chile, Bolivia, and Peru to take whatever steps were necessary to increase use of the 
German cable, such as advertising its use, and to report on the conditions of competition 
with the British Western Telegraph and its advertising methods.347 Many of the 
responses from the diplomats indicated that telegrams from the British company were 
more reliable, it was more active with its advertising, for example offering promotional 
gifts, and, perhaps most importantly, its customer service was more helpful.348 
Moreover, even though international regulations forbid it, British Western continued to 
not charge for garbled telegrams, tolerated contractions and other methods for writing in 
shorthand, and, overall, were very accommodating to its customers.349 Seeing these 
reports, the Foreign Office then instructed Reichenau, Treutler, Michahelles, and its 
other diplomats to use their connections with the Deutsch-Südamerikanische 
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Telegraphengesellschaft to create a more user-friendly cable company, as well as 
encouraging German and South American businesses to send telegrams through it.350 
 By 1913, through these efforts, the Deutsch-Südamerikanische 
Telegraphengesellschaft, was able to attract more customers in places like Brazil, Chile, 
and Argentina, and began to become profitable. The profits, however, could have been 
greater, but the Germans were unable to break the British dominance of cable routing 
and telegraph service in South America. The outbreak of World War I further stymied 
Berlin’s efforts as the Allied forces seized control of the cable and, after the war was 
ended, eventually cut it, preventing the Germans from making any further use of it. 
As the previous chapter has shown, German communities were a clear expression 
of informally developing German influence in South America. At the same time, they 
also represented a very nuanced development of the various types of economic interests 
and policies that the diplomats were pursuing. One of the best examples of how German 
diplomats and the Foreign Office used these settlements to encourage German economic 
growth occurred in Brazil beginning in the 1890s.  
German settlers had been immigrating to southern Brazil since the early 1800s. 
They left Germany seeking the usual things: opportunity, escape from the past and 
poverty, and adventure. Various societies in the German states pushed their citizens to 
emigrate to alleviate the pressures of overpopulation and inadequate opportunities at 
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home. The Brazilian government also encouraged immigrants to come to its country 
offering free or subsidized land in isolated settlements. 
By the 1850s, however, Prussia grew concerned that Catholic Brazil was treating 
German immigrants, particularly Protestants, harshly. This concern was further 
exacerbated by the Brazilian government’s policy of declaring all persons born in Brazil 
to be Brazilian citizens, which greatly complicated the German consuls’ and diplomats’ 
ability to protect the German settlers and their descendants. The Prussian government’s 
anxiety only increased with the cessation of the slave trade in Brazil in the 1850s, which 
resulted in a labor shortage. Prussia feared that their helpless immigrants would alleviate 
this shortage by replacing the slaves as cheap labor.351 Therefore, to combat this, the 
Prussian minister of trade, August von der Heydt, proposed a law that, while it did not 
forbid Prussians from immigrating to Brazil, it did prevent all efforts to encourage them 
to do so. In 1859, the Prussian government passed the Heydt’sche Reskript, and other 
German governments soon followed suit. 
In the late 1870s, after German unification and during the economic depression 
of the same decade, there was a growing sentiment in Germany for repealing the 
Heydt’sche Reskript. The German government, however, was slow to respond. For 
Chancellor Bismarck, neither Brazil nor the Reskript was a pressing issue. He had 
contempt for Germans who emigrated – to him, they were cowards evading military 
service. Moreover, in the Iron Chancellor’s opinion, Brazil was an undesirable location 
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because of the continuing horror stories about German living conditions there and 
because it fell within the United States’ sphere of influence.352 
Several events in the 1890s would change Berlin’s stance on the Reskript and 
German immigration, however. First, with the dismissal of Bismarck in 1890, Wilhelm 
II, who began to consolidate his power, looked favorably upon the expansion of German 
influence in Brazil.353 Second, political instability in Brazil following the fall of the 
monarchy in 1889 led the German government, and particularly the Foreign Office, to 
hope that the federal government in Rio de Janeiro would be unable to hold the country 
together and the southern states would break away and turn to Germany for 
protection.354 These hopes were bolstered in 1893 by a naval mutiny in Rio de Janeiro 
which coincided with a revolt in southern Brazil. Berlin was sympathetic to the 
mutineers and the secessionists, As a result, it did not join with the United States in 
sending warships to Rio, whose port the rebels blockaded, to help defeat the rebellion. 
Nonetheless, while the Foreign Office did not openly support the rebels, it quietly hoped 
that they would ultimately emerge victorious. Lacking any foreign support and 
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exhausted, however, the protestors surrendered in March 1894, but hopes persisted in the 
German Foreign Office that they might one day rise again.355 
Amongst this backdrop, trade prospects remained high in Brazil during the 1890s 
and into the early 1900s, and German diplomats stationed there continued to see 
opportunities for their homeland. In southern Brazil in 1895, the German ambassador, 
Krauel, who was the first German diplomat to visit the German settlements in the south, 
sent enthusiastic reports to Berlin, commenting on how well the settlers were treated and 
how exciting the trade prospects were. Nonetheless, as he saw it, trade was somewhat 
lacking as the flow of German emigrants to Brazil was falling. “The German colonies in 
southern Brazil are a rich treasure that has been overlooked until now,” he wrote to his 
superiors.356 Karl Kaerger, a German agricultural expert travelling with him, shared this 
opinion. He, in concert with Krauel, suggested that promoting emigration to South 
America would bolster economic penetration.357 
Along with the Foreign Office, one of the biggest supporters of German 
expansion in South America were the pan-Germanists. They were especially interested 
in establishing communities abroad, and were very vocal about their hope that a New 
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Germany would flower in places such as southern Brazil, Chile, and Peru. The 
government, willing to use any assistance it could, supported them as much as it 
could.358  
The pan-Germanists in particular saw Brazil as an ideal location, as the climate 
was pleasant, the land fertile, the natives friendly, and thousands of Germans already 
lived there. Just as important, the three southern states, particularly Rio Grande do Sul, 
were demographically friendly. “Brazil is a distant, chaotic country of 16,000,000 
people,” a pan-Germanists penned at the end of the nineteenth century, “but it controls a 
rich and fertile empire… that could become as important as the United States if only 
people of Germany…. were to rule it.”359 
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The pan-Germanists shared this view with a large part of German society. 
German pamphlets extolled the benefits of emigrating to Brazil over other areas, such as 
Mexico or the United States. “A German emigrant who comes to southern Brazil is more 
valuable to Germany than twenty who go to North America.”360 The prevailing reason 
was that Germans in Brazil bought manufactured goods from Germany and exported 
produce back that was not grown at home, whereas Germans in North America bought 
manufactured goods, particularly those from America, and exported produce back to 
Germany that competed with the local goods. As one prominent pan-Germanist extolled, 
“Any German who goes to South America… and starts working there is a more effective 
propagandist for German products than the best trader can be.”361 Such sentiments 
continued throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, especially among 
those in the diplomatic service. In 1907, for example, Ambassador Reichenau echoed 
these sentiments: “German immigrants here… are good consumers for our products 
and… help to turn the natives and other immigrant groups into buyers of German 
products.” In a message to the Foreign Office several weeks later, he again recalled this 
idea: “In southern Brazil, German emigrants remain consumers of German products, 
while their produce does not compete with ours.”362 
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German businesses supported sending German emigrants to Brazil as a means for 
increasing their profits. In the late 1890s, the profits of shipping companies were 
suffering because of a decrease in emigration. Thus, in 1899, the directors of Nord 
Deutsche Lloyd and the Hamburger Amerika Linie became founding members of the 
Deutsch-brasiliansche Gesellschaft. Its primary goal was to promote trade with southern 
Brazil and to steer emigrants to it. The latter being the most important, as the companies 
could turn larger profits with emigrants taking their ships to Brazil.363 
The sentiments, and desires, of the German businesses and diplomats in South 
America did not go unheard. In 1896, the German ambassador, Krauel, painted a portrait 
of lost opportunities in southern Brazil to Wilhelm II. “Ways must be found as quickly 
as possible to strengthen Deutschtum there,” the Kaiser commented on one of Krauel’s 
lengthy reports.364 As a result, Germany began to take a more active role in trying to 
direct German emigrants towards southern Brazil, where the people would be tied 
culturally and, perhaps most importantly, economically to their fatherland. In the 
preamble to the 1897 emigration law, it stated that in Brazil, “not only will the German 
preserve his nationality, but he will find… all the conditions favorable to a prosperous 
existence. He will, moreover, become a consumer of the products of German 
industry.”365 
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Such news was encouraging to German nationalists and businessmen. As the 
1902 Deutsche Kolonial Kongress resolved, “it is in the interest of German emigration, 
trade and industry to direct emigrants to a country with a moderate climate in South 
America, and especially to southern Brazil. We must encourage the settlement of 
Germans there through the German spirit of enterprise, German capital investment, and 
German policy.”366 For these two groups especially, the basic idea was simple – start 
with a few Germans migrating to southern Brazil, add more, and eventually, an empire 
would develop. There did not have to be more Germans than Brazilians in the region. 
The German culture and business presences would naturally dominate. All that was 
necessary was enough people to support the German presence.367 Ultimately, the 
pervading idea was that the southern states would secede and turn to Berlin for 
protection, which meant anything from friendly interest to annexation. The diplomats in 
Brazil served as the main force there to achieve such an objective. Gustav Schmoller, an 
eminent political economist who had ties to the Foreign Office, wrote, “We must at all 
cost try to create in southern Brazil a German country… it is not important whether it 
remains part of Brazil, becomes an independent state, or has a close association with the 
German empire.”368 His thoughts directly impacted Krauel’s thinking and actions in 
Brazil, and he sent a copy of Schmoller’s writings to the Foreign Office, with such ideas 
underlined for his superiors. 
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It is important to note, however, that while such nationalistic thinking matched 
very well with Germany’s ideas of being a global power, it was also not the only line of 
thinking which the government followed. By the turn of the century, the Foreign Office, 
and its diplomats, were aware of Brazilian and European, particularly British and 
French, fears concerning German aims. Through its diplomats there, the Foreign Office 
tried to assuage these concerns, but it struggled to put enough distance between itself and 
the nationalist programs of groups like the Pan-German League. Part of the reason why 
was due to the power that German businesses possessed, and the fact that they, along 
with high ranking members of the government, shared in the dreams of the pan-
Germanists. A prominent German business owner in Hamburg wrote, “The pan-German 
conception… is no fantastic idea confined to a small class of Jingo politicians, but is the 
avowed aim of modern German economists who make the music for the politicians.”369 
By the early twentieth century, even German newspapers began to expound pan-
German ideas, particularly as it related to expanding the German economy. In 1901, an 
editorial in the Grenzboten, an influential pro-imperialist paper, appeared which stated,  
Can the German Empire, which wants to be – and will always be – a world 
power, remain a spectator to the passage of one South American Republic after 
another into political and commercial dependence of the United States of 
America?... The complete exclusion of Germany from all America would be 
equivalent to our economic and political death… We cannot and we will not 
tolerate being excluded from that part of the world.370 
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The possibility that such stories could damage the public’s, especially those in Chile, 
Brazil, Peru, and Bolivia, generally positive attitude towards the Germans, and thus limit 
the goodwill of their politicians, worried German businessmen and diplomats in South 
America and Germany. As early as 1895, for example, Krauel, complained to the 
Foreign Office about such “tactless” articles in the German press. Such ideas only fueled 
rumors about German intrigue in southern Brazil, which put the local government on 
notice. In the margin of an article attached to the ambassador’s message, an official at 
the Foreign Office scrawled, “This can only make trouble.”371 In a message to Krauel, a 
German business owner wrote, “Unfortunately, part of the Brazilian press in picking up 
these attacks [on German policy in Brazil], and they have created hostility in Brazilian 
public opinion. I am convinced that the Brazilian politicians do not believe the reports, 
but public opinion could force them to refrain from showing the German settlement the 
goodwill it needs.”372 
Focusing on trying to create goodwill and increase trade without directly 
antagonizing local and foreign governments, consortiums of export and shipping firms 
attempted to set up small German communities in South America to promote emigration.  
Perhaps one of the best examples of such action took place in Brazil at the end of the 
nineteenth century. In 1896, several German businesses, including the Nord Deutsche 
Lloyd and Hamburg-Amerika Linie, agreed to set up the Hanseatische Kolonialisierung 
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Gesellschaft (HKG) and purchase a large tract of land in the Brazilian state of Santa 
Catharina. In doing so, these businesses, with assistance from the German diplomats and 
the Foreign Office, hoped to increase trade with Brazil, and spur development. The 
society was incorporated on 30 March 1897 with an initial capital investment of 1.5 
million marks. Almost two months later, on 28 May, the HKG, through help from the 
Foreign Office, negotiated the purchase of the land with Santa Catharina, and work 
began in September, but only in earnest after Berlin had granted the society permission 
to recruit emigrants. The initial plan was to begin with 1000 immigrants per year, 
increase the quota annually by 500 for eleven years, and maintain an influx of 6000 
emigrants per year until 50000 Germans settled in the colony.373 
Although there was support from the German government to grant permission for 
the consortium to form the HKG, not everyone was in favor of it. The German Agrarian 
League (Bund der Landwirte, or BDL) criticized the plan. “It is doubtful,” Arthur von 
Posadowsky-Wehner, the imperial secretary of the Interior, declared in June 1898, “that 
it is wise to grant a concession to an emigration society for the Urwald in Brazil.... 
Moreover, southern Brazil is of little significance as a market for German products."374 
Bülow, however, then the foreign secretary, adamantly disagreed. Although Germany 
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was experiencing an economic upswing and needed agricultural workers, he argued "the 
day may come when we will want more people to emigrate. It makes sense, therefore, to 
start now.... Furthermore, the Kaiser and the chancellor are in favor of it."375 The 
ministers of justice and trade agreed with Bülow, as did Alfred von Tirpitz, secretary of 
state for the Imperial Navy, while the powerful finance minister Johannes von Miquel, 
expressed only minor reservations. On 13 November 1898, the concession was finally 
granted.   
The land was a tract of approximately 1.6 million acres 75 miles west of 
Blumenau.376 In 1898, German newspapers were covered with advertisements to attract 
emigrants to it. Pan-Germans extolled the vibrant life of the colonists. The HKG itself 
mounted a vigorous campaign to attract colonists. Despite all this, however, the colony 
struggled. Shortly after arriving, many of the Germans who were persuaded to go were 
unhappy and dissatisfied. Rather than living in pleasant little villages, the immigrants to 
the Hansa lived on primitive farms surrounded by forest. It took at least six months to 
grow crops, and, in the meantime, they accrued crippling debts. In the first ten years of 
the colony, more than half of the newcomers left. German diplomats and consuls blamed 
the initial screening process: some emigrants, they argued, were doomed to fail, mainly 
because they lacked the skills to make a living in Brazil.377 
                                                                
375 “Minutes of a Session of the Ministry of State,” 8 June 1898, ibid.; and Posadowsky-Wehner to Bülow, 
2 October 1898, ibid. 
376 HKG to Bülow, 25 July 1902, Bundesarchiv-Berlin, R 30831; and Sellin to Aichberger, 30 April 1903, 
Bundesarchiv-Berlin, R 30832. 
377 Hans von Wangenheim to HKG, 29 December 1904, ibid.; and “Annual Report 1902”, n.d., ibid. For 
other descriptions of the difficulties which colonists faced see Berliner Tageblatt, 28 July 1899; Kölnische 
Zeitung, 10 March 1902, and Münchner Post, 26 November 1902. 
169 
 
The difficulties the emigrants faced were no surprise to the businessmen who 
headed the Hansa and those who had interests in Brazil. From the start, they made it 
clear what support they would require from the government. In a letter written to the 
Foreign Office in 1898, which Bülow himself read, 
The HKG faces a very difficult challenge .... [It] must counter the negative image 
of Brazil as a tropical, disease ridden country, an image that is true of only a 
small region. .... Despite all the care the HKG will exert in the selection of the 
land and emigrants, it is inevitable that many will be disappointed and will 
complain, but any large-scale emigration scheme is impossible unless one has the 
courage to accept these risks.378 
One of the largest problems that German trade faced in Brazil, which was even more so 
acute in the Hansa colony, was the fact there was not enough capital invested in the 
country. In particular, there were no railroads in German hands, which, by itself could 
revive German exports through its demand for building materials and equipment. 
Middlemen, including native Brazilians, inflated the cost for transportation to and from 
the German colonies, and this caused the goods the colonists produced to become 
uncompetitive outside the colonies, as well as making the cost of those they imported 
exorbitantly high.  
To help offset these problems, leaders of the Hansa spoke with the Foreign 
Office, mostly through the diplomats in Brazil, about building a railway from the 
colony’s main town, Harmonia, to Blumenau. “The building of the railway cannot be 
separated from the cultural task of maintaining Deutschtum in southern Brazil,” the 
Kölonische Zeitung declared in 1899. The German diplomats agreed. “Soon, a cultural 
                                                                
378 Wiegand to Bülow, 9 September 1898, Bundesarchiv-Berlin, R 30826.  
170 
 
street will be laid through the heart of South America that will be a major artery or the 
spread of German activity,” wrote Haniel, the charges d’affaire, in 1900.379 
 The HKG, however, required nearly five million marks to construct the much-
needed railroad. In 1902, in a letter to Ambassador Treutler, the directors of the HKG 
threatened, “If we do not get the necessary financial support, our successful work 
may…. have to end.” In another message sent to him, and also addressed to Bülow, they 
warned, “Our initial capital is almost exhausted. Your response will be of decisive 
important. We do not need to explain the significance for Germany of our endeavor to 
you, nor do we need to remind you of the negative consequences for the prestige of 
Germany in Brazil should our society fail…. Therefore, we humbly request that the 
society receive at least 300,000 marks from the group of banks under control of the 
government.” As the head of the Nord Deutscher Lloyd informed the Foreign Office, 
“the capital cannot be raised without the active participation of the government.”380 
 Just a year later, in 1903, the annual report of the HKG was bleak. “The railway 
should have been built first, before we thought about colonization.... Instead, in southern 
Brazil, we have done the opposite. That is why most of the colonists are still poor.” 
Going further, it explained that if the railroad were close to the colony, then the 
middlemen “would not be able to engage in their usual bloodsucking because there 
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would be competition. As it is, the colonists are at their mercy.”381 In 1904, a captain in 
the German Navy touring Brazil wrote to Treutler and the Foreign Office that Santa 
Cartarina “lacks good natural harbors… and navigable rivers. This makes it all the more 
striking that the whole state has only one stretch of railway.... It is said that the HKG… 
will collapse soon. That would be a great pity for Germany…. It would be of greatest 
significance if the railway to Blumenau were to be funded with German capital.”  In 
another letter to Berlin, the German ambassador was blunt: “For the Hansa, this railway 
is… a matter of life or death.”382 
The Foreign Office recognizing that the railway was key to the colony’s success, 
tasked its agents in Brazil to do what was necessary to urge the banks to provide the 
necessary funds. Securing the capital from the banks was far from easy for the Foreign 
Office, or the German diplomats in Brazil. Unlike German businessmen and traders, the 
bankers who did venture to Brazil were more cautious, rarely taking risks on their own, 
and when they did, it was usually through partnerships with other banks, particularly 
British ones.  
The caution of the bankers dismayed German officials and businessmen. They 
complained that the bankers “stood by and watched with their arms crossed while other 
nations fought for capital investment opportunities.”383 At the 1902 Colonial Congress, 
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the head of the Colonial Geographical Society, Dr. R. Jannasch, exclaimed, “Let us 
induce our great moneyed institutions to establish affiliated banks there…. Let us 
persuade everyone in Berlin that the railroads in southern Brazil should be held by 
German shareholders!... In short, let us cultivate the far west of southern Brazil just like 
North America has cultivated its west!”384 The bankers, however, were hard-pressed to 
change their views. Their main goal was to make a profit, and they hesitated to invest in 
any risky ventures, of which, in their opinion, railroads in Brazil were one of the riskiest.  
German traders and businessmen in Brazil were disgruntled. They complained, 
“that German initiative and German capital remained aloof from Brazil.”385 As a result, 
German businessmen and investors often relied upon members of the Foreign Office, 
both its diplomats in Brazil and those in Berlin, to intercede on their behalf with the 
bankers. In a long letter to Berlin in 1907, Treutler, sharing the views of his consuls, 
expressed his opinion on the situation in Brazil: “Ever since I became minister, I have 
observed… that with rare exceptions German capital is very passive about the economic 
development of Brazil… I asked all the career consuls for their expert opinions about 
this, and their responses confirmed my observations. Almost all said that over the last 
decade they had repeatedly stressed the importance and profitability of economic 
endeavors in Brazil.” He ended his letter encouraging the Foreign Office to do more.386 
While it was very aware of the stakes involved, what efforts they took did not nearly go 
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as far as the German ambassador, or his consuls had hoped, as it merely informed the 
bankers of the Hansa’s need for capital, and encouraged them to provide it. 387 
 In the case of the Hansa especially, a railway was essential.  Without it, even 
after a vigorous campaign to attract colonists, the colony stood on the verge of collapse 
by 1906. A year earlier, the consul in Florianopolis informed the Foreign Office of the 
overwhelming need for a railroad, regardless of the cost: “it is not a question of the 
profitability of a small local rail line of a few kilometers, but of our national purpose. 
Will Germany, in view of the threatening U.S. invasion which is already at the door… 
maintain its present interest in Santa Catarina or will we surrender it?”388 
 Still, the banks were hesitant to provide any assistance. Previously, the Diskonto 
Gesellschaft, the leading German bank in Brazil, had negotiated two loans, both in 1887, 
for the construction of a Brazilian railroad. When the loans failed shortly after 
construction began on the railroad, and the bank’s subsequent loss of its investment, its 
lenders were hesitant to support another rail project. Increasing their tentativeness was 
the fact that, in 1902, the Brazilian state of Minas revoked its railroad concession to the 
Germans.389 
Nonetheless, the threat of the U.S. building a railroad in southern Brazil finally 
provided enough impetus to force the German bankers to act and raise the necessary 
capital for the Hansa line. In 1906, a U.S. company bought a controlling interest in the 
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Sao Paulo and Rio Grande Railroad. Increasing concern among the German businessmen 
and diplomats in Brazil was the fact that this was a line related to that stretch which 
would connect Hammonia to Blumenau, Germany’s two biggest colonies in southern 
Brazil. In a cautionary letter sent to Berlin, Treutler wrote, “One thing is clear: with this 
railway business, the Americans have assured themselves a very strong position in 
southern Brazil that will not only threaten and hurt the first place we have heretofore 
enjoyed but also damage the future development of our interests in the region.” Taking 
his warning seriously, the Foreign Office leaned on the banks to provide the necessary 
capital for the railroad. Finally, the efforts of the ambassador, and the Foreign Office, 
paid off, as the banks raised the money needed to construct the Hansa line.390 
On 26 February 1906, German investors formed the Santa Catarina Joint Stock 
Company with a capital investment of 400000 marks to build a railroad from Blumenau 
to Hammonia. Although the colonists finally were seeing results with the construction of 
a railroad, there were still problems. In June 1906, Treutler sent an editorial from the 
May edition of Der Urwaldsbote, one of the local newspapers for the Hansa, which 
highlighted the growing despair of the colonists, to the Foreign Office: 
Once again, deafening silence is all we hear about the railway for which we have 
harbored such high hopes. Even diehard optimists- among whom we count 
ourselves-are overcome with pessimism. When the conversation turns to the 
railway, people say, "Once again, nothing has happened."… [The men] in whose 
hands the future of the railway lies abide by the motto ... "Inch by inch." We 
suggest they adopt instead: "It is better to do something than to contemplate 
doing it forever."391 
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By August, the situation was still bleak. The directors of the HKG wrote to Treutler 
threatening to dissolve the society and hand the concession to the United States if the 
railroad was not financed by January 1907. 
The construction of this railway is fundamental to the success of our undertaking, 
as we stressed from the beginning. We believe that the liquidation of our society 
is inevitable [if the railway is not built]. The failure to build it has had a 
devastating impact on the morale of the colonists. Bitterly disappointed, many 
families have left.... We were recently approached by a middleman, apparently 
with U.S. backers, interested in building the Santa Catarina railway. It is no 
secret that the United States has recently ... made a concerted effort to achieve 
commercial and political hegemony in Brazil by pushing out European, and 
particularly German, trade.392 
Recognizing the need for urgency, the German ambassador wrote to the Foreign Office. 
Its leaders saw that action needed to be taken and authorized Treutler to apply necessary 
pressure on the banks to continue to provide the capital needed to build the Brazilian 
railroad. 393 In December 1906, A. W. Sellin, a German who had significant interests in 
southern Brazil, published an article in Amerika, which Treutler passed along to his 
superiors in Berlin, emphasizing the same point: “If this railway is not built, then we 
should give up all hope that Santa Catarina – which for eighty years has been colonized 
by Germany – will be German in the future…. We will lose more and more ground to 
the United States in Southern Brazil.”394  
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 Finally, on 2 February 1907, the Santa Catarina Joint Stock Company was 
officially registered, and its railroad opened two and a half years later in October 
1909.395 To those in Berlin, the creation of the railroad was a success – while reading a 
report on the railway in 1911, the Kaiser wrote “Bravo!”396  To the diplomats and 
colonists in Brazil, as well as the German businessmen, however, the results were less 
spectacular. These groups all hoped that the colony would attract over 50000 German 
emigrants, but by 1911, it only boasted a population of 2478, and the railroad itself was 
losing money.397 Nonetheless, the German diplomats, colonists and businessmen still 
believed that Germany could maintain a strong presence in Brazil. They needed to gain 
stronger support from the government, however, before any real progress would be seen. 
As Treutler pointedly stated, “Without our assistance, these elements – already lost to us 
politically – would also be lost to us economically. We must – by all available means – 
preserve…”398 
 The need for the construction of a railroad in Santa Catarina underscores the 
importance of these colonies in South America for businessmen, pan-Germanists, and 
government officials. Part of the reason these groups were so desirous of creating 
settlements was because they expected them to boost trade abroad as a whole. For the 
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Foreign Office to increase trade in South America, “the Germans there should mingle 
freely with the population, making their habits and customs known and appreciated, 
while at the same time preserving their German character and spirit.”399 In the case of 
Chile, for example, the German population was small, although not insignificant, when 
compared to the total populace there.  Still, “German imports…. and exports... were now 
more important than those to or from any South American country.400 
Germany still struggled to control trade in South America, however. Part of the 
reason its trade lagged was due to import and export duties on goods. South American 
custom laws also particularly affected German interests. One of the most notorious was 
the Brazilian tariff. In a message to the Foreign Office in 1896, the German ambassador 
in Brazil, Krauel, called the tariff a “monster of expansion and bad execution.” In 1898, 
for example, due to the Brazilian custom laws, there were over twenty different 
categories for street organs on which duties had to be paid.401 As a result, customs 
clearance, in Brazil and elsewhere in South America, became a source of constant 
annoyance. In some cases, the clearance could take several weeks, with the staff taking 
advantage of even the slightest inaccuracies in documentation to incur custom penalties, 
which would result in further delays.402 South American countries used these 
protectionist tariffs to raise a certain percentage of gold to guarantee a stable income for 
its government. This was especially important for those countries, like Chile, Brazil, 
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Argentina, and Bolivia, which were experiencing a decline in the price of their currency 
due to a market depression in the 1890s.403 
Of greater concern to German businesses than protective customs were the 
differential customs laws which several South American nations began to implement, 
particularly Brazil.404 In 1890, the United States passed the McKinley tariff whose aim, 
at least partly, was to create a large sales market for the United States in South America 
through special customs agreements. Washington concluded the first of these agreements 
with Brazil on 5 February 1891. Brazil granted the United States reductions on certain 
goods and granted similar concessions to its export products.405 Immediately after its 
publication, however, the agreement was met with sharp criticism from European 
importers. Brazil itself was also disappointed as the United States reached similar 
agreements with other South American states and their goods were given the same 
advantages. This resulted in the concessions for Brazil becoming worthless and the loss 
of revenue from the reduced tariffs remained.406 
German businesses, having learned about these treaties through their connections 
with the German diplomats in South America and the Foreign Office, became very 
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uneasy. The Hamburg Chamber of Commerce, for example, demanded that Berlin raise 
serious objections with the Brazilian government.407 The Foreign Office, on the advice 
of their agents in South America, acted quickly, and tried to obtain similar most-favored 
nation treaties, not only in Brazil but also in Chile, Peru and Argentina. The diplomats 
headed the negotiations and were cautious in trying to avoid starting any tariff wars. In 
Brazil, for example, the consul in Petropolis, Otto von Dönhoff, demanded that German 
products be treated equal with those from the United States. When the Brazilian 
government delayed in responding to his demand, he secretly worked to increase the 
Brazilian public’s objection towards the American treaty. The German ambassador, 
however, was not able to sway the leaders in Rio as they rejected the idea of granting 
Berlin a most-favored nation treaty.  
With the failure to secure such an agreement, the Foreign Office proposed that 
Brazilian goods be subjected to a differential tariff.408 Dönhoff, however, advised against 
such actions, as this would create a customs war that could harm German businesses. 
The German Treasury, in a report sent to the Foreign Office, agreed with his assessment. 
In the case of tobacco, coffee, and leather, for instance, even after a tariff increase, 
German business would still be dependent on these goods and only the consumers would 
see an increase in price. With a decreasing income from the tariffs due to lower 
consumption of these goods, the treasury would suffer heavy losses.409 Fortunately, 
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Germany was able to avoid a costly tariff war due to Brazil terminating its agreement 
with the United States in September 1894. 
Although the Brazilian tariff concession with the United States affected only a 
small percentage of German exports, the German ambassadors in South America were 
worried about the future developments. In 1904, when Brazil and the United States once 
again established new tariff concessions, Treutler wrote to the Foreign Office expressing 
his concern that these reductions in tariffs was "an advance of the United States in the 
economic sphere of unimaginable scope which threatened German trade severely." The 
Imperial Treasury and Reichsamt des Innern (the Ministry of the Interior) also agreed.  
Following the initial agreement, further reductions on tariffs for other goods occurred. 
More troublesome was the fact that other South American countries, such as Chile, Peru 
and Bolivia, began to follow the Brazilian example. The German ambassador again 
wrote to Berlin expressing that “all measures taken by Germany must be viewed from 
the point of view of the danger of being pushed out of the South American trade by the 
United States. If we allow the first step to be quiet, it will be difficult to oppose further 
measures.”410 
Treutler proposed a joint action of the European states, with which the Foreign 
Office and the Treasury readily agreed, as they saw working in concert with other 
European nations, especially Britain and France, would be a good idea.411 In truth, little 
change occurred, mainly because the other European nations took no common action, 
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and each country protesting separately. Even Germany, in the end, was too timid, 
restricting itself to a protest note, with only the last sentence suggesting that the 
Brazilian approach might have consequences for the treatment of Brazilian imports in 
Germany.412 
Ultimately, Germany avoided any disaster as the Brazilian tariff reduction was 
not renewed the following year. Such satisfaction was short-lived, however. In 1906, 
when the American Foreign Minister, Elihu Root came to the Pan-American Congress in 
Rio, the Brazilian government continued to show its preference towards the United 
States and reintroduced the tariff reductions for the US on an expanded scale in the 
budget. From then on, it renewed the reductions annually.413 Again, the German 
government protested, but this time, it did not receive an answer. Part of the reason for 
this was the fact that the Foreign Office, on the advice of Treutler, did not want to 
further alienate the Brazilian government, particularly since Rio was already cooperating 
with it on several issues including the question of land rights for the planned German 
cable, freedom of customs for the building materials for the Santa Catharina railway 
company, and paying the subsidy for the Hanseatic colonization company.414 
While the reductions in tariffs between the United States and Brazil were a 
concern for the Germany, ultimately, it had little effect on its exports both to Brazil and 
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the rest of South America. Even when, in 1910, the United States was granted a twenty-
five percent reduction on cement, one of the Germany main imports, its sales continued 
to rise. Not only was German cement generally considered to be the best, but in Chile, 
Brazil, Peru and Bolivia, among other countries, it was free of duty for government 
buildings, and was fully competitive due to a reduction in freight rates.415 
For all the effort that German traders and diplomats exerted, Germany still 
struggled to supplant other powers in controlling trade in South America, especially 
when one looks only at trade statistics. As early as 1899, the Berliner Neueste 
Nachrichten even noted that “the 'real danger is the designs of the United States upon the 
whole of South America."416 Between 1890 and 1913, for example, Brazilian trade with 
the United States grew at a faster rate than did its trade with Germany. Moreover, the 
United States, for example, abolished import duties on coffee as early as 1870 and 
negotiated its first commercial treaty with Brazil in 1891. As a result, Brazilian coffee, 
sugar, rubber, and hides would enter the United States duty-free, and customs on all 
other Brazilian exports would be reduced by 25 percent. This led to reciprocal 
concessions for U.S. exports (machinery, wheat, and flour) to the Brazilian market.  
After reporting on the 1891 U.S.-Brazilian trade treaty, Consul Dönhoff warned the 
Foreign Office that unless measures were taken to bolster trade, "it is obvious that 
European influence is slowly being displaced by the Americans." Germany thus became 
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increasingly worried and complained that Washington was roping off Latin American 
trade by means of reciprocity treaties.417  
Even with such roadblocks, however, Germany did not give up easily on its 
vision of controlling trade in South America. The Foreign Office continued to work to 
expand German trade with South America, and it relied on its diplomats to help achieve 
this goal. To accomplish this, the Foreign Office not only sent trade attaches to South 
America, but the diplomats it chose, such as Michahelles, Reichenau, and Treutler, were 
experts in trade and had experience working with businesses.418  While serving in Brazil, 
Chile, Bolivia, and Peru, these diplomats became heavily involved in the details of 
German marketing – sending circulating reports about local conditions to the Foreign 
Office and German businesses, and intervening on behalf of German businessmen. Their 
reports to Berlin were especially important as they contained detailed information and 
included the view of experts in South America or from representatives of German 
businesses, especially those from the banks.419  
To further bolster trade, the German diplomats encouraged businessmen to 
publish catalogs in Portuguese and Spanish, and report weights and currency using local 
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values. They also advised them to offer long-term credit to local businesses, make 
frequent visits to their customers, speak to them in the local language, note their habits, 
accept small orders, and package their products attractively and well.  Such efforts were 
so strong that it surpassed even those of the Americans and British. Moreover, this led to 
the belief that Germany would surpass other nations, in the South American market. In 
1912, for example, a U.S. military intelligence officer predicted, "Someday the 
commercial supremacy of South America will be their's [sic]. For they are a plodding, 
frugal, conservative race, mutually aiding one another…. Behind all this is the constant 
support of the German Government." 420 These German strengths led to widespread fears 
that it would best other nations in the South American market. Although these fears were 
never realized due to the outbreak of war in 1914, the fact that such concerns were 
present indicates the potential continued growth of German presence in South America, 
and the strong efforts of diplomats to bolster German trade and economic control. 
The level of success that the German diplomats achieved throughout South 
America varied depending upon several factors, including how willing German 
businesses were in investing in South America, how established German communities 
were, the desire of South American governments to support German ventures, and the 
support the diplomats received from the Foreign Office and the German government. In 
several cases, such as Brazil, Bolivia, and Peru, the groundwork that the diplomats laid 
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paid dividends. These men also spent great energy developing German economic 
presence in Chile, where they, perhaps, found the most success in projecting German 
economic power abroad. The efforts undertaken in Chile, which the next chapter will 
examine in detail, differed, however, as the Foreign Office, its agents abroad, and 
German businesses used the events that occurred there, particularly the War of the 






THE ART OF FINANCE:  GERMAN TRADE AND BUSINESS INFLUENCE IN 
CHILE 
 
 Much like throughout South America, especially Brazil, the German government, 
the Foreign Office and its agents abroad, and German businessmen viewed Chile as an 
importance place to exert their economic power and influence. The biggest opposition to 
these aspirations was expected to come from the United States, which attempted to enter 
the Chilean market alongside the Germans. Indeed, Berlin feared that the economic and 
political domination of the United States would completely crowd out the Europeans and 
would close this “open door area.” On the other hand, Germany, was not very concerned 
about competition from Britain and France. In fact, the German government, led by the 
Foreign Office, secretly admired London and its economic model. France, which 
struggled in the economic competition of the 1880s and 1890s, was not taken as a very 
serious rival.421  
 While German trade in Chile followed in patterns similar to the rest of South 
America, it also developed differently due to several factors. In the early nineteenth 
century, the Chilean government, aware that European powers, like Germany, might 
occupy, and seize control of, southern Chile, sought to use this interest to its advantage, 
and embarked upon a policy of approved, and controlled, colonization of these 
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territories. Its hope in doing so was that as more and more communities developed there, 
the settlers would identify as Chilean citizens, which would then allow Chile to claim the 
residents, and the territories, as its own should other South American and European 
powers challenge its presence.422 At the same time that Chile embarked on its 
colonization policy, Germans began to emigrate to there. Their primary focus was on 
southern Chile, particularly the region around Valdivia, Osorno and Llanquihue. 
Although Germany, and particularly the Foreign Office, would have preferred to settle 
southern Chile without going through the Chilean government, it chose to work with the 
guidelines of the Chilean policy. In doing so, the German Foreign Office, its diplomats 
abroad, settlers, and businessmen looked to develop strong ties with the Chilean 
government, to not only receive protection from the government in times of trouble, but 
also to gain access to, and control of, strategic resources, such as guano and saltpeter, 
which would lead to an increase in its economic presence. Thus, whenever trouble arose 
in Chile, including strikes, trade disputes, war, and even disagreements with the 
government, these German groups tried to work with the government in Santiago to 
resolve any outstanding issues, in order to continue to increase Germany’s economic 
control. 
Beginning in 1842 Bernhard Eunom Philippi, a German explorer and naturalist, 
sent a proposal for German colonialization of southern Chile to the Chilean government. 
With the Chilean authorities rejecting his offers, which were submitted in 1844, Philippi 
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formed a partnership with Ferdinand Flindt, a German merchant based in Valparaiso, 
who also served as the Prussian consul there. With financial backing from the Prussian 
consul, Philippi was able to purchase land in Valdivia and along the southern bank of the 
Bueno River, which he hoped future immigrants would develop. His brother, Rodolfo 
Amando Philippi, contributed to Bernhard’s plans by recruiting nine German families to 
emigrate to Chile, who arrived in 1846 abroad one of Flindt’s ships. Although Flindt had 
gone bankrupt a year later, another German merchant, Franz Kindermann, took over his 
properties and responsibilities, and continued to support German immigration to 
Chile.423  
Concurrently, in 1845, the Chilean government passed the Law of Colonization 
and Vacant Lots, which ushered in the recruitment of colonists. That same year, the 
Chilean president, Manuel Montt, appointed Salvador Sanfuentes as the intendant of 
Valdivia, and tasked him with surveying the colonization potential of the area. 
Sanfuentes, seeking someone who knew the area well and who had a strong interest in 
helping to colonize the area, turned to Philippi to assist him, and appointed him as a 
provincial engineer.424  
The sponsored colonization of Valdivia and Osorno lasted until 1858, with the 
towns which settlers founded on the shores of Lake Llanquihue being colonized between 
1852 and 1875. By 1875, about 6000 Germans settled in southern Chile under the 
auspices of the Chilean government. With the arrival of the German immigrants, the 
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area’s economy was transformed, and many businesses showed an increase in their 
earnings. Among the chief achievements of these settlers was the introduction of wage 
labor and the establishment of Chile’s first brewery in 1851.425 
 Germany’s initial foray into the South American market developed early in the 
nineteenth century, focusing on Chile and Peru.426 At first, the German trade was an 
afterthought to the dominant English trade.427 By the 1870s, however, the German 
merchants developed into competitors with the British, which the latter dreaded. The 
shipping industry was one of the first German businesses to expand trade with Chile, 
starting with the Hamburg-based F. Laeisz company, which started regular traffic 
between the two nations in 1850. Shortly thereafter, the Deutsche Dampfschiffahrts-
Gesellschaft Kosmos (DDG Kosmos) and the Roland Linie joined in sending ships to 
South America. Their efforts were directed to not only play a crucial role in guano 
production in Peru, but also to provide a manufacturing base for the export of saltpeter, 
as German agriculture was one of the largest saltpeter and guano consumers in the world 
at the time.428 
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 In the 1860s, German wholesale merchants, such as Gildemeister & Co., Fölsch 
& Martin, and Vorwerk & Co., established saltpeter factories in the Peruvian province of 
Tarapaca. As the demand for guano increased, the miners in Peru were rapidly depleting 
and exhausting their countries’ reserves. As a result, by the 1870, saltpeter began to 
surpass guano on the world market.429 Due to earlier trade agreements regarding guano 
exports, Lima incurred massive loans, particularly from France. Faced with the threat of 
the exhaustion of guano stocks, the Peruvian government, in order to open up a new 
source of money, aimed to transform the private saltpeter trade into a state monopoly. In 
1873, it accomplished its goal with the passage of a law that forced private businessmen 
to sell their stocks at fixed prices to the state.430 
 Initially, Lima found success, as it gained a large profit selling saltpeter. Such 
success was short lived, however, as the English, German, and even Chilean 
businessmen resisted the law. By 1875, then, Manuel Prado, the President of Peru, 
passed a new law, the Ley de Expropriacion, to combat the resistors.431 According to the 
bill, all private companies, regardless of their country of origin, had to buy its property 
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from the Peruvian government. To accomplish this, Prado intended to collect an 80 
million Mark bond in Europe. Lima would prize the value of the factories, and hand out 
bonds (certificados) to the expropriated owners, which would be redeemed at the signing 
of the bond and would yield an interest of eight percent. As a result, the Peruvian 
government was able to acquire 66 factories at a value of only 72 million Marks.432 By 
1877, there were 70 saltpeter plants - Peru controlled 59 percent of the production, Chile 
nineteen percent, Britain thirteen percent, Germany eight percent, and Italy one percent. 
 Due to these policies, the German and English businessmen had accrued large 
debts to the Peruvian government, which greatly angered these entrepreneurs. In order to 
gain more access to, and control over, the saltpeter factories, and absolve these debts, the 
Germans and English turned to their diplomatic representatives, and lobbied them to 
start a war.433 While neither London nor Berlin wanted to fight a war so far away, both 
countries looked to someone else who would be willing to fight on their behalf – 
Chile.434 As Chile also had interests in the saltpeter-rich area of Tarapaca, Santiago was 
willing to assist the British and German governments. 
 Before they had their war, the British and German business turned their attention 
to the Bolivian province of Antofagasta, and established powerful saltpeter factories. 
The most important business was the Chilean Company of Antofagasta, which the 
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British company A. Gibbs and Edwards & Co. provided support. When the Bolivian 
government surprisingly and, contrary to the secret contract it signed with Peru in 1878, 
decreed an export duty on saltpeter, the Chilean Company of Antofagasta opposed it. In 
response, Bolivia sent in troops and occupied the company’s main factory. Berlin and 
London, along with Santiago, now had a pretext for war. 
 When the secret treaty between Peru and Bolivia became public, Chile began its 
“saltpeter war”, also known as the War of the Pacific, with Bolivia and Peru in 1879.435 
Although Chile was the main combatant in this war, as US Secretary of State Blain said 
in 1882, “It is an English war on Peru with Chile as the instrument.”436 Blaine 
overlooked the role that both Germany and France also played, the former supporting 
Chile, the latter Peru. 
 Immediately after the outbreak of the war, the French trading company, the Louis 
Dreyfus Group, which was one of the largest global corporations at the end of the 
nineteenth century, attempted to bring new loans to the Peruvian government. Part of the 
reason the Dreyfus Group pushed for this was to gain the opportunity to sell weapons to 
the Peru. The French group also believed that the sale of French weapons would 
guarantee a Peruvian victory, which in turn would lead to a boast in trading overall. Not 
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surprisingly, the British government vehemently protested, and it sought to cause the 
French project to fail.437 Acting on behalf of the British Banking group Rothschild, the 
British Foreign Office sent steamers, sloops and weapons to Chile. As Francis 
Pakenham, the British ambassador in Santiago, reported to Lord Salisbury, the British 
Prime Minister, on 17 January 1887, “almost the entire transport of the Chilean army, 
their munitions, and supplies of all kinds, besides the coal for their squadrons, are 
directly or indirectly in English hands.”438  In order to save Tarapaca for Peru and itself, 
the Credit Industriel et Commericel, one of the largest banks in France, asked its Foreign 
Office to combat the British interests. 
 With Britain and France opposing one another, Germany was in a unique 
position regarding the War of the Pacific. Initially neutral, both London and Paris 
courted Berlin to their side and act as either pro-Peruvian, or Pro-Chilean. Otto von 
Bismarck, the German Prime Minister at the time, relished his government’s position, 
and strove to remain neutral in the conflict.  On 26 July 1880, for example, in a response 
to a letter to Count Launay, the Italian ambassador in Berlin, he soundly rejected the idea 
that Germany mediate on behalf of the French strictly on the grounds that a victorious 
Chile would refuse to surrender any territory that it conquered.439 Several weeks later, on 
15 August 1880, in a telegraph to the German ambassador in Santiago, Bismarck 
reiterated his stance: “The Imperial government does not accept mediation which is 
planned by other countries. She hopes meanwhile that the life and property of Germans 
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in Peru are treated appropriately.”440 On 21 February 1881, France hoping to settle the 
dispute in favor of Peru, proposed one of several pro-Peruvian mediations. The goal of 
these attempts was to restore the status quo. Bismarck was again not interested. By his 
reasoning, with the conquests that Chile had already made, namely seizing Tarapaca and 
Antofangasta, the interests of the German wholesale merchants and the saltpeter 
merchants were satisfied.441 
 When the British government put forth its own mediation proposal on 3 
December 1881, Bismarck again was asked to assist in the talks. As it was no easy task 
for the German chancellor to settle a peace between Chile and Peru which recognized 
the Chilean conquest, corresponded to the interests of German investors, and yet still 
emphasize Berlin’s “neutrality” in the matter, he again declined to participate. He stated, 
“a mediation always wears the character of an intervention in favor of the winner, if – as 
in this case, one of the two warring parties is obviously the winter. It would be foolish to 
incur the lack of impartiality so singly on its own.”442 
 By the end of 1881, it was becoming clear that Peru was losing the war, and that 
events were favoring the British and German interests.443 Even so, Bismarck still was 
firm in maintaining German neutrality. Through the German ambassador in London, he 
secretly reported to the British that he opposed showing due attention for the need to act 
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in concert with the British in trying to protect the life and property of the English and 
Germans in Chile.444 In this manner, then, the German diplomats in Chile and Peru, who 
considered Chile’s cause as just and wished for its victory, acted accordingly.445 On 21 
April 1880, for example, the German minister resident in Lima lamented to Berlin that 
he was unable to prevent the protests of the bombardment of Callao. Although he might 
have wished to have done so, he knew if he tried to stop them, the French ambassador 
would have published all the harsh protest speeches. As a result, the German ambassador 
was forced to relent.446 
In 1883, after much fighting, Chile ultimately succeeded in winning the war, 
gaining concessions from Peru and Bolivia.447 Most notably, and most importantly, 
Chile gained possession of the saltpeter-rich provinces of Tarapaca and Antofagasta, 
which allowed it to establish a saltpeter monopoly. For the Germans and British 
businessmen, the victory was just as significant. With both Peru and Bolivia removed 
from the saltpeter trade, it freed the Germans and British manufacturers from the 
“specter of expropriation”, and the banks no longer needed to worry about financial and 
economic crises, nor having to pay high taxes and export duties.448 
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The war also provided an outlet that promoted the commercial interests of the 
English and Germans, while at the same time damaging those of the French. In order to 
salvage its interests, Paris attempted to establish a “European intervention” which would 
favor Peru. Representatives from the British and German governments were invited to 
participate, but, not surprisingly, both strongly rejected this plan. With little other 
recourse, France was forced to recognize Chile’s victory.  
As a result, with the growth of German investments, the concerns of German 
businessmen and manufacturers also increased. These men wanted assurances that the 
safety of their property and investments were protected, and they turned to the German 
diplomats to do so. Nonetheless, although France essentially was removed from the 
saltpeter trade in South America, the British still dominated the industry in the 1880s. 
As mentioned previously, the British pushed Chile, Peru and Bolivia to fight in 
the War of the Pacific in order to secure controlling interest in the saltpeter trade. The 
biggest supporter, and instigator, of the war was the English speculator John Thomas 
North. When the war broke out in 1879, North sailed to London, secured financial 
support from Rothschild, and returned to Inquique in 1880 with steamers and sloops 
which he immediately put into service with the Chilean fleet.449 With tremendous 
support from British financiers, North became the ruler of the war fortunes.450 
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Under pressure from the British, German, and Chilean saltpeter manufacturers 
after it occupied Tarapaca and Antofangasta in 1881, the Chilean government passed a 
law which stipulated that these men reestablish their ownership of the factories which 
had previously been seized. As a result of this law, North, who had speculated on 
saltpeter factories during the war, hastened back to London, where he established a joint 
stock company and, subsequently, sold his company, and territory, for a huge profit.451 
In order to drive his profits even higher, North bought the industrial railways of 
Tarapaca so that he would also control the food and water supplies in the region. It came 
as no surprise that German and Chilean officials began to refer to North as the “saltpeter 
king”.452  
In 1884, the Britain founded nine (mostly joint stock) companies, Germany five, 
and Chile, sixteen. At an annual production of eighteen million quintals (one quintal = 
46 kg), the British owned a 34% stake, the Germans 18%, and the Chileans 36%. Five 
years later, however, due to the efforts of North, the situation began to change. As the 
German ambassador, Gutschmid, reported: 
Only two major German companies currently still own large saltpeter stocks in 
the province of Tarapaca: J. Gildemeister & Co, and Fölsch & Martin. A few 
years ago, the possession of saltpeter factories was equally distributed between 
English and German owners…. It follows, thereafter, the striking fact that the 
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saltpeter factories and stocks, with few exceptions, are almost all owned by 
foreigners. Only a few saltpeter stores… belonged to Chilean owners.453 
By 1889, the Germans and British has wrested control of the saltpeter market from the 
Chileans. The British, however, and in particular North, were not done. With North 
controlling most of the saltpeter factories and stores, as well as the railways and food 
and water supplies, the German companies struggled to survive against the English 
competition. Gutschmid summed up the situation aptly in his report to the Foreign 
Office in 1889: “Under the circumstances, the few German owners of saltpeter factories 
realized just how valuable their refineries were…. The two major companies in 
Inquique, Gildemeister & Co. and Fölsch & Martin,” realized that “they could earn more 
money selling their factories to North than what would have been possible through many 
years of work.”454 As a result, that same year, Gildemeister & Co. sold their factories to 
North for 1.2 million pounds sterling, and Fölsch & Co. for 400000. 
 By 1890, then, the nitrate industry was a monopoly of the British “Saltpeter 
Kings,” who in turn were servants to London and, in particular, Rothschild, the leading 
British investment company. At that time, 67 factories existed, of which four were 
German, three Chilean, and sixty British.455 Together, they formed a British bloc, which 
had its administrative headquarters in London. It included the Nitrates Railway & Co., 
which owned a railway monopoly in the Tarapaca region; the Tarapaca Waterworks & 
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Co., which supplied the province with water; and the Bank of Tarapaca and London, 
which controlled all the credit in the region.456 
 While Britain had a nearly total dominance of the saltpeter industry during this 
period, its control did not last long. Chilean businessmen and entrepreneurs were 
unhappy at seeing their most valuable resources in the hands of another power. 
Therefore, they turned to their government to help them keep control. One of their 
biggest champions was the president of Chile, Jose Manuel Balmaceda (1886-1891). 
 Following the victory over Bolivia and Peru, and its subsequent conquest of the 
saltpeter provinces, the Chilean government declared it owned all Peruvian saltpeter, all 
unprocessed stocks of saltpeter which were not returned under the law of 1881 to be 
privately owned, and all saltpeter mines and fields yet to be discovered to be property of 
the Chilean government.457 As the British were interested in these sites, North offered 
Balmaceda five million pounds. Shortly thereafter, in January 1891, Gutschmid learned 
of the offer from German companies also speculating in the same area. He urgently 
reported to Bismarck that, “the businessman North is likely to succeed in winning over 
the President of the Republic [Chile]. He is said to have submitted the sum of 400000 
Pesos for this purpose.” Nonetheless, he urged the chancellor that all was not lost, if 
Berlin could provide a better deal.458 Fortunately for Germany, there was no need to 
make another offer, as Balmaceda rejected North’s attempts to purchase the sites.   
                                                                
456 Gutschmid to AA, n.d., Bundesarchiv-Berlin, R 12364. 
457 John L. Rector, The History of Chile, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). 
458 Gutschmid to Bismarck, January 1891, Bundesarchiv-Berlin, R 12364. 
200 
 
 Unlike previous Chilean presidents, Balmaceda was not so easily corruptible, nor 
was he interested in allowing European penetration into Chile. Shortly after his election 
in 1886, he targeted North and the British, declaring that former’s railway monopoly in 
Tarapaca must be broken up in the interests of Chilean businessmen and 
entrepreneurs.459 On 9 March, while in Inquique speaking before assembled merchants 
and industrialists, he again attacked foreign businessmen, particularly the British. In his 
speech, he declared three goals: the nationalization of the saltpeter industry; a 
prohibition on any cartels to limit production (thus limiting export customs); and the 
nationalization of the railroads in Tarapaca.460 
Not surprisingly, neither the British nor the German merchants received these 
proposals well. In three meetings at the end of March, North tried, unsuccessfully, to 
persuade Balmaceda to halt his plans. The British businessman’s pleas, however, did not 
sway the Chilean president. On 1 June, when Balmaceda addresses the Chilean 
Congress, he announced that the government needed to take action in order to protect the 
interests of the nation. The President went further, declaring that while “it is clear we 
must not close the door to free competition and production of saltpeter in Tarapaca, we 
cannot agree that this large and rich area will become a foreign factory.”461 Unable to 
stop the Chilean president on his own, North returned to London in the fall of 1889 
seeking support. Several weeks later, after succeeding in gaining assistance from the 
British Foreign Office, North return to Chile, and began to organize the overthrow of 
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Balmaceda. Aware of the British plans, the President turned to the one group whom he 
believed would support his anti-British policy – the Germans. The basis for his idea was 
to use the two European powers to fight one another, and thus weaken the relative power 
of each side in Chile. 
 German businessmen, as well as the German Foreign Office, eager to reduce 
British economic control of Chile, readily agreed to support Balmaceda in his efforts. 
Thus, one of the first steps German businesses took was to enter into the Chilean bond 
business, which the British banks currently controlled. In 1889, in association with 
Mendelsohn & Co., the Deutsche Bank gave Balmaceda a lone of 31.6 million Marks.462 
In doing so initiated one of the fiercest rivalries between British and German capital. 
With Balmaceda in power, and the German businessmen and diplomats working 
together with him, there was an unprecedented increase in the sales of German goods in 
Chile at the expense of the British, especially between 1890-1891. German exports rose 
from 22 million Marks in 1890 to 45 million in 1892, its highest amount pre-WWI. With 
it becoming clear that Balmaceda was embarking upon an anti-British nationalization 
plan, North and Agustin Edwards, a Chilean banker, urged members of the Chilean 
congress to oppose the President. On 8 January 1891, in order to forestall the election of 
more of Balmaceda’s supporters in the upcoming election in September 1891, Edwards 
and his followers embarked upon a war steamer and declared war upon Balmaceda and 
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his government. The bases for their fleet were none other than the saltpeter provinces of 
Tarapaca and Antofagasta.463 
 Although German businesses grew under Balmaceda, German businessmen were 
aware that he might turn his attention towards them. Thus, the merchants supported the 
action of Edwards and the anti-nationalists. In two separate reports to the Foreign Office, 
Gutschmid wrote, “the emergence of a penniless democracy bound by no great interest 
in the welfare of the country will have a gradual but sure decline on foreign capital and 
lead to the ruin of the foreign merchant to inevitable consequences.” The German 
ambassador countered, however, that victory by the opposition, “would be enough alone 
to reflect foreign trade confidence in the future because…they and the foreign traders 
have stood in trusting interactions with one another for more than thirty years and helped 
[each other] to prosperity and wealth.”464 As a result, in order to open up “trusting 
interactions,” German merchants, with assistance from the German diplomats, supported 
the Chilean revolt with the British. 
 The Chilean Civil War broke out on 8 January 1891.465 In order to assist the 
German merchants in Chile, Gutschmid negotiated with the British on their behalf. On 
19 January, he telegraphed the Foreign Office, “the English squadron expected soon. It 
is the German interest to protect.” Several weeks later, on 15 February, Gutschmid sent 
another telegram to Berlin stating, “the head of the British Pacific Squadron, Admiral 
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Hotham, has received orders directly from the Admiralty in London to put German 
interests in Chile under the protection of Her Majesty’s flag.”466  
 From the very beginning of the Civil War, the British and German “security 
policy” went hand in hand, with the primary goal to cause the fall of Balmaceda. 
Publicly, Gutschmid maintained a neutral stance to protect German interests in Chile, 
but secretly, he continued relations with the rebels, mainly through Don Anibal 
Zantaru.467 As the struggle between the nationalists and anti-nationalists developed, 
German merchants, who desired to see the anti-nationalists succeed, urged Leo von 
Caprivi, the German chancellor, to send warships to protect their property in Chile. 
Initially, the Chancellor rejected their requests. As a result, Gutschmid sent numerous 
requests for aid, and pressure began to mount from the press.468 On 15 May 1891, for 
example, the Vossische Zeitung wrote, “In fact, in Chile today, high quality German 
interests are so rooted in various operations, that it is no longer a question in Germany of 
a merely platonic participation in their fate.”469 As a result from pressure from the press, 
and the large German trading houses (the branch offices in Chile communicating 
through Gutschmid), Caprivi finally relented and sent a squadron in June. 
 When the German fleet arrived in Valparaiso in July, Gutschmid hastened to the 
commanding admiral, and talked him out of the “official” opinion (i.e. the Foreign 
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Office’s stance) that this was a “simple rebellion that was to be strictly condemned.”470 
Instead, he instructed the admiral that it was German policy to “preserve a sympathetic 
attitude towards the opposition under observation of all of the constituent 
government.”471 Shortly thereafter, the Foreign Office also ordered the admiral, in a 
move to protect German interests, “to avoid a hostile attitude towards the Congress 
Party.”472 Not long after, the German government, led by the Foreign Office, officially 
recognized the provisional government on 7 September 1891. For the German 
government, Balmaceda losing control of the government was important because his 
policies were becoming more and more protectionists, and thus prevented German 
expansion in Chile. 
 While the German government supported the rebels in this conflict, German 
merchants and investors were more ambivalent.  Due to the uncertainly of the German 
businessmen, Balmaceda tried to take advantage of this situation. To give both the 
British and German squadrons no cause for direct intervention in the Civil War, for 
example, the Chilean president calmed creditors by assuring them that his government 
was willing to pay its debts, and by his willingness not to adjust the interest payments of 
its loans. He also used the German loan from 1889 to purchase weapons from Krupp, 
which not only provided modern weapons to the Chilean military, but also greatly 
excited the financial circles in both Hamburg and London. Not all German businesses 
supported Balmaceda, even after his efforts to sway them.  German saltpeter 
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manufacturers, for instance, supported the coup, as the President’s policies limited their 
control of the Chilean market. 
 After Balmaceda’s fall in August 1891, the forces which led the rebellion, and 
were supported by the British and German bankers and investors, assumed power.  In 
particular, the British bankers, Matte and Edwards, assumed a large control in the 
Chilean government, forming the ruling banking group, and had a representative on six 
of the seven ministries between January 1892 and October 1895. Just as important, these 
two men also maintained close relations with Rothschild in London. As von Loehr, the 
German Consul in Valparaiso, expressed to the Foreign Office in 1895, “thus in his 
domain of Chile the influence of the government is more than ever available for 
Rothschild. He is the lord…. over the financial and successive political situation of 
Chile.”473 
 Nonetheless, Rothschild was not the only “lord” of Chile.  The German investors 
and bankers also secured a significant influence and dominance, grabbing a foothold in 
the competition with Britain.474 In the early days of the new, post-Balmaceda, 
government, the German supporters of the rebellion were able to seize their spoils from 
the Civil War. On 29 November 1893, the “newly elected” president, Jorge Montt 
(1891-1896), passed a law that placed twenty-two state-run saltpeter factories and 23 
saltpeter fields, all worth 2.6 million sterling, on sale in public auctions, in which the 
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German, British, and Chilean businessmen and investors all acquired a share. 475 In 
1894, the German manufacturer, Gildemeister, bought a large factory for 2.8 million 
Marks; Sloman, a shipping magnate in Hamburg, acquired a factory for three million 
marks; and Pedro Perfetti, an agent of Fölsch & Martin, bought several for 2.3 million 
marks, along with fields for 800000 marks.476  
Thus, German merchants began gaining a large part of the saltpeter industry. 
Nonetheless, the German diplomats in Chile believed that these businessmen acted far 
too cautiously. Ernst Heinrich von Treskow, the German ambassador to Chile (1892-
1899), repeatedly urged German business owners to export more to Chile.477 On 13 
February 1895, for example, he wrote to the Foreign Office, underscoring the need for 
Germany to take action in Chile, and Latin America in general: “It seems to me more 
promising for Germany to establish a firm footing at one point or another in Latin 
America, whose republics are becoming more and more incapable of self-government, 
than to expand our acquisitions in East or West Africa.”478 
With the rapidly increasing consumption of nitrate in Europe and the United 
States, German businessmen in the saltpeter industry, heeded Treskow’s call.479 In 
Bremen, for example, German investors formed the Compañía Salitrera de Santa Clara 
with a capital of 1.8 million marks to purchase a saltpeter factory, which Gildemeister 
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ultimately acquired as the main shareholder of the company. At the same time, Fölsch & 
Martin bought another large plant for 1.7 million marks. By 1896, European 
entrepreneurs built 70 factories in Chile. Of these, German businessmen owned twelve, 
with investments totaling close to 300 million marks.480 
 Along with German manufacturers and businessmen, banks and investors took a 
large interest in Chile following the end of its Civil War. In order to assist in creating the 
necessary means of communication, and in balancing the deficits in the national budget, 
German banks provided enormous loans to the Chilean government, who was also 
serving the interests of the landowners (the Hacendados) and the bankers.  
 Prior to 1889, British banks held a tight control over bonds and loans given to the 
Chilean government. Slowly over time, however, German banks began to penetrate this 
market, starting in 1892 with the Deutsche Bank, in association with Mendelsohn & 
Company, granting a bond to Santiago for 31.6 million marks, which was repayable over 
52 years.481 In 1896, the Deutsche Bank assumed twenty million of a twenty-four 
million marks loan which belonged to Rothschild (in London). By 1906, with British 
banks retreating from the Chilean market due to loan defaults, the Deutsche Bank 
became the main loaner to the Chilean government, as it continued to grant bonds to the 
government. Adding to its success, in 1911, Deutsche Bank, in cooperation with 
Disconto-Gesellschaft, another German bank, issued a bond of 200 million marks. As a 
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result of these loans, nearly 216 million marks were exported to Chile to help support its 
government, far outpacing other European governments. 
 In providing so much capital to Chile, German banks and businesses gained 
several advantages. The first was the enormous profits gained from the bond itself. In 
such loans, the country receiving the bond, in this case Chile, never was paid the entire 
amount. Usually, it only collected ninety percent of the nominal value of the bonds.482 
The German banks, on the other hand, also received, on average, a five percent interest 
rate on each bond they loaned, which yielded significant profits at the end of each year. 
The second advantage for German banks and businesses came from coupling the bonds 
with merchandise exports, which would help increase the sale of goods. The companies, 
then, would acquire a profit from the loan itself, and then gain a further profit when the 
same loan was used to purchase other German goods, such as Krupp products, or railway 
materials from the German steel syndicate. The third advantage of such loans was the 
ability to win new concessions, specifically franchises, for German industries to invest. 
 The links between the Chilean government and the German Krupp Works 
provides a good example of the advantages that German banks gained. In the bonds 
loaned to Chile between 1907 and 1911, Krupp supplied guns, rifles, ammunition 
factories, ammunition vehicles, and mobile telephone stations for thirty million marks. 
Furthermore, in 1911, as Peru threatened to wage war against Chile, German banks, led 
by Deutsche Bank, supplied a load of 100 million marks, with the intent that Santiago 
                                                                




would purchase artillery from Krupp for 70-80 million marks.483 Aa a result, Krupp 
gained a huge profit from exporting its goods to Chile, which the Chilean government 
bought, and the German banks earned profits from interest on the loans they provided 
 Between 1890 and 1914, as the Chilean government relied more and more upon 
loans and bonds from foreign governments to help its economy grow and to pay for 
building new infrastructure, those same bonds brought the government into more and 
more dependency upon both the German and British banks. By 1914, Santiago owed 
close to 600 million marks to British and German financial institutions. In that same 
year, the government also had to invest 60 million marks just on the yield of the bonds. 
Clearly, German businesses, and the German government, had gained a strong influence 
on the Chilean government, and tied its industries and markets to those in Germany.  
 With German capital being directed towards Chile, interest once again turned 
towards ways in which German businessmen could garner influence in the saltpeter 
industry, as this was Chile’s most lucrative business. While these manufactures had 
gained some manner of influence following the Chilean Civil War, their efforts at 
penetrating the market was limited, as the Chilean government tried to control it as much 
as possible. In 1901, German entrepreneurs suffered a further setback when all the 
saltpeter industries joined together into four limited production unions. These groups 
undertook to limit the quantity of saltpeter through a directorate of ten members which 
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set and distributed it based upon the factories’ efficiency.484 Not surprisingly, such 
actions greatly concerned the German business owners.  
Adding to their fears was the fact the British had a dominating influence over the 
industry, as they secured a production share of 55% (or 48 factories); Chilean 
companies, on the other hand, only had fifteen percent (or eleven factories); and 
Germany, although it controlled twelve factories, accounted for only fourteen percent of 
production. As a result, until 1909 when the saltpeter cartel fell, German efforts focused 
on undercutting British influence.485 In doing so, a fierce competition arose between the 
two European powers, which resulted in the German businessmen working in Berlin 
with the Foreign Office, and in Chile with their diplomats to achieve their aims. 
In its early days, the Chilean saltpeter cartel found success, and turned a modest 
profit.486 The price per fifty kilograms, or hundredweight, rose from four schillings in 
1900 to six schillings in just one year. British saltpeter companies, seeing this success, 
tried to take advantage by transforming the production unions into a sales syndicate 
under their leadership.487 Such news alarmed the German businessmen, who 
subsequently wrote to their commercial attaché in Valparaiso and expressed their 
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concern. These men, led by a former saltpeter contractor, Quaet-Faslem, suggested that 
Germany should acquire saltpeter fields in Chile to prevent the British from seizing 
control of the Chilean saltpeter industry. On their behalf, the attaché spoke to the 
German Ambassador, Siegfried Friedrich Kasimir Castell-Rüdenhausen, who in turn 
contacted the Prussian Minister of Agriculture. Along with explaining the investors’ 
proposal to the minister, Castell-Ründenhausen offered to use his own connections to 
facilitate the purchase of the saltpeter fields.488 The German ambassador’s news greatly 
alarmed the Minister of Agriculture and members of the Prussian government, and they 
energetically demanded that both the German and Prussian government undertake 
counter-measures to stop the British.489 Thus, on 28 March 1901, a conference occurred 
at the Foreign Office, in which its members discussed the dangers of a British saltpeter 
monopoly, and whether the German government should acquire its own saltpeter mines 
in Chile. Along with members of the Foreign Office, officials of the German and 
Prussian government attended and participated in the conference including, Ernst von 
Hammerstein-Loxten, the Agriculture Minister (Landwirtschaftsminister); Ludwig 
Brefeld, the Trade Minister (Handelsminister); Heinrich von Goßler, the Minister of War 
(Kriegsminister); Johannes von Miquel, Vice-President of the imperial Ministry of State 
(Vizepräsident des Königlichen Staatsministeriums); and Rudolf Havenstein, the 
President of the Bank of Prussia (Präsident der Seehandlung).490  
                                                                
488 Quaet-Falsem to Castell-Rüdenhausen, February 1901, ibid.; and Castell-Rüdenhausen to Ernst von 
Hammerstein-Loxten, March 1901, ibid. 
489 Hammerstein-Loxten to Bismarck, March 1901, ibid. 
490 AA memo, 28 March 1901, PA-AA, R 16641. 
212 
 
Initiating a session in early April, von Miquel declared that the German 
government should consider acquiring saltpeter mines, only if there was a risk of the 
formation of a British or American saltpeter monopoly. To ascertain the likelihood of 
whether such an action was occurring, on 19 April, the German government agreed to 
send a disguised commission to Chile to scout, investigate and, if necessary, purchase 
new saltpeter warehouses.491 The Commission was also instructed to conclude purchase 
agreements with the Salitreros, the owners of the saltpeter works, who desired to sell 
their holdings. At the end of its report, the members of the commission stated: 
In the possible acquisition and exploitation of the works, neither the Reich nor an 
individual German state can act as a contractor. On the contrary, this must be left 
to private associations, in which it considers an association of agriculture 
cooperatives and other agricultural operations. The manner in which the latter is 
to be supported by advances or credit on behalf of the Reich or of the Prussian 
state is left to further considerations.492 
The Ministry of Agriculture met again on 12 June 1901 to discuss sending the 
Commission back to Chile to conclude agreements to purchase saltpeter fields and 
mines. The Saltpeter Association of German Agriculturalists (Salpeter-
Bezugsvereinigung deutscher Landwirte), which attended the meeting, suggested to von 
Hammerstein-Loxten that the it should send their delegate, director Stanislaw Biernatzki, 
with the Commission to Chile.493 After lengthy discussions, the Ministry formed a new 
Saltpeter Commission which included Dr. Erwin Semper (mine expert), Dr. Michels 
(chemist), and Biernatzki (commercial consultant). Upon its arrival in Chile, the Foreign 
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Office, through its ambassador, instructed the Commission that they were “supported by 
the Royal Agriculture Ministry; but, they have to act as experts on behalf of Mr. Quaet-
Faslem, and avoid anything that might give the impression as if acting on behalf of the 
government.”494 
 A little under a year later, on 26 April 1902, Ambassador Castell-Ründhausen 
informed the Foreign Office that Quaet-Faslem, through the support of the German 
Commission, received a secret mission from the Chilean president to negotiate with the 
German saltpeter companies to purchase all the government-owned saltpeter fields. The 
Foreign Office enthusiastically supported Castell-Ründenhausen in this project.495 As 
soon as negotiations began, however, there was tremendous resistance from the British, 
which forced the German government to declare that their companies could only acquire 
the state-owned saltpeter fields through public auctions.496 As a result, then, when the 
explorers in the German Commission discovered saltpeter deposits in Toco, Aguas 
Blancas, and Taltal, they immediately secured them through sale contracts. Furthermore, 
to eliminate British competition in Taltal, the Commission also acquired shares in the 
Chilean Lautaro Nitrate & Company, which controlled much of the saltpeter in the 
area.497 
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 In the end, on behalf of the Saltpeter Association of German Agriculturists, the 
Commission purchased four and a half square kilometers of saltpeter fields in Tarapaca, 
72 square kilometers in Aguas Blancas, and 145 square kilometers in Taltal for a total of 
three million marks. The German company Fölsch & Martin, which committed to cede 
the rights it acquired to any person or company which the Commission designated, 
facilitated the purchase. 
 While the Commission was highly successful in accomplishing the goals of the 
German government, on 15 April 1903, it was recalled. Three months later, the Deutsche 
Salpeterwerke AG, established on its own initiative in Chile, bought all the factories and 
fields that Fölsch & Martin acquired for eight million marks with the assistance of the 
Reichsgenossenshcahftsbank zu Darmstadt (Imperial Cooperative Bank of 
Darmstadt).498  As part of the transaction, Fölsch & Martin served as the most influential 
shareholder in the company, owning a share of six million marks. By the end of 1903, 
the capital invested by the company in the saltpeter industry amounted to 31 million 
marks.499 
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 As more and more German companies invested in Chilean nitrate, and as the 
market for it continued to grow, influence in the Chilean government became more and 
more important. As a result, the role of Germany’s diplomats increased, particularly in 
representing the needs of German investors. German diplomats essentially became the 
guardians for the investors, as well as the intermediaries for their businesses. If any 
dangers threatened the companies or their ventures, the German investors would 
immediately threaten war, knowing that they had the support of the diplomats, and the 
Foreign Office. Along with being watchmen for German businesses, the diplomats as 
served as scouts, champions, and drummers for German exports. In 1904, when British 
investments in Chile became more and more extensive, Ambassador Reichenau wrote a 
lengthy report to the Foreign Office, focusing on Germany’s mission there: 
I consider it my duty…to say that further persistence in this passivity and 
rejection of our economic position in Chile is fatal. This country [Chile] is 
unmistakably on the eve of an intense economic development. It all depends on 
seizing the right moment and taking advantage of the first opportunities, 
otherwise we will say: “Too late! The world has been given away!” We have an 
especially strong interest in not allowing to repress ourselves in Chile, but on the 
contrary, to gain supremacy. 
He then put forth his solution to accomplish this goal. He suggested that, “the practical 
and most reliable way for us to secure an excellent share of the economic development 
of Chile, the development of a consortium, which the trade expert Dr. Zöpfe already 
suggested in the previous year, would be suitable for this task.”500 
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 The importance of this reports was not lost on the Foreign Office, which, shortly 
after receiving it, sent it directly to the heads of the leading banks and industries in 
Germany, including the Deutsche Bank, Discontogesellschaft, Dresdner Bank, Borsig, 
Henschel, Kappe, and Krupp.  The responses that the Foreign Office received indicated 
that these businessmen were all interested in an active expansion in Chile if high profits 
were guaranteed. Reichenau, and the German ambassadors who succeeded him, then, 
continued to serve as mediators between Berlin and Santiago, and to safeguard German 
economic expansion there.  
 That same year, 1904, Chile was still struggling to agree to a formal peace treaty 
with Bolivia following the conclusion of the War of the Pacific twenty years earlier. The 
largest issues which still were unresolved were the formal boundaries of Chile and 
Bolivia and the ceding of the province of Tacna-Arica. As a result, the Chilean 
government, seeking assistance from an outside party which also might favor it, 
appealed to Germany, and specifically the Kaiser, to assume control over the arbitration 
between it and Bolivia. 501 Wilhelm, much to the dismay of the Foreign Office, declined 
such an offer as he chose to defer to the United States in the settlement of the affair. 
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Reichenau in particular was upset as he recognized that the Kaiser serving in such a 
position was a great opportunity for German expansion in Chile.  
In a letter to the Foreign Office, in which he strove to change Wilhelm’s mind, 
Reichenau wrote that the position which was offered to the Emperor would “bring 
Germany into the forefront at the International Economic Conference; because the 
participants would primarily think of Germany for the funds and enterprises necessary 
for the execution of the treaty.” Moreover, regardless of whether Chile and Bolivia 
accepted Berlin’s arbitration, Germany would be in an excellent position. Reichenau 
suggested that, “a consortium should be set up immediately in Germany from financial 
and industrial circles for the construction of Bolivian railways [a potential solution to the 
Tacna-Arica dispute], engineers should be sent there and Chile, if necessary, will offer 
the necessary funds on behalf of Germany for the execution of its contractual obligations 
towards Bolivia. In this way, we would make Chile more and more our debtor and 
experience has shown this works more into our hands.” 502    
 German businessmen, once they saw the ambassador’s letter, did not miss his 
suggestion. A key part from the treaty between Chile and Bolivia was the Chilean 
government agree to build a railway between Arica and La Paz. Seeing an excellent 
opportunity to gain control in the Chilean market, and especially with Chilean nitrate, 
the Deutsche Bank took the lead in forming a consortium to build the state-owned Arica-
La Paz railway, and began securing the necessary capital. In 1906, a commission was 
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sent to Chile to study the situation. One year later, after much negotiations, the Chilean 
government accepted the Deutsche Bank’s offer. While it ultimately withdrew its 
support for the Arica-La Paz railway, citing that conditions imposed by Santiago made 
the project unfavorable, the fact remains that without the support and encouragement of 
the German ambassadors, especially Reichenau, such an opportunity would have been 
missed. 
 The financial support which the Deutsche Bank was willing to provide for the 
construction of the Arcia-La Paz railway underscores the importance of the role German 
banks assumed in Chilean commerce, particularly the saltpeter industry. Three of the 
Germany’s main banks, the Deutsche Bank, Discontogeslleschaft and the Dresdner 
Bank, each established subsidiary banks in Chile. The Deutsche Bank founded the 
Überseeische Bank, which started with a capital of twenty million marks, and saw an 
increase to 30 million marks in 1909; the Discontogesellschaft established the Bank für 
Chile und Deutschland in 1895 with an initial capital of ten million marks; and with a 
capital of twenty million marks, the Dresdner Bank launched the Deutsch-
Südamerikanische Bank in 1906.503 In total, seventeen German banks were placed in 
Chile by 1914, with the Deutsche Überseeische Bank operating nine of them. While 
Germany was not the only foreign country which invested banks in Chile, the British, for 
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example, also established several of its own banks, the German banks held the largest 
share of the Chilean market. Per a report from the director of the Deutsch-
Südamerikanische Bank in 1913, his three banks had “invested almost 50 million 
marks”, which generated “enormous profits from commercial and industrial loans.”504 
 The most important impact of the banks’ investments on the development of 
Chile was its concentration on the saltpeter and copper ore industries. With the European 
powers, especially Germany, focusing on Chile’s saltpeter production, the saltpeter 
itself, and its products, became the cornerstone of the Chilean economy. By 1903, almost 
76 percent of Chile’s total exports was from the saltpeter industry. While Germany, and 
other European powers, benefited from its sale, Chile also gained much from selling it, 
as the industry utilized nearly 30 million pesos of the country’s natural products and 
employed more than 23000 workers.505  
With Santiago so reliant on this industry, however, any disturbances would lead 
to a crisis which affected the country’s entire economy. In January 1905, for example, 
the Chilean government decided to place its conversion fund as a deposit against the 
current interest rates at European and American banks. When news of this action 
reached the German embassy, Ambassador Reichenau acted immediately. In a letter 
written to the Foreign Office on January 24, he explained the steps he took to safeguard 
German investments, and its banks: “After consultation with Herr Kautz, the Deutsche 
Bank’s local agent, in the interest of the German banks I asserted my influence with the 
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government by seeking out the President and insistently pointed out to him their [the 
German banks] great efficiency and security and with the same vigor I attended to the 
Finance Minister on numerous occasions.”506  
Due to Reichenau’s efforts, the Foreign Office deposited 34 million marks into 
the Deutsche Bank, and 23 million into the Discontogesellschaft, at an interest rate of 
three and a half percent for four years. Such terms were a tremendous boon to the 
Chilean economy, and secured German interests, and influence. As the ambassador 
further reported, “the result is more remarkable and more welcome than when the very 
influential Mr. Edwards used the American banks to his advantage…the local British 
Bank of Chile was anxious to acquire such a deal, and in the Parisian financial world, a 
very intense interest is being expressed in Chile.”507 
Although such deals like this excited German businessmen and members of their 
government, particularly as the Chilean government also supported it, not all Chileans 
accepted it with such enthusiasm. As the expansion of German banks and interests were 
carried out, there was a constant struggle with nationalists and anti-imperialists 
movements. As a result, the German investors, who saw threats from the political 
demands of Santiago and revolts from the Chilean workers endangering their profits, 
frequently called upon their ambassadors and consuls to use the military to protect their 
interests. In 1905, for example, Reichenau, wrote to the Foreign Office and impressed 
                                                                




upon it the need for German warships to appear along the coast near Tatal, where 
uprisings were occurring:  
At the beginning of the year, we had the privilege of welcoming the ‘SMS Falke’ 
here and hope that the Reichstag will grant the means to enable the Imperial 
Government to restore fully the American west coast station so that it 
demonstrates to the seemingly seafaring Chileans that, besides our neat little 
cruisers, we have very powerful and respected ships capable of assuring us 
Germans our place in the sun and to respect the glorious flag of Germany 
everywhere.508 
The mere presence of the SMS Falke, and other German ships, the ambassador reasoned, 
would be enough to convince the rioters to cease their activities and allow the Germans 
to continue to conduct their business. Indeed, the riot was quelled, although sending 
German warships towards the Chilean coast created diplomatic problems with other 
powers, most notably the United States and Great Britain. Still, the fact remains that 
without the help and encourage of Reichenau, and other German ambassadors and 
consuls, German investors would have struggled to protect their property and their 
investments. 
 Along with responding to large political issues on behalf of German businesses, 
including protectionist tariffs and the Chilean Civil War, the German diplomats also had 
to intercede with local issues in Chile, particularly worker strikes. In 1890, as Germany 
and Great Britain began to grow frustrated with Balmaceda, and the Chilean Civil War 
was occurring, Chilean workers at the saltpeter mines went on strike to secure basic 
rights, including abolition of the truck system, and better wages and working 
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conditions.509 The strike began on a 1 July 1890, when the workers refused to work. 
When news of this strike reached German businessmen and traders, they were very 
alarmed. As a stop in work would decrease their overall profits, and put themselves in 
danger, these Germans knew that the strike had to be stopped by any means necessary. 
Immediately, both the British and German saltpeter companies and distributors 
demanded that the Chilean government use troops to suppress the revolt. Balmaceda, 
however, was unwilling to do so. He saw the uprising as a way to hurt European control 
on the nitrate trade, as well as a means to implement his plans for nationalizing Chilean 
saltpeter manufacturing and, more broadly, the industrial sector.510 
 With the President of Chile disinclined to help, the German businessmen turned 
to the one group who they knew they could rely upon for support - their diplomats and 
consuls. On 6 July, a delegate from the Vorwerk & Company, one of the leading 
German saltpeter companies in Chile, wrote to Ambassador Gutschmid and presented 
the company’s concerns: “Balmaceda would do his duty as president better if he used his 
whole attention on the suppression of these anarchist states, instead of dealing with a 
policy which for him there is ultimately no alternative except for a coup d’état or an 
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honorable retreat.” The agent then went further, calling for Gutschmid to “use the whole 
influence of German power” to encourage the Chilean president to break the strike.511 To 
gain more support for such a request, the heads of the German and British saltpeter 
companies sent a telegram to the Chilean Chamber of Commerce in Valparaiso stating, 
“the working masses are masters of the situation. Impossible to restore order if more 
troops not sent.”512 
 Sympathetic to the German businessmen, and aware that protecting German 
interests in Chile was necessary to continue the growth of Germany’s economic 
presence, Gutschmid agreed to help. In a report to the Foreign Office, the ambassador 
explained his actions to his superiors: “It has been possible for me to help foreign 
interests when, directly upon receipt of a telegram from the German colony of Inquique 
asking for protection of life and property, I went straight to the President of the Republic 
[Chile] and I gained assurance from his Excellency that immediately telegraphic 
instruction would be sent to the military command at Tacna to transport by ship all 
troops (artillery and infantry) available there to Inquique. This has now happened.” At 
the end of his report, Gutschmid concluded that his efforts were successful, noting that, 
“because of my good relations with the head of state and his ministers, I have succeeded 
in accomplishing all that was reasonably accessible from the government for the benefit 
of foreigners.”513 
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 Several days later, on 10 July, Gutschmid again wrote to the Foreign Office, 
updating the German officials on the conditions in Inquique and the surrounding area. 
The workers, “had torn everything up in Inquique and in the province of Tarapaca; first 
the saltpeter workshops, then the gas works and waterworks, the railways, the stores of 
meat and bread etc.” Having spoken to the current Chilean Foreign Minister, Juan 
Eduardo Mackenna-Astorga, who was sympathetic to the German businessmen and did 
not support Balmaceda’s plan to nationalize the nitrate industry, the German ambassador 
explained to his superiors that he was “assured the maintenance of order and the security 
of life and property fully with respect to the city and port of Inquique and Pisagua.” 
Furthermore, “the government is fully responsible for the security of Inquique and 
Pisagus, where considerable German interests are at stake,” and the “Minister of Foreign 
Affairs gave me the assurance that the government would also endeavor, in the wider 
sphere of the province of Tarapaca, to end the destruction.”514 
 Due to the efforts from German and British diplomatic representatives, 
particularly Gutschmid who used his connections to high-level politicians in Santiago, 
the government, which also was acting in its own interests, namely to assure that its 
export duties were not interrupted, sent as many troop as it could mobilize to the areas 
which were striking.515 As Gutschmid later reported to the Foreign Office, “Fortunately, 
the government…has realized in a timely fashion, how dangerous its [the strike] 
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beginning was, and now is earnestly seeking to preserve public order and to protect the 
saltpeter trade, which is so important to the Chilean treasury.”516 
 Although the government ended the strike, albeit violently, by the end of July, 
German and British investors knew they could not continue to force the workers to 
operate under the current conditions.517 Ultimately, they agreed to a forty percent wage 
increase and abolished the truck system. At the same time, however, the Chilean 
government informed the British and German ambassadors, as well as its politicians, that 
these concessions were only temporary and would be revoked as soon as a permanent 
“protection force” (“Schutztruppen”) was stationed in the factories.518 By the end of the 
year, Chilean army units were deployed in the most important factories, whom the 
factory owners paid and fed. The workers’ wages were then cut, and the protective 
militias watched and pointed their guns at them to assure that they did not strike again. 
To assist the Chilean government with paying the protection forces’ salary and 
maintenance, and protect its own investments, German companies, such as the Deutsche 
Salpeterwerke, contributed money and also built barracks and horse stables for the 
troops. 
While the Schutztruppen were generally successful with keeping the peace, 
ultimately, they were not able to prevent the workers from striking. In 1903, a wave of 
violence again struck the saltpeter districts of Inquique, Tocopilla and Taltal. Facing 
                                                                
516 Gutschmid to AA, 17 July 1890, Bundesarchiv-Berlin, R 1222. 
517 Wright, Latin America Since Independence, pp. 133-135; and Peter DeShazo, Urban Workers and 
Labor Unions in Chile, 1902-1927, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983). 
518 Gutschmid, 31 July 1890, Bundesarchiv-Berlin, R 1222. 
226 
 
strong opposition from the workers, the heavily armed protection forces, who were 
heavily outnumbered (in Tocopilla, for example, 160 soldiers guarded 5000 workers), 
surrendered.519 Fearing that their investments were in jeopardy, the German saltpeter 
companies demanded, through Reichenau, that the German government send warships to 
protect their factories and suppress the rebellion.520  
Berlin, however, while sympathetic to the businessmen, rejected their demands. 
In a statement issued to them, the Foreign Office stated that it was self-evident that the 
Chilean authorities were doing all they could to protect German private property.521 
When the demands for sending German warships were repeated, the Foreign Office 
instructed Reichenau “to state bluntly that the Chilean government would incur serious 
liability by not adequately protecting the vast foreign interests, especially German 
interests, in their northern provinces.”522 In 1904, then, the Chilean government, to end 
the strikes, sent a commission to examine the situation and propose a plan to send the 
strikers back to work. The plan which was submitted to the Chilean parliament, 
however, only stated that the cause of the strikes was the abuse and mistreatment of the 
workers. The only advice given was to enact a few social reforms.523   
With Santiago taking no concrete action to stop the strikes, the workers’ fight for 
an increase in wages, limitation on work hours, and worker safety began in the Toco 
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district. Seeing their livelihood threatened, the German saltpeter companies once again 
wrote to Reichenau and demanded that Germany dispatch warships to Chile. On 27 
September, the saltpeter owners also wrote to the Directorate of the Deutsche 
Salpeterwerke in Hamburg expressing their concerns: “Ask as soon as possible for a 
German warship. Fear that strike will migrate to other ports. The German minister must 
be given timely instructions to hold the Chilean government responsible for all 
outcomes. Officers in danger.”524 A day later, the saltpeter companies rushed another 
telegram to Hamburg with an update on the situation: “Hope strike is broken, except for 
some dead yesterday in ‘Isabel’. Everything went well thanks to the speedy protection 
and prudence of the employees, officers still stopped, today will deport all dissatisfied 
people, hope (to) be able to begin slowly work tomorrow.”525  
Although the situation in the Toco district was improving, the directorate in 
Hamburg was still sufficiently concerned about the saltpeter factories there. The 
management wrote a lengthy letter to Ambassador Reichenau. In their letter, the leaders 
of the directorate expressed their apprehension, “It seems as if a danger to life and 
property is happily averted for the moment, but the outbreak of a strike and related 
unrest still threatens in other districts, as shown from the first telegram. From our 
knowledge of the situation in Chile, we know believe that an official plan from the 
Ambassador would have the most lasting effect and would force the Chilean government 
to take aggressive actions.” Towards the end of the letter, the directorate called for more 
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direct actions, entreating the ambassador that the factories would be disrupted, “if the 
Chilean government is not persuaded, or forced, by pressure from the outside…thus, we 
beg Your Excellency to ask the Chancellor to issue orders most urgently to protect our 
interests.”526 
Having passed this message to his superiors almost immediately, the Foreign 
Office responded quickly, instructing Reichenau to adopt the Germans’ interests and 
take whatever steps were necessary to protect them.527 The German ambassador acted 
swiftly. Within a few days of receiving the initial message from the Foreign Office, he 
wrote back with an update on the situation, “After the arrival of the first alarm message 
from Tocopilla, straightaway I insisted on immediate safeguards and definitive 
protections from the President and Ministers for the saltpeter factories there. The 
government dispatched sufficient troops with praiseworthy speed and determination.”528 
Although the German businessmen faced a serious threat from the strikes, they knew 
they could rely upon their connections to the Foreign Office, in this case their friendship 
Reicheanau. Due to the ambassador’s quick action and thinking, the strikes ended 
without serious cost to the German saltpeter industry. 
By 1914, the combined efforts of the German diplomats, settlers, businessmen, 
and Foreign Office serve as a clear example of how Germany was able to create a strong 
economic presence. While the policies of development and globalization in Chile were 
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similar to those undertaken elsewhere in South America, they also differed in several 
ways. Unlike in Brazil, Bolivia, and Peru, the German diplomats, and Foreign Office, 
sought to work with the Chilean government as much as possible from the very 
beginning. In doing so, the Germans were able to gain support from the Chilean 
government for their efforts and were thus able to use events there to channel and shape 
its presence and influence, thereby hardening the soft forms of German power. Just like 
in the rest of South America, however, the level of success that the German diplomats 
achieved in Chile varied depending upon many factors. Regardless, in many cases, the 
efforts that the diplomats exerted paid dividends such that even in 1925, the United 
States and other European nations feared that Germany had surpassed them in the 
Chilean, and South American, market.529 
  
                                                                




PROTECTING IT ALL:  MILITARY, GUNS, AND ARMS TRADE 
 
 On 18-19 September of every year in the capital city of Santiago, Chile staged a 
lavish celebration to honor the memory of its victory in 1810 in its war for 
independence.  On the centennial of its first national government, Captain Hans Edler 
von Kiesling, a Bavarian officer appointed to the Chilean army, brought Chile’s acting 
President, Elías Fernández Albano, personal greetings from the Kaiser, along with a full 
German military delegation headed by General of Calvary Kurt von Pfuel, the Kaiser’s 
personal envoy.  The Germans were seated at one end of the city’s parade grounds, the 
Campo de Marte.  The Chilean president, his cabinet, and his military establishment sat 
next to the German visitors.  At the other end of the park, surrounded by groves of 
eucalyptus, oaks, and various other trees, Chile’s premier foot and mounted regiments 
were assembled in uniforms modeled after Germany’s. Krupp guns fired the presidential 
salute, and afterwards, military bands set the troops into motion.530 
The Chilean celebration impressed the German delegation.  According to 
Kiesling, “First out [was] the cadet school, greeted by enthusiastic cheers and clapping, 
[wearing] dark blue uniforms, yellow guards’ braiding on their collars, and above their 
spiked helmets the flowing white horsehair plumes.  In front of them [were] their flags, 
accompanied by officers with drawn sabers.”  Surveying the parade fields, Kiesling 
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almost believed that he was “on the Tempelhofer Field in Berlin or the Fröttmaninger 
Heide in Munich.”531  Friedrich Karl von Erckert, the German ambassador to Chile, was 
also overcome by the excitement.  He reported to the Foreign Office, “Uniforms. Parade 
march, just like Berlin.”532 There was no doubt in either Erckert or Kiesling’s mind that 
Chile had imported the Prussian military system and that it had taken hold.533  It was just 
as General Emil Körner, the first German military advisor sent to Latin America, had 
described to Kiesling during their meeting in Berlin before the Captain set sail for Chile.  
Körner, also known as Don Emilio, had indeed transformed the Chileans into the 
“Prussians” of South America. 
 Such a description of Chile’s army was not uncommon in South America.  By the 
early part of the twentieth century, similar military missions occurred in Argentina, 
Brazil, and Bolivia.  These countries willingly adopted the Prussian system, and helped 
spread German military doctrine, weapons, and uniforms to other nations in South 
America, including Ecuador, Columbia, and Paraguay, as well as to parts of Central 
America.  Ultimately, Germany became the model for South American armies, much as 
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the British navy was the model for their fleets.  For these countries, this modernization 
of their armies meant they would be turning them into a force that would give their 
neighbors pause before they launched an attack against them. 
The increasing German influence in South America, both economically and 
culturally, along with growing geopolitical issues, throughout South America, provided a 
great opportunity for both Germany and its businessmen to further their presence, both 
globally and in Latin America. With fighting occurring within nations, such as the 
Chilean Civil War, and between South American nations, such as the War of the Pacific, 
the Foreign Office saw a means to develop and modernize the armies in South America 
through military missions.  It viewed the training and supplying of local armies in places 
such as Chile, Brazil, and Bolivia as a way to create an export market for German 
weapons and technology, and thus further increase its already developing economic 
influence. Military missions to these areas established an economic foothold that secured 
German manufacturers of civilian consumer and heavy goods easier access to markets in 
Chile, Bolivia, and Brazil.  Thus, helping to train and reform South American armies 
was only a secondary concern of Germany; the selling of war materiel and equipment 
was paramount.  In the case of Chile, for example, Körner assisted in creating a large, 
heavily equipped conscript army not because Santiago needed it, but rather because 
larger armies consumed more German weapons, uniforms, equipment, and, as in the case 
with military parades, more musical instruments.  
The Foreign Office was not the only group interested in expanding German arms 
trade in South America. German businesses also saw a chance to expand their own reach 
233 
 
and were equally opportunistic. Through his victories in the Chilean Civil War in 1891, 
for example, Körner opened the door for selling German military hardware in Chile. 
Ludwig Loewe, a representative of the Berlin based Vorwerk & Co., began to pressure 
Chile to buy Mauser rifles. Germany’s most prominent weapons manufacturer, the 
Krupp Works, also recognized that it had to sell its goods abroad to overcome the effects 
of the “Great Depression” of 1878-1890. As a result, Friedrich Krupp, the current head 
of the Krupp Works, launched an expansion program that targeted Chile, among other 
nations in South America. Due to their interests in the South American markets, Krupp, 
and other German businesses men, relied upon, and in many cases, expected, the Foreign 
Office to advance their economic interests, especially when it would enhance their 
profits.534  
Such plans, however, would not have been as successful without the interest and 
assistance of its diplomats who served in these places and enacted such policies.  
Without the efforts of these men, who mostly acted with little guidance from their 
superiors in Berlin, to mediate the interests of expatriate businessmen and those of the 
Foreign Office, Germany’s penetration into the South American arms market would 
have been limited.  Berlin placed considerable trust in these men in determining policies 
that affected German interactions in South America, particularly in terms of protecting 
its citizens and trade interests, and with developing a burgeoning arms industry. Through 
these efforts, a diplomatic-commercial-military nexus formed, in which the diplomats 
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understood their role as facilitators for German interests, and in which personal 
relationships between the business owners, and the South American governments, were 
key in bringing these nations under German economic influence. 
 Countries like Chile, Brazil, and Bolivia had their own motives for seeking out 
German military advisors.  Chile and Bolivia had managed to antagonize their neighbors 
during the War of the Pacific.  Santiago had taken land from Peru and Bolivia, and 
attempted unsuccessfully to do the same with Argentina.  In particular, Chile still faced 
ongoing disputes over the status of Tacna and Arica, regions seized from Bolivia and 
Peru.  Peru often threatened to resolve its quarrel with force, going so far as to hire a 
French military mission to train its soldiers.  Nevertheless, it was the prospect of a newly 
armed Argentina vigorously demanding a resolution to its boundary disagreements with 
Chile, and allying with Peru, that was most unsettling to Chileans, especially ardent 
nationalists.  If Argentina and Peru choose to, Chile could become hemmed in between 
the Andes and the Pacific and then crushed by Argentinean forces from the east and 
Peruvians from the north. 
 By 1914, German advisors, working either directly in South America or through 
the German mission in Chile, were training most of the military academies and armies 
south of the Panama Canal, supplying them with Krupp artillery and Mauser rifles, and 
encouraging them to order everything from bayonets to uniforms and harnesses from 
Germany.  Reaching such prestige, however, was not an easy task.  Prior to the 1870s, 
the French military system prevailed, and served as the model for modern armies.  
235 
 
Military texts were in French, ranks were literally translated from the French, and cadet 
uniforms were modeled on those of St. Cyr.   
The Prussian army changed the almost universal admiration of military “things 
French” when it defeated the French imperial army at Sedan in September 1870.  Almost 
overnight, the German way of war became the new model.  Karl von Clausewitz, and his 
book On War, replaced the Swiss Baron Antoine Henri Jomini as the new military 
theorist.  German military missions were requested all over Europe, Asia, and Latin 
America.  Following these new missions were orders for German cannons, rifles, 
uniforms, saddles, harnesses, spiked helmets, and even musical instruments.  As a result, 
well-established ties to St. Cyr and Schneider-Creusot in France were abandoned in 
order to forge new relations with the Kriegsakademie (War Academy) and Krupp in 
Berlin.  
The professionalization and “prussianization,” of South American armies began 
with Chile in 1885. Following the War of the Pacific, Chile had emerged as the leading 
power on the Pacific coast of South America.  In the euphoria of victory, however, 
Chilean leaders were not blind.  The army struggled at times, and it became clear that, in 
a time of need, it was inadequately prepared for war.  Therefore, President Domingo 
Santa María, at the urging of high-ranking officers, instructed Guillermo Matta, head of 
Chile’s diplomatic mission in Germany, to seek out a qualified instructor to train its 
army.  
The man that Matta eventually chose was Emil Körner, a Saxon commoner who 
served with distinction in the Franco-Prussian War, and was currently a captain in the 
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German army.535  In 1885, Körner accepted a position as an instructor of artillery, 
infantry, cartography, military history, and tactics and agreed to a salary of 12000 marks, 
paid in Chilean gold.  He was given the title of sub-director of the Military School and 
promoted to the Chilean rank of lieutenant colonel.  He was thorough, very ambitious, 
adventuresome, and, perhaps most importantly, well read on Chile’s military successes. 
In 1886, one year after Körner had agreed to serve in Chile, the nation’s long-
awaited war academy (Academia de Guerra) finally opened.  According to the 
government, its purpose was “to elevate the level of technical and scientific instruction 
of army officers, in order that they may be able, in case of war, to utilize the advantages 
of new methods of combat and modern armaments.”  Between 1887 and 1891, Körner 
devised the academy’s three-year curriculum, emphasizing subjects that were taught in 
the Kriegsakaemie.  In the first year of school, students studied tactics, fortifications, 
cartography, ballistics, military history, physics, mathematics or world history, general 
military science, and German.  Those who passed then took advanced courses in tactics, 
fortification, cartography, military science, history, geography and physics, chemistry, 
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mathematics or history, and German.  Also included were studies in topography and war 
games.  In the last year of course work, students took courses in war games, Chilean and 
South American military history and geography, hygiene, international law, staff service, 
mathematics or world history, and German.  The first students began in 1887, and out of 
the fifteen graduates, five went to Germany for further study. Körner was not the only 
German who taught at the academy, as Major Betzhold and Captain Januskowski also 
came from Berlin to assist him.536 
Despite rigorous training at the academy, however, Körner struggled to prepare 
the Chilean cadets.  He lamented over the state of the profession in Chile, especially the 
condition of the military academy.  He bluntly stated that the school lacked resources 
which necessitated “an exaggerated economy in expenses for maintenance of the 
personnel, as well as books and teaching materials.”537  He also deplored the abilities of 
the instructors in languages, sciences, and natural history, and that the curriculum of the 
military school was insufficient as students who prepared for the infantry, artillery, or 
cavalry did not learn enough about the other branches to provide proper coordination in 
battle.  Körner also wrote that the year-end examinations were not enough, for they 
proved only the students’ ability to apply themselves during the seven weeks prior to 
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exams and not during the rest of the year.538 As a result, the Military School needed 
reform before it could turn out qualified cadets for the War Academy.   
By 1889, Körner advocated a major change in the Chilean military profession.  
He wanted the army to be an exact replica of the Prussian army, not only in appearance, 
but also in its training, instructional methods, and strategic and tactical orientation – in it 
short, its military thinking.  What enabled Körner to pursue his goal without interference 
was the outbreak of the Chilean Civil War in 1891, in which he rose to the rank of 
brigadier general.  When the war started, Körner joined the Congressionalists as 
secretary to their general staff.  In effect, he took over the organization, discipline, and 
training of the rebels.  He realized that the Congressionalists’ victory would allow a 
reform of the army, and so he joined the revolutionary forces, not because of political 
ideas, but to open new military horizons to lead those who had been his students.539  In a 
short time, he created a strong fighting force, which, after two crucial battles, at Concón 
(21 August 1891) and Placilla (28 August 1891), defeated the government army, and 
forced President Balmaceda into exile.   
 Prior to the outbreak of the Chilean Civil War, while Körner was training the 
Chilean army, it faced a need for re-arming. Both the Foreign Office and German arms 
dealers, particularly Krupp, were well aware of this and sought to capitalize on such an 
opportunity. Friedrich Alfred Krupp, the owner of the Krupp Works at this time, was an 
astute businessman and was well-connected, both with the German government, and 
                                                                




with the military. He expected the Foreign Office to help advance his economic interests, 
and frequently relied upon it to help increase his profits. In many cases, the Foreign 
office obliged him. 
 Krupp also turned to the army, with whom he shared mutual goals, to further his 
ends.  He would invite any officers or diplomats to Essen, who were to be posted abroad 
in order to brief them about his company’s relations with that particular nation, and 
carefully educated them on the nature of his latest weapons.  With officers, he would 
provide them with formal letters of introduction to the mission’s agents.  Krupp also 
developed a complex protocol to develop potential customers.  The company wined and 
dined foreign officers and local military attachés.  Krupp literally rolled out the red 
carpet for those foreigners, such as Körner, who came to Germany to pick up their 
orders.  Whenever foreign officials visited Krupp’s mansion, Villa Hügel in Essen, they 
would dine on dishes from their nation and consume wine produced on the estate.  On 
one such occasion in 1910, a Chilean military contingency travelled on Krupp’s special 
train from Essen to Königswinter.  Here, they were treated to an enormous firework 
display in their honor.540 
 Krupp naturally employed a large sales force, and selected its men, much like the 
Foreign Office, from civilians of “good but not high status;” essentially, the company 
wanted decent, but unobtrusive middlemen.  Once abroad, these agents worked closely 
with German diplomats, and nurtured relationships with military and naval attachés, as 
well as local government ministers.  They were also required to host foreign dignitaries 
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if they visited Essen, and to report all changes in government and military personnel.  
Furthermore, they were expected to act with calm and moderation at all times; to attend 
and report the results of gunnery practices of Krupp’s competitors; to help the Foreign 
Office rewrite attaché reports; and to “exploit political tensions” in order to stimulate 
weapons sales.  Moreover, an agent had to become friendly with local military leaders 
and to use those contacts to ensure that only officers “sympathetic to Krupp” were 
involved in the purchasing of arms.541  In the case of Chile, Krupp’s man was Albert 
Schinzinger.  Following an exhaustive background check, which the German Foreign 
Office and the Prussian army conducted, Krupp signed Schinzinger to a personal 
services contract in May 1889.542 
 Schinzinger spent May and June 1889 in Essen, learning Krupp’s “art of the 
deal.”  Armed with a special “diplomatic pass” that Krupp procured, the owner 
instructed him to display “tactful behavior” and to make a “confident impression.”  As 
part of his training, he familiarized himself with local customs, and learned Spanish.  
Once in Chile, he met with military and political leaders, and with local and German-
language newspapers in order to persuade them to hype Krupp products and suppress 
any unfriendly reports.  Perhaps most importantly, Schinzinger was told to fulfill “all the 
wishes of the country” no matter how small.  In the event that Krupp guns were 
displayed or tested, Schinzinger had to make sure that the German ambassador or 
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military attaché was present.  He also invited Chilean war ministers and generals to the 
tests, after they had eaten a lavish breakfast.543 
In early 1889, Krupp had a chance to secure a contract with President Balmaceda 
to purchase artillery.  Sensing a huge opportunity for Germany, Ambassador Gutschmid 
apprised the Foreign Office that while the president looked favorably upon Krupp, and 
would openly welcome its envoy, the company needed to submit the lowest bid for the 
Chilean orders.  In an effort to help further German policy in Chile, the Foreign Office 
immediately passed the information on to Essen.  As a result, the ambassador had 
become an unofficial agent for the Krupp Works.544   
 When Gutschmid wrote to the Foreign Office in January 1889, he informed its 
members that Krupp’s main competitor was Colonel Charles Ragon de Bange, the 
designer for Cail et Compagnie, in Paris.  De Bange’s products were highly praised and 
compared favorably to Krupp’s by the “Francophiles on the Chilean newspaper El 
Ferrocarril.”545  Several days later, the ambassador contacted his superiors again saying 
that, “it was most regrettable that the Foreign Office did not take a more active role in 
the Chilean business” since Schuchard, Grisar & Company, Krupp’s old agent, seemed 
unable and/or unwilling to push his interests sufficiently.546  At that very moment, de 
Bange was shipping two 8-centimeter 0/77 field guns and two mountain pieces to Chile.   
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 The Foreign Office immediately appraised Krupp of Gutschmid’s reports.  As a 
result, the company was able to plan its course of action.  Krupp quickly invited Colonel 
Diego Dublé Almeida to come and inspect its artillery in Essen.  Next, it delayed the 
Chileans for months with petty excuses, such as the desirability of holding the tests in 
Essen, while using General Körner to feed Santiago with literature that favorably 
compared his products to those of de Bange.  In the meantime, Krupp prepared its 
newest guns and agents for service in Chile. 
 At the same time, Krupp focused his attention on selling coastal artillery for 
Valparaiso.  Using the offices of Körner and Major Gustav Betzhold, a Prussian officer 
and Krupp confidant in charge of harbor defenses, Krupp secured the contract for ten 28-
centiment L/40 coastal guns.547  Although the bids from Schneider-Creusot in France, 
and Armstrong in Great Britain were lower, the Krupp company won the competition by 
arranging a loan of 30.6 million marks through the Deutsche Bank.  In September 1889, 
Krupp and two fellow German manufacturers landed another major contract, this time 
for sixty-two thousand tons of steel rails for the new Chilean railroad.548 All the while de 
Bange’s guns remained in a warehouse in Santiago. 
 As a result of these contracts, Krupp directed Schinzinger to proceed to Chile 
with two each of the latest models of the 7.5-centimeter field and mountain guns.  On his 
way there, Krupp asked the Foreign Office to grant Schinzinger an audience with 
Balmaceda to make his stake in Chile clear, and to provide him any support he may need 
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to complete an arms deal with the government.549  Krupp knew it needed the support of 
the Foreign Office, as not only was the Chilean artillery order at stake, but also the 
chance to extend his company’s influence throughout South America. 
 When he finally arrived in Santiago, Schinzinger found the country in turmoil as 
Krupp’s adversaries had waged defamatory press campaign against the company.  The 
Revista Militar, the army’s unofficial journal, praised de Bange’s gun, thus threatening 
Krupp’s plans.  Realizing the importance of having Krupp in control of the arms industry 
in Chile, Gutschmid secured an audience for Schinzinger with Balmaceda, who 
expressed his firm expectation that the contract would be given to the German business.  
The president also reminded Schinzinger and Gutschmid that Chile had used its earlier 
purchase of Krupp weapons to its advantage against Peru and Bolivia in the War of the 
Pacific.550  Still, the president insisted on a competition, which Schinzinger was 
determined to win. 
 The contest began on 1 March 1890 and lasted for two weeks.  It was the event 
of the year as French and German diplomats, newspapermen, Chilean ministers and 
generals, representatives of both companies, and a multitude of onlookers travelled to 
the testing grounds.  By the end of the contest, on 11 March, Krupp’s field artillery had 
hit tits target 1639 times; de Bange’s only 1389.  On average, Krupp guns fired between 
three and ten times faster.  Perhaps the most important moment occurred following an 
inspection of the guns.  As it turned out, the tubes in de Bange’s guns had developed 
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small tears, and the rough powder burned in the calico cartridge bags badly soiled the 
barrels and seared the packings and seals.  The Krupp guns, on the other hand, which 
used metal cartridges, passed the Chilean Artillery Testing Commission’s white-glove 
inspection.551  Krupp supporters began to celebrate the company’s apparent victory.  
Even the head of the commission, General José Francisco Gana, congratulated the 
German company.  Further, he admonished the Chilean officers who still openly 
supported the French: “Those officers who refuse to recognize the superiority of the 
Krupp guns after this test firing display a lack of patriotism.”552   
On 17 March, the Commission voted unanimously for Krupp.  When Kaiser 
Wilhelm II, who read Gutschimd’s reports with great attention and covered them with 
his own comments, learned of the results, he sent his “heartiest congratulations” to 
Krupp.  He was greatly pleased by the result, particularly since it established an 
important foothold for Germany in Chile.553  Part of the German company’s success 
throughout this period was due to the help of Gutschmid.  The German ambassador had 
supplied Krupp with confidential telegrams between Chile and German Foreign Office 
concerning their need for arms.  With victory in hand, he basked in his success.554 
The 1890 artillery contract, and the conclusion of the Chilean Civil War in 1891, 
opened the floodgates for Krupp.  Schinzinger used his ties to Körner and Gutschmid to 
great advantage and spent 1891 cultivating relationships with Chilean ministers and 
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generals and visiting artillery garrisons.  Commanders of the artillery readily provided 
testimonials to the quality of Krupp guns, which the Krupp envoy then had published in 
the Chilean press.  He wrote to Friedrich Krupp that if he would spend just 1000 Marks 
to “buy new uniforms and swords for 20 members of the officer corps,” this would result 
in additional sales.  Körner and Gutschmid both agreed that this would be a great idea.555 
When the Chilean Civil War ended in 1891, Körner set out to Prussianize the 
army.  Such a task was made easier when, at the end of the year, he was promoted to 
General and Chief of the General Staff.  The next year, Körner also served as professor 
of applied tactics and military geography at the War Academy.  In April 1894, the 
General Staff granted him a leave of absence, and he returned to Germany to supervise 
the completion and shipment of coastal artillery batteries that the Krupp factories in 
Essen built.  While in Germany, Körner also looked to hire a number of training officers 
to staff his mission in Chile.   
When Körner returned to Chile in October 1895, he resumed his post on the 
General Staff, and on 1 November was promoted to division general.  Upon his arrival, 
thirty-six German officers accompanied him, all of whom played key roles in the 
training, and modernization, of the Chilean army, and were part of one of the largest 
European contingents ever to serve in South America.  The German mission had a 
profound effect upon every level of organization and training of the Chilean army.  
Overall, Körner’s mission had staff, command advisory, and instructional 
                                                                
555 Schinzinger to Krupp, 20 January 1892, HAK-WA, 4/2284. 
246 
 
responsibilities and control.  These men had penetrated the War Academy, Military 
School, and Escuela de Clases.  They also supervised the training of artillery, infantry, 
cavalry, and, to a lesser degree, engineers and officers, the building of fortifications, 
training Chilean marksmen, and influenced the armaments commission.  These men did 
their work quietly and efficiently – traits that made them models of the late nineteenth 
century German officer.556 
With the arrival, assignment, and renewal of the German mission in 1897, the 
first of many Chilean officers went to Germany for further training.  Between 1896 and 
1902, twenty-three officers went to Germany, and between 1902 and 1905, another 
nineteen.  After returning to Chile, many of these German-trained Chileans served with 
distinction in military and other government services, becoming the core of the army 
elite.  Indeed, all-important military and political positions during this time were held by 
graduates of the War Academy or by officers who trained in Germany.557  These men 
became Germanophiles and, as a result, also created an officer corps elite, whose 
continual presence had an increasing effect on their subordinates. 
The Chileans learned at the best institutions in Germany.  Infantry officers 
attended courses in marksmanship at Spandau, and took gymnastics and fencing courses 
in Berlin with Germans.  Cavalry officers went to Hannover, artillery officers to 
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Jüterbog, and engineers to Charlottenburg.  Others were assigned to cavalry and infantry 
regiments, and transportation, and machine gun units.  The mix of Chileans and 
Germans in the military was very thorough by the end of the century, and became even 
more intense during the early 1900s.   
Those who studied in Germany were profoundly impressed by what they saw 
outside of Chile and away from the classroom.  According to one student at the War 
Academy, the German instructors stressed etiquette and proper conduct to their students.  
This, he thought, “helped to raise the Chilean army from a simple fighting force to a 
distinguished institution with élan and esprit de corps.”558  There was little resistance in 
Körner’s attempts to mold the Chilean army after the Germany’s. The Germans, and 
Körner himself, were popular with the people and the government in Chile - immigrants 
had contributed much to Chilean economic expansion, the German government had 
supported the congressional forces in the recent civil war, and German trade and 
investment were important.  
Between his return to Chile in 1895 and a second trip to Europe in 1900, Körner 
developed instructional programs and formalized the theories that made Chilean officers 
and troops the best trained, most literate and the most prestigious units in South 
America.  The most basic need for these programs was the continued presence of a 
European instructional staff, primarily composed of Germans.  In 1897, when the second 
German mission arrived, Körner wrote in one of the military guides: 
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I must not forget here the part played by the foreign instructor-officers, who in 
the space of little more than a year have resided among us and have cooperated 
effectively and intelligently in this work of progress.… the [Chilean] 
government, desirous of consolidating and strengthening their teachings in our 
army, has made new contracts with some of them which will assure for a few 
more years the availability of their services.559 
He also stated that German language instruction was a prerequisite to the study of 
military science and to the preparation of staff officers for advanced studies in Germany.  
Due to his limitless prestige, he also reminded the government that military salaries were 
not high enough or equitable, especially for staff officers.  Examples such as this 
demonstrate Körner’s desire to champion the cause of the incipient modern army elite.   
 In 1900, the Chilean government tasked Körner with a new project – to go to 
Europe to study systems of obligatory military service, and to prepare military ordinance 
reforms.  He was also charged with the implementation of a plan for the distribution and 
colonization of government owned lands in the Lake Villa Rica area, “a measure 
destined to foment national progress and…a personal tribute” to his talent.560  After 
returning in 1901, Körner only spent nineteen months in Chile before he received a new 
commission in Europe.  This time, he was instructed to study the comparative 
administration of European armies.  He spent three years abroad before coming back in 
May 1904 when he became the Inspector General of the Chilean army.561 
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 Due to Körner’s efforts, the Chilean army quickly mirrored the image of the 
German armed forces.  Ultimately, he had restructured its high command and created or 
reformed the General Staff and the institutions that fed into it: the Escuela Militar, the 
various specialty schools, and the Academia de Guerra.  He even established 
conscription.  Perhaps most importantly, he purchased the latest military equipment for 
the soldiers to carry into battle. 
Still, while Chile’s army appeared Teutonic, by 1901 it was clearly far from 
being it, as most of Körner’s reforms did not accomplish their goals. The conscription 
law failed because no one would obey it; the reserve system was unsuccessful because 
the army, and state, neglected to implement laws and allocate funds which would allow 
for the registration and recall of reserves for training; and the supply system failed, either 
through greed, a lack of trained personnel or will, or simple disinterest.  Chile’s army 
dedicated so much time and effort to teaching basic military and civilian skills that it had 
little time left for more advanced training.  As a result, its forces were ill prepared to face 
an emergency threat.  Still, by 1913, Chilean officers were regularly trained and 
commanded by German troops, with some of the best graduates of the Military Academy 
in Santiago being sent to Germany for several years of more training.   
With increasing trade between Germany and Chile in the 1890s, Chile saw many 
German deliveries, including the shipment of arms, come through its largest port, 
Valparaiso.  The custom receipts increased dramatically from 19.4 million marks in 
1881 to 39.7 million in 1891.  By 1901, Valparaiso was generating 72 million marks in 
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trade.562  Through the assistance of Ambassador Gutschmid, German arms technicians 
flocked to Chile to service the new weaponry and instruct the Chileans in its use and 
care.  Körner entrusted the inspection and acceptance of the Krupp guns to his closest 
associate, Colonel Boonen Rivera.  The ambassador assured the Colonel that the Foreign 
Office would guarantee that he would receive a cordial reception every time he visited in 
Essen.563  Indeed, in September 1892, Colonel Rivera, General Estanislao del Canto, and 
Colonel Florencio Baeza were welcomed with a lavish banquet upon their arrival in 
Essen.564 
Krupp was not the only German to profit from the arms trade in Chile.  Körner 
also encouraged the Chilean government to purchase small arms from other German 
manufacturers.  With the assistance of the German Foreign Office, and its diplomats in 
Chile, the Deutsche Waffen- und Munitionsfabriken AG (DWMF became the main 
supplier of guns and ammunition to Santiago.  Following its initial deal to rearm Chile in 
1894, the DWMF received a second order in 1895 for thirty thousand Mauser rifles, and 
ten thousand carbines.  In the end, this order would earn the Berlin firm over two million 
marks.   
These deals for Mauser rifles and equipment, however, were only the first phase 
in a massive program to sell arms to Chile, as Santiago would require additional 
weapons and equipment for its military due to the military missions which Körner led 
during this period.  Due to this high economic potential, however, Germany’s rivals also 
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wanted a part of the market.  Austria-Hungary, for example, took great lengths to 
weaken Germany’s hold on the Chilean market.  As a result, competition erupted 
between the two countries and their firms.  One of the clearest cases of this rivalry led to 
an artillery duel in 1907.   
In January 1907, Johann Baron von Styrcea became Austria’s ambassador to 
Chile.  At this time, he discovered that Germany’s preeminent role in Chile was 
beginning to erode.  In particular, he noticed that War Minister Ramón Antonio Vergara 
was anxious “to emancipate the Chilean army from the purely Prussian direction in 
which General Körner had taken it.”565  As a result, the ambassador urged the Austrian 
Foreign Office to invite the Chilean Military Mission in Berlin to visit Pilsen and Steyr. 
In June 1907, Colonels José María Bari and Tobías Barros Merino toured the 
Skoda Works at Pilsen, where they tested the firm’s mountain and field artillery.  Other 
members of the mission would soon follow them there.  Right before the Chileans 
arrived, the DWMF also received word of the Austrian interest in Chile “from a member 
of the Chilean Military Mission in Berlin.”566  The firm, of course, was referring to 
Körner.  The new director of the DWMF, Max Kosegarten, at once notified the German 
Foreign Office of the pressure that the Austrian diplomats in Chile “were mounting in 
favor of Austro-Hungarian industry.”567 Moreover, he reminded it that up to that point in 
time, the DWMF supplied Chile with everything it needed:  “Mauser rifles, bullets for 
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them, machine guns, materials for a powder factory.”568  Kosegarten also demanded that 
Berlin prevent “a change of mind” in Santiago, and requested that it “respectfully 
instruct” its envoy in Santiago to assist the company in its struggle.569  Within forty-
eight hours, the Foreign Office contacted Ambassador Hans Baron von und zu Bodman 
to “work on behalf of German industry,” and act as he saw necessary.  Immediately, the 
ambassador raised the issue with the Chilean government, who subsequently instructed 
its mission to end its visit to Skoda and return to Berlin.570 
Bodman clearly recognized the importance of the situation.  In January 1908, he 
dispatched Legation Secretary Hanno Count von Welczek to survey potential Chilean 
military needs.  Choosing Welczek was an important move on the ambassador’s part for 
he had married a daughter of former President Balmaceda, and had excellent contacts 
not only to the current government, but also to opposition parties in Chile.571  Welczek 
also had a strong interest in seeing Germany succeed in Chile since he was an investor in 
the German-South American Mining and Land Syndicate at Berlin.  He and Bodman 
were convinced that lower ranking officers, along with German tailors, blacksmiths, 
mechanics, and skilled craftsmen working in Chile, could be expected to work endlessly 
on behalf of German industry. 
Due to these efforts, in July 1908, Bodman sent Chancellor Bülow a lengthy list 
of the munitions that Chile could be expected to order in next five years.  As part of this 
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list, he noted that Santiago would require mountain and field guns, which would amount 
to about twenty-five million marks.  Although there was no guarantee that the Chilean 
government would favor German companies, Bodman was confident that, “simply on 
the basis of gratitude, German industry would be given a monopoly over these 
orders.”572 Ultimately, Chile did offer the arms contract to Germany, although it was not 
solely out of appreciation, and cultural affiliation towards Berlin. During the artillery 
tests, not only did the German weapons outperform its rivals, but the Chilean Military 
Commission, which was to select the new guns, included Körner, who, without a doubt, 
sided with the German product.573 
Along with Chile, a German military mission was also sent to Bolivia beginning 
in 1901.  Much like Chile in 1891, Bolivia was struggling due to internal and external 
problems.  In 1898, Bolivia was beset by its own Civil War. Although the war only 
lasted for one year, and it brought a change in the ruling party, the Liberal Party seized 
control from the Conservatives in the name of regionalism and federalism, little actually 
changed, and internal strife remained.574  
La Paz was also relatively weak in terms of its foreign policy.  In 1895, the 
Bolivian government attempted to reach an acceptable treaty with Chile to conclude the 
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War of the Pacific.575  Under this proposed agreement, it was suggested that if the 
former Peruvian provinces of Arica and Tacna were ceded to Chile, then Bolivia would 
receive Arica, or another equivalent port on the Pacific, in exchange for Bolivia yielding 
Antofagasta to the Chileans.  Needless to say, Peru, an ally of Bolivia during the war, 
was irate, and as a result, the relations between the two nations soured.  Ultimately, the 
negotiations between Chile and Bolivia broke off with the outbreak of the Bolivian Civil 
War.576 
Due to both the internal and external struggles that his country faced, President 
José Pando, who was an officer in the army and was very interested in military matters, 
sought to reorganize the Bolivian army, which was no better in 1900 than it was 1885, at 
the end of the War of the Pacific.  It lacked barracks and military schools for training 
officers and NCOs, as well as basic clothing and equipment.  There was also no single 
organization or teaching method for the army that was nearly 2500 men.  The men in the 
officer corps had little education and almost no military knowledge.577  In comparison, 
the soldiers and officers in Bolivia were similar to those in Chile and Argentina in the 
mid-1880s, right before German military missions began to occur.   
Initially, the Conservatives in the government had attempted to reorganize the 
army in 1894.  Since Chile wanted to recruit a German military mission to train its army, 
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the Bolivian government looked towards the French for help, based upon the long-held 
belief that the French army, and its method of training, was better.578 In the end, 
however, the Bolivian request did not come to fruition as the government was not 
willing to meet French financial demands.  Adding to President Pando’s unease in 
requesting a mission from France was the fact that currently Paris was assisting Peru 
with its own military mission.  With both La Paz and Lima still quarrelling over the 
territory of Antofagasta and the port of Arica, there was a fear the members of the 
French mission would inform Peru about the readiness of the Bolivian army.   
As a result, in May 1900, just as the talks with Paris were postponed, the 
Bolivian ambassador in London contacted the German ambassador, Graf Paul Wolff 
Metternich, with a request to send four German instructors to Bolivia.  Due to the 
complex relations between Bolivia and Chile, whom the Germans were currently 
training, however, the Kaiser, when he learned of the request, rejected it.579   
Seemingly unable to obtain help from either Paris or Berlin, Bolivia did not lose 
hope.  The Bolivian ambassador in Paris, Macario Pinilla, tried his luck with the French 
one more time, stating that his government wished to model its army after the French 
because its tactics were well-formed, its army one of the best in the world, and, perhaps 
most importantly, due to the sympathy that existed between Bolivia and France, whose 
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origin is from the same people and system of government.580  To underscore his petition, 
Pinilla encouraged the French ambassador, Belin, to accept his proposal.  Belin realized 
that helping to build the Bolivian defenses would help to consolidate a warm friendship 
between the two countries and would be the greatest benefit to France’s influence and 
interests.581  Shortly thereafter, the French government declared its readiness in principle 
to send a military mission. 
At the last moment, however, President Pando broke off negotiations with France 
over the proposed mission and engaged the Germans instead. There are several factors 
why such a switch occurred.  One reason was due to the success and good results that 
Chile had achieved with its army in using German instructors.  The other motive was 
that the government believed that the instability of the Bolivian national character could 
be settled with military education through the appointment of German officers as the 
heads of the cadet and military schools.  
Realizing that such a decision would upset the French, President Pando contacted 
their envoy.  He explained that the Bolivian army was not yet ready for such qualified 
instruction, such as a French military mission would require.  As such, it was decided 
that two German officers would spend the next year preparing the Bolivian army, after 
which Bolivia would gratefully welcome a French military mission.582  Having shown 
respect to French sensitivity, the Bolivian War Department then requested six more 
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officers and eight non-commissioned officers from Germany.  Three would help 
organize the General Staff and the rest would instruct the infantry, cavalry, and artillery.  
The Bolivian government also asked the Foreign Office to help in the recruitment of 
active officers.  Just as in 1901, however, the Foreign Office rejected an offer of official 
assistance, partially because the finances of the Bolivian government were in poor 
condition and partly because, due to the tense relations between Bolivia and Chile, the 
German Foreign Office did not want to sour relations with the latter.583    
Regardless, there were still unofficial attempts made at reforming the Bolivian 
army under the leadership of the inactive German officers, who had agreed to come to 
Bolivia.  Under Plotho, a retired German lieutenant, Bolivia established the Escuela de 
Clases, an NCO school, where he developed an active and lively curriculum.  After only 
a year, the school had already experienced a considerable upswing through his teaching, 
such that one of the Bolivian national newspapers, El Comercio, enthusiastically 
celebrated Ploto as the “Bolivian Körner.” Furthermore, based upon this observation 
about the German lieutenant, the article speculated that he, and the other instructors, 
would succeed shortly in converting the 2500-man Bolivian army into one of the most 
modern armies in South America.584 At the War College (Escuela de Guerra), part of the 
coursework that the soldiers undertook was on tactics and military history, which the ex-
Prussian Captain Vacano taught.  President Pando, who was considered very pro-
German, thoroughly supported such education.   
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With the establishment of the first German military mission to Bolivia in 1901, 
the German arms industry, much like in Chile a decade earlier, found a foothold to sell 
German arms.  For companies such as Krupp, however, they faced stiff competition 
from the Schneider-Creusot and other French arms manufacturers. This was mainly due 
to the fact that following the Bolivian presidential election in 1904, the new president, 
Ishmael Montes favored the French, whose army he saw as the best in the world, and 
whose weapons he believed were better built.  Indeed, due to a clever press campaign in 
1905, Schneider was able to gain a significant victory against Krupp, knocking the latter 
from its position as the canon supplier for Bolivia.585  The following year, the Krupp 
Works suffered another blow during training exercises.  While the Bolivian gunners 
were holding target practice, a number of the Krupp’s produced guns suffered significant 
damage.  Adding to the embarrassment was the fact that many of the parts for these 
“new” weapons were cannibalized from older models, making the weapons appears old 
and not durable.  When these facts became known, the Bolivian press lead anti-Krupp 
campaigns.586 
Just as problematic, in 1904, the unofficial German military mission came to an 
abrupt end, when President Montes ended it.  As a result, a majority of the German 
instructors left the country, an action which, as the German ambassador Johann Friedrich 
Wilhelm von Haxthausen reported to the Foreign Office, many Germans, especially 
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those connected to heavy industry, actively regretted due to the loss of influence with the 
Bolivian government.587  The only German officer who remained in Bolivia at this time 
was Captain Vacano, who was recently promoted to a major.  He retained his post as the 
director of the military school, where he continued to exercise a limited German 
influence on the Bolivian army.588   
With Germany no longer instructing the Bolivian army, Montes re-opened 
negotiations with France regarding training its army. The French government readily 
agreed, and with a military mission established in Bolivia, French industry began to 
flock to Bolivia, particularly from the leaders of the Ordinance Department of Santa 
Cruz, who strongly supported Schneider-Creusot. All was not lost for Krupp, or the 
Germans, however. The French mission was only good until 1909, at which point the 
Bolivian government would negotiate a new one, and there was no guarantee that the it 
would renew the French contract. This was particularly important as Bolivia would be 
electing a new president in 1908, and the winner would determine who would train the 
Bolivian army.  Thus, August Lothar Brück, the German Minister Resident in Bolivia 
(1905-1906), and Haxthausen, Minister Resident (1906-1910) spent the years between 
1904 and 1908, attempting to garner favor for Germany, and the German arms industry.  
In 1906, when Brück learned that the Fernando Guachalla, a liberal politician 
who had the best prospects of becoming the next Bolivian president, was planning a trip 
to Europe, the Minister Resident recommended that all German industrial companies 
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who wanted to do great business in Bolivia later to encourage him to visit them in 
Germany.589  He also suggested to the two major German banks, the Deutsche Bank and 
the Diskonto, to take similar steps.  Furthermore, he advised current, and potential, 
businesses working in Bolivia concerning Guachalla’s visit.  To help Krupp recover 
from their previous embarrassment, Brück urged him to invite the Bolivian politician to 
Essen to tour his factories, as well as to show him the beauty of Villa Hügel.  
Recognizing that Bolivia would offer a good market for other goods, Brück also 
proposed to the heads of the DWMF, the Borsig-Werke, a railroad company, and 
Siemens & Halske, a communications and engineering company, that they ask Guachalla 
to visit their companies in hopes of signing contracts with him to establish factories in 
Bolivia.590 
 To help expand the pro-German attitude of Bolivian politicians, in 1908 the 
Foreign Office, at the encouragement of Haxthausen, suggested to Albert Ballin, the 
director of the Hamburg-Amerika-Linie, that he invite the current Bolivian president, 
and his potential successor, General José Manuel Pando, to Kiel for Kieler Woche 
during their European visit.  While Ballin readily accepted this proposal, as he was 
excited by “the trade and shipping circles walking hand-in-hand with the government,” 
he also suggested that other industries should participate in the “social treatment of 
outstanding foreign personalities”, much like the Krupp had already done.591  
Concurrently, in La Paz, Haxthausen hosted dinners and numerous receptions, much to 
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the annoyance of the French ambassador, Emile Joré, who had no such funds to do so.  
The purpose behind these events was to outdo the French competition and sway 
influential Bolivian politicians to favor the Germans when it came to buying weapons 
and, more importantly, in choosing whom would train the Bolivian army.  By the end of 
1908, the prospect for Krupp, and other German arms businesses, was very favorable. 
With Montes’ presidency ending in 1909, however, the questions of whom would 
succeed him, and whether the Germans or the French would reorganize and arm the 
Bolivian army, was still unsettled.  Within a short span of time, ambassadors of Paris 
and Berlin made offers to Montes concerning the deployment of military missions. The 
president, however, delayed in accepting either offer, stating that he needed to consult 
with his possible successors before deciding.  In principle, however, he favored the 
French offer.592  
Regardless of the assurances from Montes, the French Foreign Minister, 
Théophile Declassé, expressed concern that just like in 1900, Germany would again beat 
out France concerning the reorganization of the Bolivian army.  As a result, he urged the 
head of the South American division, Conty, to warn the French ambassador in La Paz to 
not be overzealous.  By early 1909, with continual assurances from Montes, Ambassador 
Joré, was convinced that Paris had no reason to worry.   
What Joré, he did not know, however, was that in April 1909, Montes had 
approached a member of the German embassy saying that he wanted to “recruit German 
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instruction officers for the Bolivian army.”593  Part of the reason for his sudden switch 
was because the Bolivian government had not been satisfied with the French reform 
attempts.  As border disputes with Peru were still unresolved, Montes believed that the 
Bolivian army needed a fast and thorough reorganization, which he believed a German 
mission could provide, particularly given its successes in Chile.594  As a result, when 
Bolivia’s newly elected president, Eliodoro Villazón, who was pro-German and already 
expressed a desire for a German military mission, took over in October 1909, he 
formally invited German officers to come to Bolivia, and thus ended the competition 
between Berlin and Paris.595 
Even though France no longer had a military mission in Bolivia, it still fought to 
keep control over supplying the Bolivian army. Although President Villazón preferred 
German instructors to train his country’s army, he favored French arms, as he believed 
that were more durable and reliable. As a result, in 1909, he assured the French charge 
d’affaires, Camas, that, even though previously his government had purchased 10000 
Mauser rifles from DWMF, any remaining army contracts would be sent to the Bolivian 
Military Commission in Europe to decide whether it would be purchased in Paris or 
Berlin.  Fortunately for the French, Colonel Santa Cruz, who had supported French 
training of the Bolivian army, headed the commission.  It was assumed, then, that the 
arms contracts would fall to French firms.596 Camas himself also tried to help this 
                                                                
593 Beer to AA, 3 April 1909, PA-AA, R 16475. 
594 Haxthausen to AA, 4 September 1906, PA-AA, R 16474. 
595 Haxthausen to AA, 4 October 1906, ibid. 
596 Haxthausen to AA, 6 October 1909, PA-AA, Berlin, R 16475. 
263 
 
predisposition by suggesting that Paris would assist Bolivia in building a state bank and 
would assume any loans which would affect the purchase of arms. This was a strategy 
which Germany had undertaken in both Peru and Chile with great success. 
The German Ambassador, Haxthausen, however, recognized what the French 
were attempting and therefore, suggested to his colleagues that the Krupp Firm should 
discreetly send its “able and energetic representative in Buenos Aires”, the well-known 
Herr von Restorff, to La Paz.597  Furthermore, he advocated that DWMF, Krupp, and 
other interested companies should “make known in as much detail as possible the 
achievements of German weapon technology” to the Bolivian Commission in Europe.598 
The enthusiastic report of the Bolivian consul in Germany, Sanjines, showed that this 
policy was, at the very least, partially successful.  In his report, he not only praised the 
beauty of Krupp’s guest hotel, the “Essen Hof”, but he also highlighted the high 
performance of Krupp and its factories.599  As a result, the Commission selected the 
German contract and, in addition to the 10000 Mauser rifles already purchased, the 
Bolivian government bought a further 15000 rifles and ammunition, one and a half 
million cartridges and sixteen Maxim machine guns.600 
With arms trading now favoring the Germans, the German Foreign Office 
returned its attention towards sending a military mission. Thus, in January 1910, it 
forwarded an official request from the Bolivian government to Ambassador Haxhausen, 
                                                                
597 Haxthausen to AA, 6 October 1910, PA-AA, Berlin, R 16477.  
598 Ibid.  
599 Report of Sanjinés, 12 May 1910, Archivo General del Ministerio de Defensa Nacional (MdDN), 
Bolivia, B-5, 1908-1910, cited in Schaefer, Deutsche Militärhilfe an Südamerika, p. 105. 
600 Notiz über die bolivianische Armee, 6 September 1911, PA-AA, Berlin, R 16478. 
264 
 
in which it expressed its desire to adopt German tactics and organization.601  In it, the 
Bolivian ambassador, Busamante, expressed that he saw “through the influence of the 
mission, a means of promoting our [Bolivia’s] prestige in the country,” which would 
benefit it economically.602  Haxthausen agreed, and advocated the Bolivian proposal to 
the Foreign Office because he believed that Germany would also profit.603  
Following the German ambassador’s endorsement, negotiations between Bolivia, 
led by its newly appointed ambassador, Dr. Salinas Vega, and Germany, led by 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Wilhelm Eduard Freiherr von Schoen, began in 
Berlin.  Initially, the talks proceeded smoothly for Salinas, as Schoen assured him that it 
would be easy to obtain the constant of the emperor.  Indeed, Wilhelm II was not averse 
to comply with the Bolivian requests, particularly since the leaders in the Foreign Office, 
based on Haxthausen’s recommendation, supported the mission due to the positive 
impact it would have on German influence in Bolivia.604 
With so much overwhelming support from Germany for the military mission, the 
discussions with the Foreign Office appeared rapidly to reach its conclusion.  In early 
June, however, when it learned that the Bolivian Military Commission wanted to buy 
weapons from Schneider-Creusot, the meeting quickly came to a halt.  Germany was 
accustomed to an arms monopoly in South America, and believed it was betrayed when 
it learned of Bolivia’s intentions.  Although negotiations were tenuous for several weeks, 
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by the middle of July, Wilhelm II finally agreed to dispatch a military mission to 
Bolivia. 
Given the large number of requests from other countries for German officers, 
such as Brazil, Nicaragua, China, Chile, Turkey and Serbia, the War Ministry was 
limited as to whom it could name.  Ultimately, it chose Major Hans Kundt, whom his 
superiors valued highly, as the head of the mission.  Accompanying him was his brother, 
Captain Goetze, who served as an instructor for the infantry, Lieutenant Frederick 
Muther as the director of the military school, Lieutenant Rochus von Rheinbaben, as 
instructor of the cavalry, Captain Rinke for the artillery, and thirteen other non-
commissioned officers from various branches of service. 
Initially, Bolivia’s neighbors did not receive news of the arrival of the German 
military mission well.  Despite the good relations between the Chile and Germany, a 
“distinct displeasure” was noted.605  Relations with Peru and Paraguay were also 
worsening, and the German mission only increased tensions, and put the German 
Foreign Office in a tight position. Nonetheless, the German instructors still received 
strong support, both from Berlin and the newly appointed German ambassador, Wilhelm 
von Sanden, who previously was the Consul General in Argentina.606 
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As the head of the mission, Kundt supervised the training of the troops.  One of 
his first measures he took was to introduce the Prussian field-gray uniforms for use in 
parades and field exercises.  He also reorganized the General Staff based upon the 
Prussian model and defined the role of the Ministry of War.607  He and Sanden were 
both in agreement that, in addition to their military tasks, the members of the mission 
would also “fulfill a political and diplomatic mission” that would stand “in service of the 
Empire.”608  In 1911, as part of this mission, Kundt, with the support of the German 
ambassador, convinced the Bolivian government to spend more than half a million 
marks purchasing war materials from German firms.  In 1912, the order was increased to 
around two million marks, and in 1913, an order of thirty million cartridges and a 
cartridge factory, with a value of more than two and a half million marks, was placed 
with the German firm Karlberg AG in Eveking.609 
After just a few months, the Bolivian government, led by President Villazón, 
boasted about the zeal and diligence of the German instructors.  In October 1911, the 
President attended a military exercise as a spectator. Recognizing the power of the 
instructors, he promoted them accordingly – Majors Goetze, Rinke and Muther to 
lieutenant colonels, Kundt as the Chief of the General Staff.610  Part of the reason that 
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the mission found so much success was that Kundt and the instructors gave the Bolivians 
confidence in their military capabilities.611 
The German mission, and its influence, gained further strength in fall 1912 when 
the Bolivian government, due to the popularity of Kundt, promoted him to Brigadier 
General.612  The results of such a promotion, Sanden reported, meant a “painful defeat” 
for French supporters in Bolivia.  He also predicted that this would reduce their impact 
in the future, and would strengthen the position of the German officers.613 
Sanden, however, may have slightly overstated the current, and future, German 
position in Bolivia.  In 1912, Montes replaced Villazón as president. Knowing that in the 
past, Montes supported them, the French tried to capitalize on this change in 
government. Even before he took office in mid-1913, they were already trying to obtain 
assurance from him that the contract of Kundt and the other members of the German 
mission would not be renewed.614  France’s attempts also received support from the 
Bolivian Minister of War, and Bolivian officers who did not trust their German 
counterparts.  In accordance for these efforts, Paris was certain that in July 1913, the 
contract for the German mission would not be renewed.615 
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The Germans, however, did not sit idly by as France tried to improve its position.  
Already in the summer 1911, Wilhelm Hermann, the manager of the Bolivian 
concession area of the German-Argentine company Staudt, suggested to Sanden that the 
“Imperial government show the Bolivian ambassador in Paris, and most likely next 
presidential candidate, General Montes, some attention,” as was done in the case of the 
ex-Argentine President Firgueroa Alcorta.616  Sanden agreed and explained to the 
Foreign Office that “as experience has shown…attention from Germany quite effectively 
is a heavy counterweight,” against the efforts of France and Britain, both of which were 
expending their efforts in convincing Montes to turn against Germany 617 
With Sanden’s message clear, Kundt sought to sway Montes towards the German 
side.  His plan was to invite the Bolivian General to military maneuvers in Germany, 
during which time he would be considered an honored guest.  Vacano, one of the 
German instructors, also described to the future president the benefits that the Bolivian 
army had received from German instruction and added that those advantages would soon 
be found in the army.  In his reply to Vacano, Montes already was in favor of continuing 
the German army training at least for another ten years “because the criterion, the 
proceedings, and the general plan of… Kundt must suffer no change.”618 
Still, in 1913, when Montes officially took over the presidency, it was uncertain 
whether the German military mission would continue.  According to a report from a 
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representative in La Paz, Schneider-Creusot informed the French Foreign Office that no 
new funds would be provided for the German military mission, and that only Kundt 
would remain as an instructor.619  Adding to Paris’s confidence was the fact that the 
Bolivian government was in the process of negotiating a loan of 400000 pounds with the 
French bank, Credit Mobilier.  France saw this as a perfect opportunity to convey to the 
Bolivians that, in return for financial support, they should not renew the German 
mission, and that their officers should be sent to France for training.620  
Although everything appeared to favor the French, in the end, their actions were 
too late.  At the end of November 1913, the Bolivian government made the decision to 
extend the contracts of Kundt and nine other German instructors by one year, and to 
allow two more General Staff officers to arrive from Germany in 1914.  Although such 
actions created a very tense foreign and political situation for Bolivia, the decision to 
allow the German mission to continue was necessary.  First, relations with Chile had 
worsened since 1910 due to La Paz’s desire to once again have a port on the Pacific 
Ocean.  The fear that Chile might restart its war with Bolivia helped to create an 
agreement amongst the political parties in Bolivia to keep consistency in the training of 
the army.621  Furthermore, at this time, the Liberal party, who had dominated politics 
since 1902, feared a coup d’état from the Republican opposition.  With Kundt as the 
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head of the Bolivian army, however, the Liberals believed that they were safe from 
political challengers.622 
By eve of World War I, it was clear that Germany was successful in reorganizing 
the Bolivian Army.  Such efforts were recognized throughout the world as even the U. S. 
ambassador to Bolivia, Horace Knowles, remarked that given the difficult working 
conditions, the Germans had done a very good job.  Moreover, he believed that the 
United States had missed a great opportunity to gain prestige and expand trade.623  Part 
of the reason why France struggled in re-gaining any advantage against the Germans was 
because it was not until the end of 1913 that it recognized that the influence of the 
German military mission extended beyond just the military sector.  Indeed, the mission 
also affected the social, and perhaps most importantly, the economic field in Bolivia – a 
fact that the Americans also recognized.624 
The situation in Bolivia by 1914 mirrored those of Chile at the same time.  In 
terms of their outward appearances, the armies of both countries mirrored Germany’s. 
Regarding their fighting capabilities, however, the Chilean and Bolivian armies were far 
below.  In the case of Bolivia, while the process of reorganizing its army began in 1910, 
by the outbreak of World War I, such action was incomplete.  Certainly, the confidence 
in the capabilities of the army was high, but had Bolivia faced the threat of war with 
Chile, or any of its other neighbors, its prospects were not good as many of the soldiers 
had little more than basic training.  Still, Bolivian officers were regularly sent to 
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Germany to receive more training and, particularly after World War I, continued to 
support the efforts of Kundt, who would remain in Bolivia until the mid-1920s, and help 
to increase confidence in the Bolivian army that would last until after World War II.   
While the situation in Chile and Bolivia followed a similar pattern (establishing a 
military mission, sending German officers abroad to train the soldiers, opening trade 
with the respective armies), the circumstances regarding Brazil were different, 
particularly owning to the large support for the French which came from the Brazilian 
intelligentsia and politicians. Still, Germany, and its diplomats assigned there, were 
committed to establishing an arms trade in Brazil, although they struggled in their initial 
forays. 
Just as in other countries throughout South America, Krupp relied upon the 
Foreign Office and military attaches for assistance in selling arms in Brazil.  Between 
1902 and 1905, then, Krupp was able to avoid defeats through the help of Field Artillery 
Captain Reinhold von Restorff, whom the Kaiser himself sent on his behalf.  In 1902, for 
example, Brazil held a closed competition for an arms contract, which both Schneider-
Creusot and Krupp were seeking to win. Following the practices that were detailed in the 
Krupps’ handbook, Restorff leaked rumors in the Brazilian press about Peruvian plans to 
conquer rubber areas in the Amazon basin.625 This invasion, the rumors stated, would 
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threaten the border not only between Peru and Brazil, but also the Bolivian-Brazilian 
boundary.  More importantly, Peru was ready to act on this plan with the assistance of 
Schneider guns.626  Due to Restorff’s intervention, Brazil feared that the purchase of the 
French guns would indirectly assist Peru. As a result, Krupp was awarded the contract 
without any further testing.627 
Following his successes in Brazil, Krupp transferred Restorff to Argentina to 
assist with concluded an arms deal there. While the captain was in Argentina, however, 
the German chargé d’ affaires in Brazil, Wilhelm von Hacke, called upon him to return 
to Brazil.  The German ambassador, recognizing how persuasive and successful the 
captain was, needed his help, as Schneider-Creusot was about to send a French naval 
officer to Rio de Jainero, which would “make stiff competition for Krupp for new orders 
of war material.”628  The Kaiser willingly granted the request of the Foreign Office for 
Restorff to go back to Brazil, and to continue to assist Krupp interests in both places.629 
The more that German arm merchants succeeded in Brazil, the more the Foreign 
Office intervened to promote the sale of arms there.  In 1909, when news broke that 
France had invited Brazil to station a military attaché in Paris, Gustav Krupp, the new 
head of Krupp, approached Emmerich von und zu Arco-Valley, the German ambassador 
in Brazil, for assistance.  Realizing the importance of the situation, Arco-Valley wrote to 
                                                                
626 Charles Maitrot, La France et les Républiques Sud-Américaines, (Impr. De Berger-Levrault:  Paris, 
1920), p. 20f. 
627 Restorff to Admiralstab (Naval Staff), 2 February 1905, Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv-Freiburg 
(hereinafter cited as Militärarchiv), F 5094/II. 
628 Krupp to Richthofen (AA), 4 July 1903, PA-AA, Berlin, Argentinien Nr. 1, vol. 3; Restorff to 
Generalstab (General Staff), 27 August 1905, Militärarchiv, F 5094/II. 
629 AA to Krupp, 20 February 1904, PA-AA, Berlin, Argentinien Nr. 1, vol. 4. 
273 
 
the Foreign Office and advised, “this is clearly a way to increase French exports.  
Germany should do the same.” Berlin, wishing to support Krupp and continue to see a 
growth in trade, agreed with the Ambassador and, soon thereafter, an attaché was invited 
to Berlin as well.630   
As the arms trade in Brazil grew, the German Foreign Office also attempted to 
strengthen and professionalize the Brazilian army in hopes of further increasing German 
influence.  Young reformist officers in Brazil, who had a great admiration for the 
Germany army, also sought assistance from Berlin to train their army.  Initially, Brazil 
allowed Germany to establish maneuvers, remove incompetent officers, and restructure 
the classes at the military school.  As a result, by 1902, the first Brazilian officers were 
admitted to the German army, albeit with great reluctance.   
This unwillingness towards training Brazilian officers stemmed from the Kaiser 
and continued for several years, culminating in 1906 when Wilhelm II stated that, 
because of their strong connection to Britain and France, whom he viewed as Germany’s 
biggest rivals, “one cannot trust these people, they are so-called French or English.”631  
When his comments appeared in the press, Treutler, the current German diplomat in 
Brazil, tried to intercede with the Brazilian Foreign Minister, Rio Branco, who felt 
slighted by these statements.  After much trying, however, he was unable to soothe the 
Foreign Minister, and the German attempts at training Brazilian officers appeared to 
stall.  Luckily, the Foreign Office, led by Treutler, recognized the use of military 
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influence abroad, particularly when one looked at the successes in Chile and Argentina, 
and they fought to continue to train Brazilian officers.  As a result, by the beginning of 
1907, the Foreign Office was able to convince the Kaiser to no longer fight against a 
German military mission to Brazil, and to send officers there. 
On the Brazilian side, the driving force to obtain a German mission to instruct its 
troops was Rio Branco.632  As Brazil was still in negotiations with Peru concerning 
unresolved border issues that stemmed from the War of the Pacific, its Foreign Minister 
was closely watching Peru’s efforts to modernize its army with French instructors. 
Moreover, he was keenly aware of the military reform, which the Germans were leading 
in Argentina, and feared that if Brazil did not modernize its army, it would fall behind 
and could easily lose territory to its neighbors and leave itself open to attack. 
On the surface, it seemed clear that Brazil would seek to undertake a mission 
with the French.  The overall strength and history of the French army, and the success of 
the French mission to instruct the police forces in Sao Paulo, impressed the Brazilian 
politicians, in particular Hermes da Fonseca, the minister of war.633  Rio Branco, 
however, during his time as a consul and ambassador in Europe, observed the Germans 
and a rising, self-confident Reich, which was expanding into all areas, impressed him.634  
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As a result, he believed that German educators were more appropriate to infuse a 
military spirit in the Brazilian soldiers, and he worked intently towards bringing in 
German instructors.635 
Initially, Rio Branco sought to gain the support of da Fonseca for his plan.  He 
had high hopes that the minister would agree to his plan as he was continuing the 
reforms that his predecessor, Marshal Mallet, had started.636  Still, like most senior 
officers, da Fonseca was initially against using foreign instructors to train Brazilian 
soldiers.  His opinion began to change, however, after seeing the success of the French 
in Sao Paulo.  As a result, Rio Branco saw his chance, and he reached out to current 
German envoy, Franz von Reichenau, to invite the Minister of War on a trip to Germany 
to observe the German military.637 
Reichenau strongly supported this plan, and arranged an invitation from the 
German military cabinet for da Fonseca to attend the autumn parade in Berlin.  Together 
with Lieutenant Auer von Herrenkichen, who commanded the German delegation, 
Reichenau endeavored to create personal contacts with the military circles at the 
Brazilian maneuvers in 1907 in order to easily and naturally exert German influence and 
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to counter the French.638  As a result, in May 1908, da Fonseca and General Medes de 
Moraes received an invitation from Wilhelm II inviting them to the fall parade of the 
Gardekorps (Guard Corps) in Berlin, and the imperial maneuvers in Alsace.639 
The invitation had its desired effect as it lifted the German reputation in Brazil.  
Most of the newspapers reported that the invitation thrilled and flattered the nation and 
was the topic of conversation for several days in Rio.  It was seen as an extraordinary 
honor to Brazil because it was directed towards the first non-European war minister.  
Only a few newspapers, such as O Seculo, was against the invitation, arguing that France 
would perceive it as an insult.  Berlin could not be happier with the results.  In his report 
to the Foreign Office, Reichenau wrote, “the effect of the imperial invitation is so 
welcoming for us here, and the mood arising from it is so satisfactory and favorable, that 
one would have to say that more would have been less.”640 
The Autumn Parade of Guards in Potsdam, and the imperial maneuvers in 
Alsace, impressed da Fonseca, and he became very enthusiastic about the German 
military.  While he was in Germany, commercial groups, especially arms dealers, 
actively pursued meetings with the Brazilian minister of war, gatherings which 
Reichenau and the Foreign Office helped arrange.  The Krupp family hosted da Fonseca 
at Villa Hugel, and led him on a tour of their armament factories.  In Hamburg, the city 
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hosted a brilliant reception with a harbor cruise for him, and the Chamber of Commerce 
prepared a banquet.641  Needless to say, no expense was spared in trying to impress da 
Fonseca. 
For Rio Branco, and the German Foreign Office, da Fonseca’s visit fulfilled their 
purposes, as the minister of war returned a staunch supporter of German military 
institutions.  At a reception upon his return, he could not contain how impressed he was, 
as he repeated stories about his visit.  He constantly used the words “perfect”, 
“amazing”, and “wonderful” to describe the discipline of the German army and its 
people.  He even went so far as to state that, “the Germans are our friends, they devote a 
great interest to Brazil, ask about everything, show enthusiasm to us, and believe in our 
future.”642 The press also built upon the enthusiasm for Germany, In the Jornal do 
Commercia, for example, it energetically demanded a commitment for German 
instructors.643  Happy to see such press coverage, Reichenau wrote back to the Foreign 
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Office encouraging it to convince the government to send a mission to Brazil to inspire 
more good will and help bolster trade even further.644 
At this point, Rio Branco thought that the time had finally come to recruit a 
German mission to Brazil.  In making inquiries, he wrote to Reichenau, saying that 
because of the excellent impressions that the war minister received in Germany, the 
resistance of the old officers and veterans would now be broken., and that a German 
mission would be well received.645  In Germany, the opinion was also positive, with 
Wilhelm II declaring his consent and allowing any army officers, who were interested, to 
join the mission.646 
As a result, in 1908, the Brazilian government authorized a budget for the 
following year which included a German mission.  With support from the government, 
and the populace, the situation appeared promising.  The mission did not start 
auspiciously, however. In May 1909, da Fonseca resigned as the Defense Minister to run 
for president.  The clashes that followed his candidacy barely allowed any room to 
continue the negotiations which had only just started.  Making the situation only harder 
was the fact that da Fonseca’s opponent, Rui Barobosa, did not favor any missions to 
train the military.  Therefore, the pursuit of Rio Branco’s objectives depended upon 
whether the former Defense Minister won the election. 
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In the end, however, da Fonseca was able to defeat Barbosa on the ballot of 1 
March 1910.  Several weeks later, after da Fonseca took office and the new government 
was formed, Brazil agreed to the demands of the German government to support its 
mission.  As a sign of good faith, the new president planned to visit Germany in July 
during his upcoming tour of Europe.  Germany, however, on the advice of Michahelles, 
the new German ambassador, delayed in granting its approval of the mission.  He 
recommended that Berlin should personally announce its agreement to da Fonseca when 
he visited during his upcoming tour of Europe.  Doing so, he explained, would give the 
Brazilian president the feeling that the mission recruitment was due to him and the 
personal relations he made during his trip in Germany. This in turn would provide the 
German officers with his support in the future.647   
Michahelles travelled to Berlin ahead of da Fonseca’s July arrival to prepare for 
his visit.  The Brazilian president arrived in Danzig (present day Gdansk), where 
Wilhelm II met him and treated him with great kindness.  As the German ambassador 
later remarked, the Brazilian president was “delighted with what he had seen, 
particularly the naval parade, which he had viewed on the imperial yacht 
‘Hollenzollern.’ ”648  At a breakfast several days later, which the Secretary of State 
hosted and where he met with Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg, da Fonseca remarked that 
he was “very satisfied with everything he had been through.”649   
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The Kaiser, Chancellor, and other government officials and businessmen 
continued to meet with da Fonseca while he was in Germany.  At the invitation of 
Wilhelm II, he visited the autumn palace of the Guard Corps and, that evening, 
participated in a parade at the Royal Castle.  Michahelles also attended the event, at the 
behest of the Kaiser.  While there, Wilhelm pulled him aside, and they spoke at length 
about the situation in Brazil. During their conversation, the Kaiser expressed that “the 
Marshal [da Fonseca] had pleased him very much,” and because of this, he ordered the 
ambassador to “develop good personal relations with him.”650 
Although da Fonseca’s trip to Europe was hardly finished, Wilhelm II, = and the 
German government, were thoroughly pleased with the president’s visit.  As a result, 
Berlin approved of a mission to Brazil and prepared to send a German contingent of a 
major, and nineteen captains, who were assigned mainly to the military districts of Rio 
de Janeiro and Rio Grande do Sul.651  When the news appeared that a German military 
mission was being sent to Brazil, however, the French press released a storm of 
indignation, which “greatly annoyed [da Fonseca] and only made him appreciate the 
friendly reception he had found in Germany.”652  This was good news to Michahelles, 
and the Foreign Office, since he was leaving for France to attend maneuvers in “open 
displeasure over the agitation of the French press,” which only would continue to 
convince da Fonseca to support a German mission.653   
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The situation appeared favorable for Germany, especially with the support of the 
Brazilian President and Foreign Minister.  Nonetheless, there was still much opposition 
in Brazil towards a German military mission.  Several high-ranking officers in the 
Brazilian army, including a few generals, opposed the mission believing that the 
agreement was an insult and a sign of their own incompetence, which would lead to a 
moral resignation within the ranks.654 There was also resistance from those in the army 
and government who still supported the French. In 1909, the Brazilian Defense Minister, 
General Carlos Eugenio de Andrade Guimaràes, issued a report concerning the German 
mission.  Within it, it was mentioned that Brazil had a strong linguistic and cultural 
connection to France. This, many senior officers concluded, indicted that Brazilian 
soldiers would more easily adapt to French way of training than the German.655  
France itself was also highly critical of the German mission, and envisioned the 
German instructors suffering many difficulties.  Paul Walle, who travelled to Brazil in 
1910 as a special envoy for the French government, remarked that German officers 
training Brazilian soldiers would only bring problems, particularly due to the differences 
in national character between the two. As Walle noted, the German training methods - 
brutality, lack of empathy, and conceit - would create a very bad situation for its officers 
as the Brazilians, while good-natured, were excessively proud. As such, one needed to 
be kind and use persuasion for them to follow orders.656 
                                                                
654 Der Urwaldsbote, 30 August, 1911. 
655 Brunn, Deutschland und Brasilien, p. 320. 
656 Ibid., p. 321. 
282 
 
Germany, however, could not fully capitalize upon the troubles which plagued 
France and were unable to overcome the opposition in Brazil.  Pressure from Paris 
continued to impact the Brazilian attitude.  Due to fear that Brazil could lose necessary 
loans from France, the government never issued a clear statement as to which side it 
favored.  Instead, it sought only to keep both the German and French supporters happy 
through flattery and conciliation.657  As Walle remarked, the forces in the government 
were equally distributed and no side seemed poised to exert its will. 
Regardless, Rio Branco worked tirelessly to convince the Brazilian government 
to support a German military mission.658  The constant fluctuation of support from the 
president did not help matters, and, over time, thoroughly disappointed the Germans.  
Even with all these difficulties, it still appeared as though Germany would still send a 
mission.  In 1911, against fierce opposition, particularly from Deputy Barboza Lima, a 
state budget, which gave the authorization to recruit the mission, was passed in 
Congress.  The Senate, however, fought a very contentious battle over it.659  In the end, 
the Senate passed the budget, but it was to little avail.  The president was too weak to 
stand up to the opponents of the plan, and Rio Branco, who would have been able to 
enforce it, died soon after the budget was passed.660 
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Before the outbreak of World War I, due to the supremacy of German arms and 
military equipment industry, South American parades appeared to be little more than an 
arms exhibition for the Reich.  While the nations in South America, particularly Chile, 
Brazil, and Bolivia, might only have been a small part of German industry, the sums 
they totaled were significant at the time, and took a prominent place in the overall trade 
between Germany and Latin America.  Between 1910 and 1913, Krupp alone supplied 
the South American nations with guns valued at 115.4 million marks.  By 1912, 
deliveries to Chile reached a value of sixty million marks; in Brazil, by 1913, carbines 
and pistols were the second most imported German goods. In Bolivia, from 1910 to 
1912, Berlin was able to increase its exports from 17.4 percent to 30 percent of the total 
Bolivian imports.  Thus, Germany was at the forefront of countries exporting there, even 
in front of Britain, the United States, and France.661  With the help of the German 
military to conquer, or at least gain a larger share, of the Bolivian market, Berlin was 
able to move into second place in trade with Bolivia, right behind London. 
In turning the South American militaries into a German copy, they became a 
fertile ground for the sale of German weapons and arms.  They wore German helmets, 
tunics, knapsacks and billhooks, carried Mauser rifles and pistols, and manned Krupp 
mountain and field guns and howitzers.  By 1914, in Chile, for example, one in every 
four Chilean officers had been trained in Germany. Due to these efforts, German 
businessmen had a significant advantage when it came to winning contracts to sell arms: 
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“the younger generation of Chilean officers trained in the German system” and had 
become the Reich’s apostles.  As Ambassador Bodman, stated to Bülow in 1908, 
“German military training had changed the national character.”662   
Due to the military missions, and the efforts of the ambassadors acting on behalf 
of the Reich, the German arms industry, particularly Krupp, remained nearly 
unchallenged in places such as Brazil, Bolivia and Chile.  The power of the German 
commercial-diplomatic-military nexus reaped many benefits for Germany in its efforts 
of globalization. In an era where extending one’s power across the globe was paramount, 
Germany’s ability to embrace a new policy of development allowed it to extend its 
global outreach. 
  
                                                                





CONCLUSION – GERMAN LEGACY IN SOUTH AMERICA 
 
On the eve of World War I, German influence in South America was starting to 
bear fruit, particular in Chile, Brazil, and Peru. German businesses, such as the Krupp 
Works and the Deutsche Bank, were turning profits, albeit in many cases it was only 
slight, and German communities in these countries were finally taking root and growing. 
Even during World War I, German influence was clear. The German government, 
through its diplomats, leveraged its control to obtain safe harbors for its ships to refuel 
and repair, to provide necessary resources, especially nitrates, saltpeter and wheat, to 
assist with keeping the German armed forces well-equipped and running.  For German 
businessmen, settlers and emigrants, members in the Foreign Office, and diplomats in 
South America, they believed that they could find success throughout South America 
and expended as much energy as they could in establishing, and fostering, projects that 
would entail it.  
With the advent of World War I, and Germany’s ultimate defeat, however, the 
situation changed, making it hard to evaluate how successful it was in developing itself, 
and the countries in South America, as Germany increasingly sought to demonstrate 
itself as a global power. Nonetheless, theses early efforts at globalization and 
developmentalism laid the groundwork for power projection during the latter half of the 
twentieth century. Although Germany did not finish, or truly succeed, in exerting its 
286 
 
control in South America, its policies and plans of development and early globalization 
that the German diplomats enacted, and the Foreign Office supported, had far reaching 
effects on the way forward for how Germany looked to re-integrate itself into the global 
community post-1945. These ideas and policies also have been the basis for today’s 
Germany as it becomes one of the major leaders on the global stage, and in Latin 
America. As a recent report from the Foreign Office stated regarding Latin America, 
particularly regarding economic opportunities, “Our bilateral economic relations with 
Latin America have a long tradition: German companies have had subsidiaries in the 
region for more than 100 years and enjoy a high standing, while German immigrants 
have contributed to economic development in the region.”663 Moreover, today’s German 
government argues that its development policy and its role as a leader in globalization, is 
just as important, if not more so, than its other governmental policies 
German interactions in South America at the end of the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries were an example of a new form of imperial rule, one that operate 
outside of the framework of the classical model built on territorial control, and marked 
by distinct boundaries.664 Between 1880 and the First World War, Germany’s colonial 
links and its wider global interlinkages increased. A number of different groups, first and 
foremost the vociferous proponents of Weltpolitik such as Bulow, Tirpitz, the Foreign 
Office, and the representatives of the numerous nationalistic groups, supported these 
connections. Broad swathes of the educated bourgeois were the most important 
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propagators of a global consciousness around 1900, and they too supported it. 
Weltpolitik was also a private capitalist program for global market acquisition, and for 
that reason, entrepreneurs, industrialists, and businessmen advocated for it.665 Although 
agricultural groups were more reticent, their business decisions were influenced greatly 
by the development of a world market, and poor workers had a high share in the 
migratory movement during this period. 
In economic terms, by 1914, Germany was highly involved in the process of 
globalization – in many areas, only Britain exceeded it in its involvement.666 The use of 
the term “world economy” and the establishment of the Kiel Institute for the World 
Economy in 1911 are indications that contemporaries were very aware of this. By 1914, 
foreign trade made up 34 percent of national income (approximately three percent came 
from Latin America). This was a level that Germany only attained again in the 1960s. In 
the years leading up to 1914, the German Empire, led by the efforts of the Foreign 
Office and its diplomats, particularly in South America, became “the most dynamic, and 
soon, in many markets, the most important exporting power.”667 This affected the 
foreign-trade balance and also helped to determine which areas of manufacturing grew 
most strongly.668 The electrical, metal, and nitrate industries produced large amounts for 
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exports – nearly 35 percent of the nitrate industry’s production was focused on 
exports.669 As a result of Germany’s transition to an industrial economy, imports of raw 
materials became more and more important. Wool was imported from Australia and 
South Africa, wheat from the USA, Russia, and Chile, and saltpeter and fertilizer from 
Chile, Bolivia, and Peru. 
Almost three-quarters of German exports went to Europe, mostly to Britain, and 
while Argentina, Brazil, and Chile never reached this level as trading partners with 
Germany, they still became increasingly important. Investment projects, such as the 
Baghdad and Arica-La Paz railways, were also designed to gain international prestige.670 
While there was not as much capital investment in areas like South America as there was 
with Britain, the fact remains that Germany made a conscious effort to bring these zones 
into their international economic interlinkage. 
Foreign policy during the Wilhelmine period was also affected by the broadening 
of developmental and globalization policies. Many political decision makers, especially 
in the Foreign Office, regarded it as an established fact that the system of European 
equilibrium had been superseded by one of world equilibrium.671 The British example, 
or rather the concern about the political and economic dominance of London, played a 
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role.672 German interest in globalization, and becoming a world power, was to a large 
extent an attempt to break British  hegemony and make Germany a world empire that 
would, according to widely held hopes, pay its part in determining world events.673 
Territorial expansion was on the agenda, and Berlin looked for any opportunities to gain 
land and, just as importantly, influence, across the globe. Important foreign policy issues 
now often involved locations outside of Europe – Venezuela, the Chinese Boxer 
Rebellion, the War of the Pacific, Samoa.  
All of these conflicts had local causes and are evidence of the expansion of 
German politics around the turn of the century. Th fact that the most German diplomats 
supported the Foreign Office’s efforts to foster policies of development and 
globalization only increased Berlin’s efforts to become a world power. Still, these events 
also need to be situated within European power politics, which remained the 
Kaiserreich’s primary concern. This is particularly true of Germany’s colonial policy, 
which was both directed at Britain and France and, at the same time, was part of a 
collective European project despite the national rivalries involved. 
Large sections of Germans experienced globalization through migration, both 
domestically and internationally. Domestic migration, mainly from rural areas to the 
developing industrial centers, was one of the most significant social phenomena of the 
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nineteenth century and was a major contributor to transforming society. This internal 
migration was linked to an increase in mobility that did not stop at national borders. As a 
result, collective German memory associated the Wilhelmine era with mainly the third, 
and largest, wave of emigration. Between 1880 and 1893, almost two million Germans 
emigrated, primarily to the Americas. One of the objectives behind acquiring overseas 
colonies was to redirect this “loss of national energies” to the prospective territories of 
“New Germany.” In the case of South America especially, the German Foreign Office, 
and pan-Germanist groups, hoped to capitalize on this large-scale emigration. They 
sought, through the diplomats abroad, to foster the settlers’ ties, particularly their 
feelings of cultural identity (Deutschtum). to the German nation as a means to increase 
its presence and influence in Brazil, Chile, Bolivia, and Argentina, among others. 
Moreover, in this context, the Foreign Office, and its diplomats, sought to use the 
Malthusian ideas of overpopulation and worry about German Lebensraum (“living 
space”) to garner support for German settlers and their communities outside of Germany. 
The general impression of expansion also had its effects culturally and 
ideologically, both on the German populace and on the people in other nations. At home, 
references to the “world” became almost universal: Weltpolitik, world economy, world 
powers, world empires. Woodruff Smith has described the competing, but also 
complementary, concepts of Weltpolitik and Lebensraum as ideological components of 
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German modernism that developed under the conditions of globalization around 1900, 
and whose effects were felt into the 1930s and beyond.674  
Outside of Germany, the Kaisserreich was not only an exporter of industrial 
goods, it was also global in terms of its cultural and social effects abroad. In many 
countries, including in South America, Germans took over institutions, translated them 
and appropriated them. Schools especially were the starting-point for a process of 
intellectual transfer that brought the German model across the globe. The ideas covered 
both organization and institutional structure, as well as the development of disciplines 
and areas of studies, along with providing an education to the populace, which included 
the local populace, mainly members of modernizing elites, and German settlers. Not 
only was the system of German education exported, but also areas of studies such as 
medicine, language, sociology, and history.675 German influence was not just limited to 
education and teaching. After Prussia defeated France in the Franco-Prussian War, 
Prussian military advisors were in demand around the world, and particularly in Asia 
and South America. Jacob Merkel prepared the Japanese army for its victory over China 
in 1895, and Emil Korner assisted Chile in defending its borders following the War of 
the Pacific.  
Just as important, for latecomers, and newly emerging nations, such as those in 
South America and Asia, Germany was seen as a model for modernization. Nation-states 
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viewed Germany as a means for development that would bring them into the present, 
while also holding onto their traditions. It was this role as a modernizer which the 
German Foreign Office, and its diplomats, seized upon as it fostered a policy of 
development to help increase its influence across the globe. 
Perhaps more than anything, it was German efforts of development and 
modernization which were most in demand in South America, and which underscored its 
efforts of globalization prior to the outbreak of World War I. Just as important is the fact 
that the German diplomats and their actions, especially in South America, were 
necessary for fulfilling the desires of the Foreign Office. It is difficult to deny the 
undercurrents of “informal imperialism” present in the policy-making of the Foreign 
Office and the actions of its diplomats in South America.  
“Nation building” and developmentalism were a large part of German 
globalization, and colonization, efforts, and these ideas went hand in hand with extensive 
territorial rue in the classical imperial version that flourished during the nineteenth 
century. Instead of control over, and development of, a large dependent territory, 
authorities in South America limited their efforts to building a base there from which a 
larger informal presence was erected and maintained. This form of imperialism was less 
expansionist and territorial than intensive and concentrated. In his work on Japanese-
controlled Manchukuo, Prasenjiit Duara, describes this phenomenon as “new 
imperialism.”676 Imperialism has thus moved in a different direction, weakening the link 
                                                                
676 Duara, “Imperialism of ‘Free Nations,’ p. 212. 
293 
 
between empire and nation building. While this shift has been most clearly evident since 
the Cold War, it originated earlier. Twentieth century empires still invoke a rationale of 
benevolent transformation, but the nature of the rationale has changed. As a result, the 
imperial vision of the new imperialism was different from earlier visions and was much 
more global in its outlook. 
The efforts of the German diplomats in South America also reveals the 
possibilities of an evolving policy, and space, that was both imperial and non-imperial. 
Throughout South America, German societies, and influence, continued to emerge and 
change – through migration, exile, and trade, it became a complex and highly diffuse 
zone of contact. Within these contact zones, imperial agency, particularly on the part of 
the German diplomats, was produced, attracted, contended with, and negotiated among 
the various German settlers, diplomats, businessmen, nationalistic groups, and the 
German Foreign Office, as well as the Chilean, Brazilian, Bolivian and Peruvian 
governments, social groups, and networks. Chile, Brazil, Bolivia, Peru, and Argentina, 
among others, became places for projecting German power in Latin America, as well as 
a areas where experiments in commerce and communication emerged. These 
developments challenged Germany to move beyond the formal imperialism of the 
previous century as it competed to control global resources and become a Weltpolitik. 
These early efforts of development and globalization also impacted German 
policy post-1945, and, more broadly, influenced development throughout the globe. In 
this new era, Germany, decimated by two World Wars and the effects of Nazism, found 
itself on the sidelines on the global stage. While it desired to be more global, its path to 
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such status was murky. Imperialism and colonialism were no long a path to global power 
status, and so Germany needed to seek a new way to re-assert itself into the global 
community. During this period, the leading nations of the world, in particular the United 
States, viewed policies of development as a method to rebuild the world. For Germany, 
which experienced these methods first-hand, its attempts at globalization in the 
nineteenth century, and its development policies, provided a template for how it could 
achieve re-integration into the world and, ultimately, become a leading player in global 
affairs. As a result of these efforts, Germany has, once again, became a leader both in 
European, and world, politics.  
This is not to suggest that such a path was easy. Much like in the pre-World War 
I era, central structures and conflicts emerged in social, political, economic, and cultural 
relations that have and continue to affect Germany. For this reason alone, the effects and 
repercussions of global and colonial interactions during the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries are of particular importance to study and examine.677 Moreover, by 
understanding the consequences – both positive and negative – of past development 
efforts, such studies can contribute to current policy debates about foreign aid and bring 
attention to the potential ramifications of those actions.  
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